

JPRS-NEA-87-049

30 APRIL 1987

Near East/South Asia Report

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

30 APRIL 1987

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

CONTENTS

ARAB AFRICA

MOROCCO

EEC Farm Production Relations Described (LE MESSAGE DE LA NATION, 11 Feb 87)	1
EEC Negotiations Outlook, by Bahia Amrani	1
Minister on EEC Relations, Mohamed Seqat Interview	3
Recommendations of Second Mediterranean Meeting	12

SUDAN

Three Prominent Leaders Interviewed on Civil War (Peter Cirillo, et al. Interview; AL-DUSTUR, 23 Feb 87) .	15
Ba'th Party Suggestions Reported (AL-DUSTUR, 16 Feb 87)	23
International Funding Aids in Railroad Improvement (AL-DUSTUR, 16 Mar 87)	27

ARAB EAST/ISRAEL

IRAQ

Relations Between Kurds, Communists Discussed (AL-DUSTUR, 16 Mar 87)	30
Labor Union Leader Interviewed on New Labor Legislation (Ahmad Muhsin 'Alwan Interview; AL-DUSTUR, 23 Mar 87) ...	32

JORDAN

Briefs

Negotiations for French Planes	34
--------------------------------	----

SOUTH ASIA

AFGHANISTAN

Author Explores Soviet Strategies, Legitimizing Resistance (Olivier Roy; POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, No 34, Winter 86-87)	35
Afghan Rebels Insist on 'Puppet' Regime's Removal (Mohammad Eshaq, Sayd Baha'uddin Majrun Interview; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 5 Apr 87)	42
Project To Augment Water Supply (KABUL NEW TIMES, 24 Feb 87)	45
Briefs	
70 Soviet Soldiers Reportedly Killed	46

INDIA

Fishing War With Pakistan Reported Building (PATRIOT, 14 Mar 87)	47
Space Research Head Discusses Soviet Offer (THE TIMES OF INDIA, 15 Mar 87)	48
Official Tells Indian Success at Moscow Fair (PATRIOT, 8 Mar 87)	49
Details on 9 Mar Speech by PRC Trade Delegation Leader (THE STATESMAN, 10 Mar 87)	50
Businessmen Discuss Recent Indo-EEC Talks (THE STATESMAN, 18 Mar 87)	52
Papers Report on Visit of French Foreign Minister (Various sources, 6 Mar 87)	53
Differences, Agreement Discussed, by G. K. Reddy 5 Mar Talks, Banquet	54
Trade Protocol Signed With Bulgaria (PATRIOT, 7 Mar 87)	56
Paper Reports on Visit of Romanian President (PATRIOT, 11 Mar 87)	57

Defense Budget for 1987-88 Criticized in Detail (B. G. Verghese; INDIAN EXPRESS, 9 Mar 87)	59
Gandhi, Mahanta Discuss Assam, Differences Persist (THE HINDU, 5 Mar 87)	63
Central Vigilance Commissioner Makes Annual Report (PATRIOT, 5 Mar 87)	64
Congress-I Revokes Suspension of Former Minister (THE TIMES OF INDIA, 6 Mar 87)	66
Majority Favor Popular Election of Prime Minister (N. Bhaskara Rao, S. Venkat Narayan; THE TIMES OF INDIA, 8 Mar 87)	67
Emigration Rules Simplified To Protect Workers Abroad (THE TELEGRAPH, 8 Mar 87)	69
Tata Experts Improve Superconductivity Temperature (THE HINDU, 9 Mar 87)	70
Writer Sees Hidden Devaluation of Rupee (K. K. Sharma; THE TELEGRAPH, 11 Mar 87)	71

IRAN

Possibility of U.S. Intervention 'Virtually Nil' (Tehran Domestic Service, 9 Apr 87)	73
Tehran Rejects 'Great Satan's' Overtures (Tehran Domestic Service, 9 Apr 87)	74
Superpowers Confining Islamic Revolution (IRNA, 10 Apr 87)	76
Commentary Scores French Support for Iraq (Tehran Domestic Service, 8 Apr 87)	77
KEYHAN Views Economic Resources of Southern Iraq (KEYHAN, 29 Mar 87)	79
SAIRI Chairman on Need To 'Liberate' Iraqi Nation (Tehran Domestic Service, 10 Apr 87)	81
Iraqi Mojahedin, Refugees March in Tehran (IRNA, 10 Apr 87)	82
Velayati Returns From Disarmament Conference (Tehran Domestic Service, 11 Apr 87)	83
Tudeh Organ Calls on Armed Forces To Rise Against Regime (NAMEH-YE MARDOM, 3 Mar 87)	84

Tudeh Delegates Attend Second National Front Congress (NAMEH-YE MARDOM, 3 Mar 87)	88
Gulf War Criticized as 'Useless, Endless, Aimless' Bloodshed (NAMEH-YE MARDOM, 10 Mar 87)	90
Shah's Son, Former Premiers Send Nowruz Messages (Mesbahzadeh; KEYHAN, 19 Mar 87)	92
Reza's Message	92
Amini's Message	94
Bakhtiar's Message	94
Gendarmerie Chief Discusses Projects Against Smugglers (Mohammad Sohrabi Interview; ETTELA'AT, 16 Feb 87)	97
Clandestine Radio Reveals Secret Bank Accounts (Voice of the Kavyani Banner, 8 Apr 87)	99
Briefs	
Gunning Down of Protestors	100
Iranians Set Up Suicide Squadron	100
Iran, China Discuss Agriculture Ties	100
Iranian Kurdish Leader Killed	101
PAKISTAN	
People's Party, Jamaat-e Islami Cooperation Said Inevitable (Faruq Puacha; JANG, 4 Mar 87)	102
Briefs	
Netherlands Grant	105
SRI LANKA	
Government Faces Worst Economic Crisis Since 1977 (SUN, 25 Feb 87)	106

/9986

EEC FARM PRODUCTION RELATIONS DESCRIBED

EEC Negotiations Outlook

Casablanca LE MESSAGE DE LA NATION in French 11 Feb 87 p 11

[Article by Bahia Amrani: "Morocco--EEC: Singular and Plural"]

[Text] The Second Mediterranean Meeting for the Development of Agriculture was held between 2 and 5 February at Mohammedia under the theme of "Coordination-Cooperation and Complementarity for Mediterranean Agricultural Development."

This important event was held under the chairmanship of Mr Mohamed Segat, secretary of state for relations with the EEC, and was attended by Commerce and Industry Minister Tahar Masmoudi, Agriculture and Agrarian Reform Minister Othmane Demnati, Minister Delegate attached to the Prime Minister in charge of Economic Affairs Moulay Zine Zahidi, European Commissioner in charge of Mediterranean Policy and North-South Relations Claude Cheysson, and the president of CERDAM (Mediterranean Agriculture Development Research and Project Implementation Center) Denis Verdier.

A dozen countries along the Mediterranean Basin attended it, as did all of the ambassadors of the EEC countries, representatives of Moroccan professional associations, growers, researchers, domestic and foreign university professors, and, along with the domestic press, a large number of representatives from the foreign media.

But the importance of the Second Mediterranean Meeting does not reside in the efforts that were made to make this gathering successful--efforts which, we must admit, were enormous--nor in the recommendations with which the three study groups that were established closed the transactions. These recommendations will assume true importance once their practical application has been started.

The importance does not reside so much in the conditions and ways in which the meeting itself was carried out but rather in the occasion which that meeting represented for all parties concerned--each according to his own resources--in terms of addressing themselves to the Morocco--EEC case.

This case is of the utmost importance to Morocco, since the future of our exports and our trade are heavily committed to that.

This is also a preoccupying situation because the unequal fight in which we find ourselves as a "singular" partner at the end of the line, with Morocco, in other words, at one end, and with a "plural" protagonist, the Twelve of the EEC, at the other end.

Morocco can pull the rope as much as it wants but the forces will always be unbalanced.

This is true especially since the Ten became the Twelve and since it is necessary to revise the 1976 accord, the last that was concluded between Morocco and the EEC before Spain and Portugal were admitted to the EEC.

Everybody knows the difficulties with which the EEC is struggling; the EEC certainly recorded a minor success in 1986 with the decline of meat and beef production but, during this year of 1987, it had to grapple with a frightening number of long-range problems. They included the commercial differences with Japan and the United States and those with Spain which already showed a deficit in the balance of trade, not counting all of the problems of economic and social cohesion of the members of the Community since their expansion, the institutional reform of the EEC, the reform of the PAC (Common Agricultural Policy), the financing of the Community, etc.

On the other hand, one can easily understand that Morocco wants to defend its interests which have been hard hit by the expansion of the Community.

And although Moroccan public opinion, which is very sensitive to these issues, knows in general terms that negotiations between Morocco and the EEC did not lead anywhere, such a meeting and the participation of Mr Claude Cheysson, in particular, awakened the hopes for new elements that might make it possible for this case to achieve positive progress.

We thus listened very carefully to the proposals presented by Mr Cheysson.

Alas, he gave us no cause for enthusiasm. Having recognized the legitimacy of Morocco's concerns, having admitted that "Western Europe has more affinities with Morocco than with any other Southern Mediterranean country" and that "Morocco is entitled to the kind of treatment that takes into account its factors as well as the stabilizing role which it plays at the Maghrebien Arab and African levels," Mr Cheysson stated and regretted a certain number of things.

Mr Cheysson found that, while there were indeed some stray pressures on Europe, Morocco did not have the means for that, contrary to the United States who managed to force its cereal crops on the Spanish market by holding French cognac and Italian macaroni "hostage," so to speak.

Talking in short-range and medium-range terms, Mr Cheysson recalled that the EEC rules, juridically speaking, did not provide for the admission of a country such as Morocco.

Then the European commissioner regretted the delay in negotiations between Morocco and the Community. He regretted the absence of a common Maghrebian front visavis the EEC and doubted "that there was any very shiny prospect for the future."

We also seized this opportunity to present our review of the Morocco-EEC case. To provide the answers to the many questions arising from that case, LE MESSAGE DE LA NATION went to one of the persons best equipped to answer them, that is, Mr Mohamed Segat, secretary of state for foreign affairs and cooperation, in charge of relations with the EEC.

Minister on EEC Relations

Casablanca LE MESSAGE DE LA NATION in French 11 Feb 87 pp 12-16

[Interview with Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation in Charge of Relations with EEC Mohamed Segat by Bahia Amrani: "There Were Never Any Real Negotiations"]

[Text] LE MESSAGE DE LA NATION: To begin with current affairs, Mr Secretary of State, could you tell us what your impressions are on the Second Mediterranean Meeting which just ended and which was held under your chairmanship. Were there any concrete or perhaps even positive results?

Mr Segat: First of all, this meeting was not organized by Morocco. Morocco was only the host. It was to some degree held within the context of the Moroccan professional associations which had to attend this meeting. We thus tried to get the maximum benefit out of this meeting which was attended by European professionals, growers, exporters, producers, and even importers and we tried to move a certain number of viewpoints closer together. Above all we attempted to sensitize European professional public opinion to Moroccan problems. I believe that we were successful on that score and this already is a first result for Morocco. Now, as regards Mediterranean agriculture, you saw the recommendations, essentially those of Group 2. But even at the level of the two other groups, the recommendations were important. The most important ones however, in my opinion, are those of Group 2 which advised the establishment of specialized organizations for citrus fruits and fresh vegetables. The most important here is represented by fresh vegetables because for citrus fruit we already have the CLAM [Mediterranean Citrus Fruit Liaison Committee]. But there was nothing in the matter of fresh vegetables. Hence, an organization parallel to the CLAM should strengthen the action of the growers. They are going to meet in Spain rather quickly in an effort to pursue an action similar to the one carried out by the people of the CLAM at the level of production coordination to avoid competition--not unfair competition--but rather absurd competition in certain cases because it is not in the interest of individuals, neither of the grower, nor of the European consumer. The third important result is that the CERDAM which initiated these meetings, that is to say, the first and second, made everybody feel the need for transforming that body. In the short speech I made at the end of the transactions of this meeting, I clearly demanded that the CERDAM be transformed to become a kind of Mediterranean international organization, specializing in Mediterranean

agriculture, and that it no longer remain a French body which takes the initiative in arranging international meetings. By becoming a regional international organization, it could have a much greater impact and the growers and professional organizations would feel much more committed, both regarding the initiatives and the resolutions that would be adopted by the meeting.

[Question] Is that what you are proposing?

[Answer] The fact is that Mr Verdier, the chairman of the CERDAM, was thinking of something not similar but did say that the CERDAM should evolve since it is now charged with taking followup measures, etc. Personally, I think that it should go a little further and even become a kind of international organization specializing in these issues, in other words, it should become more effective.

[Question] At the opening of this meeting, you delivered a speech in which the following short phrase stands out: "One cannot hope to improve the degree of food self-sufficiency if the development base of crops does not include the export dimension." This brings us to another question: What is the link between self-sufficiency and exports?

[Answer] First of all, we are forced to remain on the export market, to improve our products, to employ new techniques, to adjust to the tastes of the European consumer, in other words, somehow to improve our profitability and our value added, if I may express myself thus regarding agricultural products, in other words, exported products, hence this need for employing modern techniques both in the matter of management and in production or sales. Now, food self-sufficiency does not mean agriculture that produces foodstuffs; it is impossible for food self-sufficiency to be achieved through archaic methods. It must thus be able to keep up with technological development, the use of fertilizer, the employment of modern production processes, the use of sales and storage instruments, etc. This means that there must be a link, there must be reciprocal effects between export agriculture and the production of food for the purpose of achieving self-sufficiency. If we were to abandon exports, I dare say, we would not have this incentive to improve our product and hence to be more competitive. This is the fundamental link between the two.

[Question] Mr Secretary of State, would you be kind enough to elaborate on the Morocco-EEC issues. On the occasion of the meeting, we were able to get some further clarification from Mr Claude Cheysson on that subject but we would like to ask you this question now: At what point are the negotiations with the EEC as regards the adaptation accord? If the EEC addresses to Morocco what we called an ultimatum in the press, what was Morocco's response to the EEC?

[Answer] First of all, there was no ultimatum. It is the European procedures of the Community which are such that when a mandate of negotiation is given by the Council of Ministers to the Commission, negotiations are practically terminated from the European viewpoint. Now, this cannot be the case from the Moroccan viewpoint. So, if you will, I will explain to you the European viewpoint and the Moroccan viewpoint.

From the European viewpoint, the Commission, which is in charge of negotiations, submitted several proposals to the Council of Ministers. To arrive at these proposals, there was some back-and-forth motion between the Council and the Commission and there were improvements between the first position and the last position, at least regarding some of those proposals. But there were setbacks on others and these were qualitative setbacks. For example, in one of the Commission's proposals there was an automatic provision for the modulation of import prices starting in 1990, something which we do not find in the mandate for negotiations since this modulation becomes possible. According to the Commission, the different proposals that were submitted to the Council took into account the demands of Morocco through the White Book, the memorandum which was sent to the EEC in February 1986. Hence, the mandate for negotiations, which the Council gave to the Commission is a response to that memorandum. This is a Community offer which takes into account the Moroccan demands and Moroccan interests. From the viewpoint of the Commission, and the Council, in other words, from the viewpoint of European bodies, this is the last offer which they can make to the extent that they took all Moroccan demands into account. They are not satisfied in their entirety but only partly; however, this is the last offer they can make. They cannot go beyond that, considering the cases they have to take care of, in other words, they cannot at the same time negotiate with all of the Mediterranean third countries; there is a balance to be maintained and then one must take into account the fact that this is the formula which, I would say, was met with the approval of everybody, the agreement of everybody.

So, this is the European viewpoint, a viewpoint which is entirely logical, within the context of European logic.

From the Moroccan viewpoint, we would say this to them: We expressed our demands to you; we expressed our viewpoint to you in a memorandum; you perhaps took that into account in your internal, inter-community negotiations, among yourselves, but we never negotiated about that and we, the Moroccans, never had a chance to defend our case and to express our viewpoint before the Council or even before the Commission. Of course, there were meetings; there were declarations on either side; but there were never any real negotiations in which you offered us something, in which we rejected it, and in which we tell you why we rejected it and why we demanded more and why we are right. Now, Morocco is a major country. It can defend itself all by itself. It does not need to defend itself through interposed commissions.

As for telling the press that this was an ultimatum, in reality, it is not an ultimatum; it is the last offer which the Community could make to Morocco, considering its own demands. But we think that this last offer is a basis for negotiations which must be improved, especially as regards a certain number of points.

[Question] Do you think that Morocco will have the means for defending itself? What is the future of these negotiations?

[Answer] The future of these negotiations? Morocco will not remain inactive. We quite correctly tried to sensitize the various countries that

are members of the Council of the Ministers of the Twelve. We tried to sensitize them, on a bilateral plane, to the Moroccan case in order to explain to them why we believe that Morocco is a specific case which cannot be treated like the other Mediterranean countries. If the mandate for negotiations is a global mandate for all the Mediterranean third countries, then we feel that Morocco is a country which is specific because of different reasons and we explained what these reasons are. It is not out of chauvinism that we feel that Morocco is a specific case; absolutely not. We feel that Morocco is a specific case for different political, economic, and commercial reasons and because of our exports. No country exports the vast range of products which we export to Europe. No country has such old and even ancient trade relations with Europe as does Morocco. No country has made the decision in favor of democracy, no country has chosen a society that is closer to Europe than has Morocco. No country has adopted fundamental options in its foreign policy geared toward Europe as did Morocco, of course without denying its origins, which goes without saying. And since there are also problems involving fishing, no other country has the kind of offer to make to the Community which Morocco can make. This turns Morocco into a specific case which perhaps would require special treatment, different from that of other countries.

[Question] Let us now speak specifically of fishing. Observers consider the fishing agenda as Morocco's major ace in the hole. The fishing agreements with Spain are due to expire this year and after that there will have to be automatic provisions in favor of the other Eleven since Spain is henceforth a part of the Europe of the Twelve. Do you think that this ace in the hole will be decisive in negotiations and is that what you're going to use?

[Answer] By force of circumstance. Even if our desire were not to generalize these negotiations because, first of all, the fishing problem is a specific problem. We do in effect have an accord with Spain which runs out in July and which must be renewed with the Community since the Community takes charge of all foreign agreements entered into with the third countries. When we renew it, obviously, Spain will be a great beneficiary of that because it is the Spanish fishing fleet which is the biggest in Europe and which certainly will do the most fishing in our territorial waters. So, the fishing problem basically will have to take its normal course, independently of the adaptation agreement. We could have concluded the adaptation accord a long time ago and we could have negotiated a fishing agreement in all serenity. Now, it so happens that the adaptation agreement does not yet provide for any possible compromise, something would bring the two viewpoints together. By force of circumstance, the two negotiations are going to be conducted parallel and, by force of circumstance, they will influence each other. Evidently, if we do not gain anything or, at least, if our demands are not met only in a partial fashion, while at the same time ensuring the future and guaranteeing our agricultural products, in other words, securing for them the traditional European markets, if we do not have these guarantees, then the fishing issue will be automatically influenced. In the light of Moroccan public opinion alone, we could not even think of concluding an agreement on an issue where the community is the demanding party and leave hanging in the air an issue in which Morocco is the demanding party. There has to be a balance. And this, I think, is something

which our European friends understand. This is why many voices are being heard in Europe, saying that Morocco has a basic card to play, in other words, the fishing card. But as for us, our concern is to make sure that we can negotiate the two agreements very calmly and that we will not be forced to resort to haggling through procedures which we condemn and which the media condemned in the case of the United States.

We do not want to use blackmail; that is not part of our methods.

[Question] And the negotiations concerning the financial protocols, are they tied to the adaptation accord?

[Answer] No. Here, again, I must be very specific: The third generation of financial protocols strictly does not have anything to do with the adaptation accord since we are basically here in the third generation. The financial protocol should have been negotiated in November or even a little before the old one expired and it ran out on 31 October. This is an act, I would say, a current matter in the context of our relations through the Convention and through the cooperation accord which we have with the Community, that is, the accord of 1976. The protocol is something that comes every 5 years. Consequently, since the second one expired, there has to be a third one. The link established by Mr Claude Cheysson in his press conference between the admission of new members who must contribute financially and the negotiations, to the effect that the financial protocol must thus await the conclusion of the adaptation accord...All of this has strictly nothing to do with...because the adaptation accord deals with the commercial aspect, with exports, and has absolutely nothing to do with the financial character. On the other hand, there is even a contradiction in what Mr Cheysson said because he spoke of transit and the financial accord. As for transit, he thinks that Spain, being a member of the Community, is linked...it must by virtue of this fact allow Morocco transit since Morocco has a cooperation agreement with the Community. As for the financial protocol, there is a different line of reasoning. That is not logical! Now, if Spain must let us pass through, it must also contribute because, by joining the Community and the Europe of the Twelve, Spain committed itself to adhere to all of the accords which the Community signed earlier. There cannot be any discussion on that. The financial protocol basically must see the light of day in a manner entirely independent of the adaptation accord.

[Question] And what if this is not the European viewpoint?

[Answer] This perhaps is not their viewpoint but I think that these are simple juridical questions. One must very simply check the laws and the acts of membership and this will show who is wrong and who is right. But, at any rate, for the time being, the Europeans are not yet ready. They have not yet agreed on the figures to be granted to the Mediterranean third countries within the context of this third generation of financial protocols. For the moment, the problem does not arise in these terms. For the moment, even for the countries which have already approved the adaptation accord, there is as yet no protocol. So, let us wait, perhaps the problem is a phony problem. From that angle, perhaps one can agree on the adaptation accord. One must hope that the Europeans will not delay in agreeing

among themselves also on the amount of financial aid which they want to give to the Mediterranean third countries and that, consequently, one will not have to verify the cogency of Mr Cheysson's line of reasoning.

[Question] Were your recent trips to Great Britain and Italy devoted to the adaptation accord? Is this the beginning of a strategy of bilateral meetings with the Twelve?

[Answer] I was in Great Britain, Germany, and Italy and I obviously tried to sensitize these countries and their officials to the Moroccan viewpoint, to sensitize them to the Moroccan line of reasoning and to explain the Moroccan position. Because, as I told you before, we are not in direct contact with the Council of Ministers. We negotiate or we express our viewpoint on the occasion of the meetings with the people of the Commission and we are rarely in contact with the people of the Council. So, we had to see the people who are on that Council and we also had to see the ministers of foreign affairs and the ministers of agriculture of the Twelve and the ministers and secretaries of state in charge of relations with the Community in those countries.

This is what I did in Germany. Along with that, I also met the secretaries of state particularly in charge of cooperation in Great Britain and Germany. We not only reviewed Morocco's relations with those countries on a bilateral plane but also relations between Morocco and the EEC and thus the future of the 1976 cooperation accord. We thus explained to our friends...

[Question] And did you run into a favorable atmosphere there?

[Answer] Yes, the people over there obviously express to you their full understanding but they reaffirm that, without a consensus within the Twelve, it is very difficult to take initiatives that are individual. So, in reality, the twelve countries are the friends of Morocco. Starting with this fact, we try to sensitize them and to get them to take a collegial initiative so that the Morocco case might possibly again come before the Council and so that everybody would be sensitized to our line of argument. Of course, it would be much easier to get all of the Twelve together.

[Question] Why was there no direct contact with the Council? Could you not demand that?

[Answer] The 1976 accord provides for the possibility of assembling what is called the Cooperation Council. The Cooperation Council is a council consisting of the foreign affairs ministers of the Twelve, the representatives of the Commission, and the Moroccan foreign affairs minister, in other words, Morocco. And they review all of the problems. For the moment, we do have relations on a bilateral plane. One must first of all, as you said, evaluate the quality of the reaction to our demands. Once this quality has been discovered, in the sense in which we hope, then there is nothing to prevent anyone from convening that Cooperation Council and possibly demanding a meeting of that Council for an assessment, not only of this issue, but also of all the other political issues that arise in terms of our relations with Europe and then the relationship between the Arab World and the Muslim World and Europe, on a more general political plane.

[Question] In the light of what you have just said, one can understand that it is your intention to get all of the Twelve together, one after the other, as you did in the case of the first three, that is, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain. Is it your intention to make the rounds?

[Answer] If only to continue to sensitize the various countries to our position. But to make the rounds of twelve countries, that takes much time. I hope that it will be possible to work out a solution before I have finished my entire roundtrip. And then, at any rate, you know that we were visited by foreign affairs ministers here; we had a visit by the foreign affairs minister of Denmark, so that we had an opportunity to sensitize him to our viewpoint here. We were visited by the Belgian foreign affairs minister who is presently chairman of the Council of the Community.

In April we will be visited by the agriculture minister of the Netherlands. So there are several things we are doing. Mr Pedro Solvez, the Spanish secretary of state, was here recently. So we might say that it is not absolutely necessary for me to make the rounds personally. Opportunities arise for these ministers to come visit us.

[Question] Is Spain the toughest partner?

[Answer] No, I do not see why...

[Question] Perhaps because there are several problems between us? First of all, there is the fishing problem, then there is the transit problem which we are trying to settle in a friendly fashion and then, because of the fact that Spain, together with Greece or Portugal, is our most bitter competitor.

[Answer] Not necessarily. The fact is that the exports that compete with us most are the Spanish exports. This is where we produce during the same period of time and this is where our products compete under several headings.

As for being "the toughest," I do not believe so. First of all, Spain in my opinion should be the country which perhaps, among the Twelve, would most strongly support the Moroccan position for various reasons.

[Question] Mr Secretary of State, could you give us these reasons?

[Answer] Yes, first of all because that is the country that is closest to Morocco; it is our immediate neighbor. And when we say our immediate neighbor, this implies an enormous amount of things. This implies that Spain has every interest in seeing Morocco prosper. It is better to have a prosperous neighboring country than a country that has problems, economic problems or other. I can assure you that the present Spanish administration is entirely aware of the fact that Spain is one of the countries that is fighting for the maintenance of all Moroccan gains within the Community, such as we ourselves hailed the admission of Spain to the Common Market. And this is in its own interest. Displaying different behavior would be a fundamental error of political assessment.

[Question] But is it Spain that is the main competitor in these products?

[Answer] No, the meetings we have had, such as the one that just took place in Mohammedia, is precisely designed so that there will no longer be this kind of competition. The competition is not only with Spanish products. Spanish products also compete with French products. Dutch tomatoes have come to compete not only with Moroccan tomatoes but also with French tomatoes and, at a certain time, also with Spanish tomatoes. The potatoes we produce compete with the potatoes grown in Germany, and so forth and so on. So, if there is coordination at the level of Mediterranean production activities and growers, this is to prevent overproduction which necessarily leads to a price drop at the European level and thus the kind of competition that is not beneficial to anyone. This coordination at the Mediterranean echelon already exists. As for citrus fruit, I talked to you about the CLAM. The CLAM is presently undertaking even preliminary contacts before each harvest drive, to determine who produces what and during what period of time his output reaches the market in order then to try to coordinate and thus to create as little competition as possible. One cannot rule out that this might also happen in the case of all of the other Mediterranean production activities which reach the European market. These are phony problems. The real problems are problems of political coordination, of society choice, of the common future. This is the real dimension of relations between two neighboring countries.

[Question] The problems of cooperation facing Spain are problems of cooperation between Spain and the other members of the EEC who compete with Spain. For example, as you said, concerning tomatoes, there is Holland and for oranges, there is Portugal. But for Morocco, which is outside the EEC, do not problems of competition arise in different terms?

[Answer] No, we see a cooperation accord between Europe and the Mediterranean countries. In other words, all of the Mediterranean countries that grow the same products. An agreement consisting of coordinated production and sales to prevent driving prices down on the European markets and also to avoid the application of the mechanisms of the PAC (Common Agricultural Policy of the Twelve) when products of the Mediterranean third countries are imported into the European market. So, we pursue coordination in this direction. Not only in a bilateral fashion, between Morocco and Spain, but extending to all of the producer countries, be they in Europe or in the third countries.

[Question] And what about questions such as transit?

[Answer] As regards transit, Morocco prefers to settle this problem in a bilateral fashion.

[Question] In a friendly manner? Without going to the European Justice Court?

[Answer] Exactly. Now, if we do go there, Morocco will know how to defend its interests in one way or another, by all means available to it and by all possible means. But the very fact that we go to the European Justice Court

is not an unfriendly act toward any other country. One does engage in litigation, of course, one goes before the jurisdiction that settles the manner, and that is all. For the moment, this is a problem which we think we can settle in a bilateral fashion, without having to go for judicial procedures.

[Question] Do you not yet have the Spanish viewpoint on that?

[Answer] Yes, we have it. I told you that we discussed it on the occasion of the last visit by Secretary of State Solbez.

[Question] Could you tell us what the main thrust is ?

[Answer] The Spanish government thinks that there are many circles which are very sensitive to that and that it will take a little bit of time to get people used to the basic principle, etc. So, this is a wait-and-see position. But time passes and a decision must be made rather quickly. I think that Morocco so far has proved to be very patient from that viewpoint.

[Question] Now, Mr Secretary of State, what is the future outlook for all this?

[Answer] The future? The future will tell us. We are in the process of doing our best to get the best results in keeping with the aspiration of the growers, the aspiration of Morocco's legitimate interests.

And when I say legitimate interests, this means interests which do not run counter to those of any other country. On the contrary, we are in favor of the harmonious development of all economies and above all the European economies. We have not the slightest intention of interfering with one or the other production effort on the European market. On the contrary, we are in favor of coordination. We are in favor of the attainment of Community objectives and we are thus in favor of prosperity, both in our country and in Europe. When I say prosperity, I am talking about that of the growers.

As for financial cooperation, obviously, we want that even more. I hope that the protocol will be an opportunity to show that the Europe of the Twelve is ready to help Morocco even more during this phase of financial difficulties which our country is going through. We are aware of Europe's budget difficulties but we expect of it a minimum effort so that Morocco may benefit from substantial financial aid granted by Europe to third countries.

As regards the fishing issue, here again our cooperation with Europe must be beneficial for both parties. Beneficial for us, above all, because this is one of the fundamental facts of life, of food self-sufficiency. Fish must become one of the fundamental elements of the population's nutrition. For that purpose, a portion of the catch--regardless of whether it is made under the Moroccan flag or under a European flag--must be unloaded in Morocco and processed in Morocco. A portion must be exported and another portion must be consumed locally. We must be able to benefit from financial aid here, again, in this field, so that we may reorganize our sector, so that we may be able to procure what we need to exploit our fishing wealth. And then, in

the field of research, in the field of preservation of these resources, because, when these resources are exploited ruthlessly, they run out; we must therefore preserve them and not make the mistake Europe made some years ago to the point where it had to implement the "blue Europe" program to preserve its resources.

We must prevent this kind of problem in our environment quickly and to do that, we have the European experience to learn from.

We must therefore not consider the fishing agreement to be an only mercantile agreement; absolutely not; this is a real cooperation agreement. And this is how I see the future: Financial cooperation, scientific cooperation, economic cooperation in the common exploitation of resources. There is your future.

[Question] One last question: Should the next proposals come from Europe or from Morocco?

[Answer] There are no proposals. Basically, we must be able to get together again with Europe, with the people of the Commission, in an effort to try to advance this case.

[Question] Is that what is being planned?

[Answer] Basically, we are in the process of trying to arrange some meetings. Because there has to be signs of evolution so that we can see what is coming up. Without any signs of evolution, we would run into a repetition of the same things that we said last October and that is not worth the trouble. We already had contacts last October. Mr Filali and I myself were in Brussels, we had contacts with the Commission's representatives: Commission Chairman Delors, Commission member Cheysson, Energy Commissioner Mozart, and Agriculture Commissioner Senne. And after that things did not develop in a significant fashion which would provide an incentive to schedule new meetings.

[Question] Thank you, Mr Secretary of State.

Recommendations of Second Mediterranean Meeting

Casablanca LE MESSAGE DE LA NATION in French 11 Feb 87 p 13

[Text] At the end of the transactions of the Second Mediterranean Meeting on Agricultural Development, the three study groups which emerged from this meeting adopted the following recommendations.

Group I. Food Self-Sufficiency

The first group, which studied the question of self-sufficiency, notes that this idea can have several meanings. In the opinion of the group, this involves self-supply for basic products (cereal crops, sugar, oil, milk, and meat) within a reasonable percentage. It does not in any way whatsoever mean autarchy.

The notion of food self-sufficiency has a dynamic character referring to production, consumption, and the transfer system.

The definition of the general context of food self-sufficiency policies is a matter for the States; its implementation however runs through the economic operators.

The meeting was organized by the professionals of agriculture and all of the participants are convinced of the major role of the operators in the formulation and implementation of cooperation programs, particularly in the search for better food security. This role will be consolidated through various forms of contacts and cooperation (meeting in the forums, exchanges of visits and information, technical meetings to compare practical experiences, staging common operations or joint undertakings, etc.).

For the immediate future, it is recommended that the inter-Mediterranean organizations, such as the CERDAM or the CIHEAM, take the initiative in these contacts.

Group 2: Citrus Fruits and Fresh Vegetables

As regards the agribusiness angle and production efforts for the future, the 2nd Group recommends the following:

Schedule periodic meetings between the professionals in Mediterranean agriculture;

Create commissions on a product basis;

Survey the new products that must be subjected to coordination;

Involve the professionals in negotiations concerning exchanges of Mediterranean agricultural and agribusiness products;

Promote cooperation and complementarity in the matter of research and training;

Launch an action among Mediterranean professionals with a view to the organization and mastery of distribution circuits.

Group 3. Agribusiness and Future Production

Charged with studying the question of citrus fruits and fresh vegetables, Group 3 emphasized that the reference price system must be the subject of profound reflection with a view to identifying the harmful effects of mechanisms underlying it. Appropriate solutions could then be proposed so that the reference price system might regain the function that was initially assigned to it, that is to say, "to prevent the offers made by third-level suppliers at abnormally low price levels."

The delegates unanimously felt the need for laying the foundations for a cooperation and a coordination of all of the Mediterranean operators which

could pertain to the most sensitive markets. In this connection, the CLAM is an example of the organizational framework that is likely to promote this interprofessional cooperation.

The group thus recommends that a similar committee be constituted in the sector of fresh vegetables while coming out in favor of strengthening the representation of the growers within the CLAM.

This coordination could be aimed at the following objectives: Planning crops, planting schedule, regulation of supply, common search for alternate markets, etc.

The group also recommends that the CERDAM, whose dynamism it hails, be the promoter of this coordination effort.

The creation of companies with European-Mediterranean participation: This must be encouraged with a view to obtaining a concentrated supply covering a broad range of complementary products. These mixed companies would be a counterweight to the power of the purchasing centers and would permit a better channel for the penetration of modern distribution circuits.

The question of inter-Mediterranean land transportation must be resolved in a fair manner so as to permit the effective circulation of goods and merchandise and, by virtue of that fact, a better targeting of distribution circuits.

5058

CSO: 4519/80

THREE PROMINENT LEADERS INTERVIEWED ON CIVIL WAR

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 23 Feb 87 pp 20-22

[Interview with Major General Peter Cirillo, governor of Equatoria Region, Joshua Dei Wal, minister of local government, Major General Muhammad Zayn-al-'Abidin, head of the Sudanese army's war operations branch, and several unnamed senior army officers, by Ahmad Muhammad Khayr: "Three Conversations About the Civil War"; Juba, date not given]

[Text] The ongoing civil war in the south of the Sudan and its effects are an issue on which AL-DUSTUR has continually presented the differing political points of view. Continuing this practice, AL-DUSTUR conducted three interviews with executive and military officials about certain questions relating to events of the armed struggle in the South, meeting with the governor of Equatoria Region, Major General Peter Cirillo, and the minister of local government, Mr Joshua Dei Wal, as well as with several military leaders.

[Question] To begin, AL-DUSTUR asked the governor of Equatoria Region his assessment of the reasons that have made agreement among the Southern political parties on a method of administering the South a difficult matter.

[Answer] In fact, I do not find myself in a position that enables me to answer this question. If there is no agreement between the parties at this stage, the reason can only be opportunism and the struggle in pursuit of power. The betrayal of the South has always been this way. I intensely dislike this subject. I think these politicians are insincere and never think of the welfare of the masses.

[Question] What is your evaluation of the security situation in the region?

[Answer] The security situation is much better. It is now stable for the first time in a long while, especially as concerns the rebels and highway robbers. We are very committed in this area. We want peace, but peace must be the result of the desire of both sides. One side cannot pursue and discuss peace, while the other side cannot talk about it because it has fallen under the domination of a foreign state. Wouldn't this amount to a waste of time? There is no doubt that the situation will stabilize in the near future. If the terrorists obtain more supplies from Ethiopia, they may cause more

disturbances. It depends on what is offered to them from Ethiopia and foreign countries.

[Question] Please tell us how the war has harmed development projects and solving the region's problems.

[Answer] The war has had a great impact on development, because the region was moving on the road to development. We have many projects that have been affected. There is the project for tea production: completion of construction of the plant has halted because of the rebellion. There are programs for cement production and manufacture, cattle raising, and supplying drinking water. There is the Jonglei and Terakeka project, where the schools have been closed and withdrawn to Juba. All these projects and institutions have been harmed and affected because of the terrorists.

[Question] What is your opinion about Kenya's position toward the rebellion. Do you believe it is based on internal politics, or does it derive from foreign influence?

[Answer] I am convinced that Kenya has a hand in the matter. I regret Kenya's position, because everything is reaching the rebels through them. We have proof of it. Every day, 20 vehicles are dispatched to them. We think that Kenya should not interfere in our internal affairs. The reason for what is happening is that foreign quarters are putting pressure on Kenya, just as is the case with all developing countries. However, [Kenya] can do nothing, no matter what they want.

[Question] What are your hopes for the future of Equatoria Region?

[Answer] We can forge ahead in spite of all these difficulties. We are determined, because this is what the people of the Sudan have chosen and what we have always been committed to. Had you come to this region 14 years ago, you would have found nothing but jungles and scattered huts. Now, however, we have changed that situation, in spite of all the difficulties. We have begun to build other things. If peace comes, there is no doubt that Equatoria will become more attractive, in spite of the fact that we are in a transitional period. If Equatoria in the future has genuine leadership, it will become like the other developed regions.

Causes of the Problem

In a brief interview with AL-DUSTUR, Mr Joshua Dei Wal, the minister of local government, summarized his view of the reasons that led to the armed conflict. He said: "The entire problem is a creation of colonialism. When the southerners demanded implementation of a federal system in the administration, the members of the Executive Council replied that the demand would have to be discussed by the Constituent Assembly. In 1958, when the assembly met and the southerners insisted on their demand, the northern politicians gave authority to the army, which took control of the government." The minister mentioned the unfair methods by which the "Sudanization" of administrative offices had been implemented and how this had led to rumors that the new government was nothing but another colonial administration. This had led to the Torit

rebellion, which spread in Equatoria. Because of the antagonisms administrators created by mistreating tribal leaders and ordinary people, the situation deteriorated. Some intellectuals emigrated and founded the Sudan African [National] Union (SANU), under the leadership of Joseph Oduho, and with William Deng as secretary. After the 1964 popular uprising, William Deng decided to return and founded the SANU Party. Then the transitional government of Sirr al-Khatm called for a round-table conference. The conference passed through a crisis when the northern parties united and decided that federalism was a step toward secession. The conference set up a committee whose proposals Numayri exploited at the Addis Ababa conference, since he took over part of them. The rebellion continued and became a war of attrition, because the government forces began to target educated people in the South. There were massacres in Juba and Waw. Many people fled from the massacres; more than 1 million emigrated into neighboring countries.

The minister then discussed the Addis Ababa agreement, the cease-fire, and the absorption of the Anya Nya forces. He said: "A transitional government in Juba was formed headed by Abel Alier. He decided to dismiss all officials who had been adsorbed into the civil service. They were indeed dismissed and emigrated to Ethiopia, where they formed the core of the second rebellion (Anya Nya 2). Mengistu welcomed them and began to have them trained by Cubans near the border between the two countries. I witnessed this when I was an inspector in Upper Nile. They were recruited and organized from the leaders of the tribes.

"In 1980, Numayri dismissed Lagu from the chairmanship of the council and dissolved the regional parliament, appointing a committee for general elections in the South under the leadership of Abel Alier. The result of the elections was the return of Alier to chairmanship of the council. Lagu resented this and thought about how to take revenge. The administration came under Dinka control, and it became necessary to divide the South into three regions. Lagu worked to gain the agreement of the northerners in this direction. In October 1981, Numayri dismissed Alier and dissolved the executive council, of which I was a member. He also dissolved the regional assembly and appointed people sympathetic to Lagu, under the leadership of an unknown southerner who had grown up in the North.

"In 1982, supporters of unity and supporters of southern secession competed in the elections. The supporters of secession, however, were imprisoned. On the eve of the elections, 'Izz-al-Din al-Sayyid arrived and turned the tables. Tempted by offices, 27 supporters of the union decided to sacrifice their principles and support Tembura, who was supporting secession. Clement Mboro, a supporter of unity, lost the elections. From that time onward, the South has been divided into three regions, because the head of the assembly had been a secessionist. In 1983, Numayri decided to partition the Sudan. In the same year, John Garang left the country. Others rebelled in Bor and founded an organization. Still others left the country and joined the Anya Nya 2, withdrawing from the Anya Nya 1. As for Garang, he stood on the side of the Ethiopians. The two groups united and decided on leadership. Garang snubbed them, and they refused to submit to him. They left their positions and entered Sudanese territory. They are the Anya Nya 2. They became powerful.

Garang began to massacre the Nuer along the Ethiopian border. Numayri was expelled, but the war continued!"

Army View

In a third interview, AL-DUSTUR asked several high officers in the Sudanese army's general command about how Garang's movement obtains arms and who his middlemen are. Having asked that their names not be mentioned, they said:

"In encounters that have taken place with the rebels, we have captured a number of weapons. These include Kalashnikov rifles, Goryunov machine guns, RPG-7 and 11 weapons, 81 and 82 [mm] mortars, antitank mines, and antipersonnel mines. Many of these weapons were manufactured in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. The 106 [mm] artillery and SAM missiles used by the rebels are Western weapons from Europe that the Ethiopian army used to use in the past. After Ethiopia modernized its arsenal with weapons from the Eastern camp, it offered some old weapons to the rebels."

[Question] Do you think the churches and Christian religious organizations play any role in supporting Garang?

[Answer] Yes, the churches give them assistance, and the Red Cross carries and moves their casualties. We must not forget that Ethiopia was Christian before it was socialist. The Ethiopians consider the problem of the South to be on the same level as the problem of Eritrea and are therefore trying to use it to put pressure on the Sudan in order to bargain about the Eritrea issue. When the rebellion began, Kenya sensed that the movement was leaning toward communism. This was clear from its communiques, political attitude, and its relation with Ethiopia. Kenya therefore tried to "rescue" Garang's movement from the communist direction and Ethiopian domination. This position of Kenya's is in line with Kenya's policy and principles and with the line taken by President Moi, who is considered to be one of the church's chief supporters and a supporter of Britain and the Western World generally. The churches have supported Kenya's attitude and its position on Garang's movement, and the Western countries and church organizations inside and outside of Africa have given their blessing to it. To win Garang's movement over to this direction, Kenya began at first with enticement, allowing him to open an office for his movement in Nairobi and to form an organization to help him there. They allowed him to use their territory and roads, and they allowed equipment to be transported to him on the pretext that it was relief supplies, not to mention their giving him freedom to move as he pleased.

[Question] Why are you cooperating with the forces you call "the friendly forces," i.e., the Anya Nya forces that broke with Garang?

[Answer] These forces have many disagreements with Garang. They differed with him first concerning the question of communism. They had thought that his movement was really a movement of nationalist character, whose goal was to realize nationalist demands and nothing more. That being its nature, they thought it would be independent. When they expressed their dissatisfaction, Garang used Ethiopian forces to liquidate them physically. Secondly, his tendency was to allow the Dinka tribe to dominate the movement. This meant

imposing the domination of a single tribe on the rest of the tribes within the movement itself. This they rejected on principle. They therefore ceased hostilities against the Sudanese army and began to cooperate closely with it, embarking on joint operations with the army. In this way, the southerners themselves began to fight against Garang. In any case, the number of people from various regions returning from Garang's ranks is increasing. However, we need to strengthen political work so that it can be a strong foundation for solving the entire problem. We have to show good intentions by announcing a general amnesty, welcoming those who come to us, returning them to their jobs, and giving them aid. All these things will indeed contribute to hastening an end to the war, stopping the killing, and reestablishing peace so that we can devote ourselves to building the country.

[AL-DUSTUR] Major General Muhammad Zayn-al-'Abidin, head of the Sudanese army's war operations branch, comments as follows on the military operations that have taken place and on the rise of Garang's movement:

"In 1983, an infantry battalion in Bor mutinied when it was informed of a decision to transfer it to the North. The pretext was that life in the north of the Sudan was unsuitable for the southern soldier, given his family ties and the large size of his family.

"To contain the rebellion, the leadership sent a force from Juba to Bor, but the mutinous battalion had already fled and entered Ethiopian territory. At that time, Numayri had decided to divide the South into three regions. Equatoria supported him in this decision; the others, however, opposed him and began to work within the ranks of the armed forces to influence them and win them over.

"In Ethiopia, there were the Anya Nya 2 forces led by Samuel Gai Tut, 'Abdallah Chol, and Akuot Atem. They were up in arms against the Addis Ababa agreement, which they rejected. Ethiopia organized the movement and brought together the Anya Nya 2 and the forces that had fled from Bor under one name and under Garang's leadership as the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement, with its military wing, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army. The movement received great support from all the countries that opposed Numayri's regime, their aim being to support the movement in order to bring down the regime. The movement was in fact able to enlist large numbers of southerners and began to conduct operations within Sudanese territory and then withdraw to its bases in Ethiopia. After a time, the movement succeeded in spreading its forces throughout most areas of the South and was able to halt work on some of the largest development projects in the country: the oil drilling and extraction project in the Bentiu area, and the Jonglei canal, which was scheduled for completion that very year (1983). Afterwards, the movement concentrated on cutting roads and land, river and air communications, with the aim of widening the area of famine and paralyzing all aspects of life in the region. This would cause the government to lose control, and the movement would then be able to impose its authority over the entire region. However, although the government forces were small in size and separated by vast distances, the army was able to absorb the first shock and contain the situation. After a time, the movement began to face supply problems, desertions, and difficulty in persuading the population in the South to join its ranks. This was because

the movement's political goal was unclear and because of hardships, famine, and epidemic diseases. This was accompanied by the large losses the movement suffered and by its inability for a long period to achieve clear successes. This led to the creation of large groups of armed men who deserted, taking their weapons with them, and went to their regions to engage in looting and plundering. Among the principal factors leading to the movement's lack of success was the breaking away from it of the Anya Nya 2, together with all its members from the Nuer, the second largest tribe in the South numerically. A large number of men from the other tribes also broke away and joined the so-called "forces friendly to the army." In addition, the tribes of Equatoria and some of the tribes of Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile began to take part in operations against the forces of the People's Liberation Army. These factors led to the fragmentation of the People's Liberation Army, whose forces had at one time reached 25 battalions of 1,200 soldiers each. These forces dispersed and became skeleton battalions. Disputes broke out between the leaders of the movement and within the ranks of the fighters, leading to the return of most of them to their areas.

"Inasmuch as most of the fighters were simple, uneducated men, the possession of firearms tempted most of them to commit acts of looting and plundering. We should not forget that all these forces were living off animals that belonged to the people. For example, the average consumption by each battalion was about 20 cows, taken by force from the citizens. This is something that had never happened in any liberation movement, because the principles of guerrilla war require that citizens be protected and won over to the side of the movement.

"Afterwards, the movement resorted to compulsory forced conscription. The behavior of some of its ordinary fighters was marked by brutality toward innocent citizens. All this, plus the famine, led large numbers of southerners to go north to the deserts, leaving their herds and their land, with all its resources, in order to escape with their lives. Thus, things became complicated for Garang's forces; they failed to polarize the people and became isolated.

"What is happening now in the South consists of armed tribal conflicts, in addition to the existence of a crushing famine. Education has stopped, except in very few cities where there are army garrisons.

"As for the militias, they had been fighting the government but made truce agreements because of their belief in the importance of dialogue to create solutions. They obtained their weapons basically from Garang, worked with him, and served with his forces in large numbers. The government has not armed them. These groupings have now taken on a tribal character. The Anya Nya 2, for example, is from the Nuer tribes. The Murle youth are under the leadership of al-Sultan Isma'il. And there are other groups from other tribes. Many members of small tribes used to join Garang's movement in order to obtain weapons and would then seize the first opportunity to return to their areas to defend them and their families.

"The situation has greatly improved now. Garang knows that his situation is difficult and deteriorating, but he is under many pressures from abroad."

[Box, p 21]

The Sudanese South occupies an area equal to that of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia combined and is inhabited by approximated one-third of the population of the country. The people are descended from African stock and belong to many tribes, the largest of which are the Dinka, the Shilluk, the Nuer, and the Zande. The South is bordered by five African states: Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, and the Central African Republic. The majority of citizens of these neighbors belong to the Christian religion.

The South enjoys enormous wealth in forests, water, livestock, agricultural land, and fruit trees. Among its agricultural products are cotton, coffee, tea, corn, and cattle. Its mineral wealth includes petroleum, gold, and iron.

From the point of view of contemporary history, colonialism separated the Sudanese South from the North, considering it a closed area which northerners had no right to visit, except by special permission from the British administration. On the other hand, the colonial administration opened the south to European Christian missions which became established there, spreading education, and offering services. When the British colonial regime planned for the constitution development of the Sudan under pressure from the nationalist movement during the forties and announced the formation of the Advisory Council, it limited it to only northerners. Faced with popular resistance to the Advisory Council, the colonial regime offered some concessions and proposed the idea of establishing a Legislative Assembly to encompass the Sudan as a single administrative unit. Consequently, the Conference on Administration of the South emerged in 1948, after which the southerners decided that their region should be an independent administrative unit. Southerners occupied 12 seats in the assembly. When the State Council was formed to replace the British governor-general, one of its three members was a southerner.

In 1954, when planning began for the "Sudanization" of the Sudanese administration, the southerners' share was only four administrative positions, which were not of the highest level. This provoked complaints among southern intellectuals, and in the second half of 1955, they spread rumors that the new government would be nothing but the replacement of a foreign master by a local one. The rebellion began in Torit and spread through Equatoria Region, leaving many victims. Some intellectuals left the country and announced the founding of the SANU Party (the Sudan African [National] Union), which raised the banner of secession, on the pretext that the southerners were an oppressed African minority.

In 1958, there was a military coup by Ibrahim 'Abbud. 'Abbud followed a policy of force, subjection, and repression in the South, just as he did in the North, but in a more tyrannical way, imposing the teaching of Arabic, nationalizing the mission schools, and replacing Sunday with Friday as a weekly holiday.

The Anya Nya organization began and continued a war against the central government in the North. In 1965, the round-table conference was held and a

committee of 12 was formed. It issued regional autonomy decisions which the Sudanese political parties approved in 1966. However, the parties postponed abiding by the decisions, and the armed conflict continued. In 1972, the Addis Ababa conference met and issued its well-known agreement for a cease-fire and the formation of a transitional government in Juba. In October 1981, Numayri dissolved the Executive Council and the Regional Assembly in the South and appointed people close to him to replace them. In 1983, John Garang and others formed a new organization, after they had mutinied in Bor, left the country, and proclaimed the formation of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement. On 31 July 1983, the movement issued its political communique. In March 1986, after exhausting efforts, the Kokodam meeting took place between delegations of the movement and of the National Grouping and the two sides reached a limited agreement. The war, however, is still going on and the bloodshed continues.

12937

CS0: 4504/175

BA'TH PARTY SUGGESTIONS REPORTED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 16 Feb 87 p 20

[Article: "The Ba'th Facing Two Issues in the Sudan: the Constitutional Convention and the Government's Slowness"]

[Text] Among the heated political issues being ceaselessly discussed within political, party, and popular circles in the Sudan, two issues stand out at the present time. The first relates to preparation for the constitutional convention and ways to make it succeed. The second issues relates to what some political forces active in the Sudanese arena call the "slowness" of Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's government in making decisions and laws capable of dealing with the situation inherited from the Numayri government.

The issue of preparation for the constitutional convention has come to take precedence over all other issues in the Sudan in view of the fact that this long-awaited convention will discuss all the problems of the Sudan. Discussion of this convention therefore revolves around the need for good preparation and for guarantees of its success.

On the subject of these guarantees, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party in the Sudan has prepared a paper of suggestions, corroborating the general approaches proposed by the Ministry of Peace during its discussions with representatives of the political parties, and summing up the guarantees for the constitutional convention's success in the following specific points:

--That participation in the debates and discussions of the constitutional convention should be guaranteed to all political forces active in the national arena in the North and South, including the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement, the regional organizations, and the productive social forces.

--That an agreed-upon committee be formed and entrusted with conducting talks with the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement, to have it participate in preparatory activities, and to ask it to observe a cease-fire and halt all military actions.

--That the Sudanese government make a serious step toward assuring the convention's success by repealing the September Laws, replacing them with

democratic laws, and lifting the state of emergency; this to coincide with the movement's declaring a cease-fire.

--That all political forces be represented in the constitutional convention on an equal basis, with each political party to be represented by three officials who are members of it and have been fully deputized as authorized agents by their parties.

--That the technical committees for any preparatory activities be formed with the approval of the National Assembly, and that these committees should present the results of their activities or contacts to the National Assembly for its study and approval.

--The ideas contributed by the political parties, productive forces, regional organizations, or the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement should be presented to the secretariat of the convention early enough to allow the secretariat to distribute them to all the forces participating in the conference. Sufficient opportunity should be allowed for presenting, discussing, and commenting on them, as well as for commenting on the notes on the paper made by the body that presented it.

--It should be stipulated that the person who chairs the constitutional convention and directs its activities and discussions not be a political party figure; that he be a capable legal expert, deeply and broadly familiar with the various issues and problems of the Sudan in their various historical stages of development. Preferably, the chairmanship should be entrusted to a group of not less than three people, all of whom possess the above qualifications.

--The convention's sessions should be public and broadcast by the media, so that they can be seen and heard by the people.

--The convention's recommendations should be based on the principle of consensus.

In addition to these guarantees, the suggestions of the Sudanese Arab Socialist Ba'th Party made reference to two points. The first relates to the fact that the expression "leading figures" ("fa' aliyat") occurring in the communiques and statements of the Ministry of Peace and Constitutional Convention Affairs is an expression without an exact criterion and that the criterion ought to be made more specific. The second point relates to the Ministry of Peace's insistence on holding regional conventions. In the party's view, such conventions would not be useful, because they would create more of the negative phenomena that arose in the atmosphere of the regional government experiment under the May government. This was an atmosphere that stimulated regional chauvinism and racism. In this regard, the party pointed out that the regions will be represented within the constitutional convention and will debate issues in it. Regional conventions should therefore not be considered.

These are the proposals of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party for guaranteeing the success of the constitutional convention. They are proposals that have been set before the public, the Ministry of Peace, the leaders of the parties, and

the National Grouping, in hope that they will receive their attention and fruitful debate in the context of serious work for good preparations that will lead to the success of the constitutional convention.

How Long?

It has been about 8 months since the Sudanese people elected its Constituent Assembly and the government of Mr al-Sadiq al-Mahdi took office. How long will the government continue to follow the laws, policies, and economic path of the May government, without venturing to issue contrary laws guaranteeing that the horse will be put before the cart?

This question now being asked in the Sudan is based on a fact that increases its magnitude and the need for the government to act to answer it in practical terms before it is too late.

This fact--and it is a surprising one--is that Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi on more than one occasion criticized what the transition government and the transitional military council used to say when they were asked about the reasons preventing them from passing laws contrary to those of the May government. The transition government and the military council used to use as a pretext the "transitional situation" and their inability, such being the case, to make the kind of decisions that would respond to the basic demands for which the uprising had taken place.

Now, in spite of his earlier criticism, and in spite of his having said that the transitional military council could have repealed all the May laws with a stroke of the pen, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's government, which enjoys a majority within the Constituent Assembly, has not as yet translated these criticisms into action. It has claimed to be tied down by constitutional restrictions that prevent it from making decisions or passing laws contrary to the May laws.

The question now is: What can al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's government do? The answer has come in an open letter, the fourth in a series of letters written by al-Tijani Husayn, a member of the party's political committee, in the pages of AL-HADAF, the newspaper that speaks for the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party in the Sudan. In it, he has defined what the Sudanese government can do, as follows:

--Issue a law for a popular settling of accounts.

--Issue a law how did you come by this [property]?" law, in order to prosecute ill-gotten wealth and restore the money of the people to the people.

--Repeal the September 1983 laws and all laws that restrict freedoms, replacing them with the laws formerly in effect. Also, serious and capable committees should be formed to draft new laws that find their inspiration in the people's vision of its past, present, and future.

--Purge the government apparatus of supporters and remnants of the May regime and corrupt elements, and work to reform the civil service.

--Restore government support of basic commodities, lower prices, and impose official and popular supervision of them.

These points are linked to a number of important observations. For example, talk about waiting for a constitutional amendment providing the appropriate circumstances and conditions for purging the vestiges of the May regime is unjustifiable and may be regarded as a maneuver aiming at allowing time to pass so that the claims that "the May regime is over," and that "we have to think about new slogans, other than purging the vestiges of May," can succeed. Certain political and party circles warn that the success of such claims will mean that the May regime's laws and policies will become a fait accompli and that the uprising and its slogans will thereby be relegated to the museum of history.

Another important observation made by al-Tijani in his open letter to the Sudanese cabinet is that the decisions the government ought to make can be passed, provided the required seriousness is present. If the two ruling parties have a fixed idea about amending the constitution so as to allow purging away the vestiges of the May regime, the various political forces, even those which reject constitutional amendments that would prejudice democratic rights, would agree unanimously to amendments that come within the scope of allowing the vestiges of the May regime to be purged.

12937
CSO: 4504/176

INTERNATIONAL FUNDING AIDS IN RAILROAD IMPROVEMENT

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 16 Mar 87 pp 32-33

[Article : "Sudanese Railroads Regain Their Prestige and Vitality"]

[Text] About a decade ago, the Sudanese Railroad Authority entered a period of decline that had an impact in one way or another on the performance of the Sudanese domestic economy. With a work force of approximately 23,000 workers and employees, the authority is the largest Sudanese agency offering employment to citizens. Although in the sixties it was able to achieve record load capacities amounting to 3 million metric tons, during the mid-seventies it returned to a load capacity of under 1 million metric tons. Its directors and some Sudanese economists think that open political interference during the past decade was the main reason behind the decline. However, reports circulating in international economic circles bring encouraging news of possible success by the Sudanese railroads in regaining their prestige and initiative.

Economists and former directors of the Sudanese railroads agree that the authority's decentralization policy devised by deposed President Ja'far Numayri in 1986 is the basic reason for the distress that has crippled the railroads. This is because the reasons for the decentralization decision were political in the first instance; there was no managerial goal behind them. In the wake of a trade union strike in 1982, Numayri urged that decentralization be implemented quickly in order to shrink the size of the approximately 10,000 worker labor force at the authority's main installation at 'Atbarah in the northern Sudan. When decentralization was implemented, the first casualty was the maintenance programs, which used to take place routinely at 'Atbarah, while the small maintenance stations in al-Ubayyid, Kusti, and Sannar were charged with handling small, incidental malfunctions.

The World Bank, which is the principal institution that gives support to the Sudanese railroads, granted four loans in 1978-79, on condition that load capacity be raised to 2.8 metric tons. Instead, the loans were used to import 30 new locomotives, in spite of the fact that the purpose of the financing was to repair existing locomotives and cars, reinforce the tracks, and improve the signal system. The authority's former director criticized the World Bank and accused it of trying to impose priorities on the railroad. In 1984, the two sides differed sharply over the World Bank's allegation that the authority's

problem was primarily administrative. As a result of these differences, the bank urged others, such as West Germany, not to offer loans to the Sudanese railroads. This led the Saudi Development Fund, the Common Market delegation, and the Canadian International Development Agency to hesitate in offering needed support for the authority's projects.

The bank's permanent representative in the Sudanese capital says that the World Bank has provided the authority with \$90 million since the beginning of the bank's cooperation with it. It is clear that the bank and the financiers who share its view are insisting that they need to ascertain that their funds are being spent in the proper way. It appears that the differences in viewpoint between the authority and the World Bank have ended positively, because this February the bank announced the earmarking of \$20 million to help the authority through its difficulties. Officials of the agency, however, think they need somewhere between \$60 million and \$70 million to overcome all the obstacles blocking the path of the railroad.

After the World Bank's decision, it was announced that the West German Fund (KFW) had decided to offer \$9 million to the agency, and the Kuwait Development Fund decided to offer \$10 million.

Italy has offered \$10 million to improve the rail line between Babanusah and Nyala in the extreme west of the country, so that the line can carry cars with greater load capacity. The authority's assets are estimated at approximately 12 million Sudanese pounds, in the shape of locomotives, cars, buildings, and track. This includes 159 electric and diesel locomotives, only 54 of which are operating now, 6,067 freight cars and fuel tank cars, of which only 4,467 freight cars and tank cars are operating, in addition to 487 passenger cars, only 237 of which are in daily use.

Mr Serafino Wani Swaka, the minister of transportation and communications in the Sudanese government, believes that the former regime's interference in the affairs of the railroad can be considered the basic reason for the decline in its performance. In a recent interview, the minister pointed out that deposed President Ja'far Numayri more than once called out soldiers of the strategic battalion to run the affairs of the authority. He added that the decision by the transition government to allow persons and companies to rent entire cars did not have a positive effect on the income of the authority. He explained that the operation has presently returned to its former system, in which it was stipulated that the owner of a consignment of merchandise would pay the fee in cash at the station from which the merchandise was to be transported. The minister said that his ministry is studying a proposal from the World Bank involving decreasing the work force on board each train, so that 825 persons would serve each 30-car train. He explained that at the present time there are 30 trains in service, with 33,000 persons serving them.

The railroad authority intends to extend its tracks to remote southern stations, such as Juba, by way of Rumbek or the territory of the Zande tribe, with a rail line possibly reaching Uganda. Within the other areas of the Sudan, high costs stand in the way, for it costs about \$250 to lay a single meter of track.

Among the issues World Bank officials raised with leaders of the railroad authority was lowering expenditures for salaries and wages. It has been observed in this respect that the authority pays 75 percent of its total outlays in the shape of wages. At the same time, the authority complains that the central government's lack of interest in railroad development has led to an improvement in the land roads, so that they compete with the railroads. For example, in the 6-year plan for 1977-83, it was decided to appropriate 78 million Sudanese pounds for railroad authority projects, against 242 million Sudanese pounds earmarked for land roads.

It should be mentioned that the Sudanese Railroad Authority has 4,752 kilometers of tracks, extending from Wadi Halfa in the extreme north of the country, via 'Atbarah and Khartoum, to al-Ubayyid in Kordofan Region, and from 'Aradibah junction to Nyala in Darfur Region. An extension from the latter line branches off from Babanusah and goes to Waw, the capital of Bahr al-Ghazal. The authority also manages river transportation from Kuraymah to Dunqula in the north, and from Kusti in the central Sudan to Juba in the south. It also offers seasonal service on the Blue Nile from al-Suki to al-Rusayris.

Building of the railroad in the Sudan first began in 1873. Previous to the now overthrown May regime, the authority was a government unit whose separate budget was approved by the parliament.

12937

CSO: 4504/176

RELATIONS BETWEEN KURDS, COMMUNISTS DISCUSSED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 16 Mar 87 p 6

[Article: "Al-Talabani's Group and the Iraqi Communist Party"]

[Text] The campaign of mutual recriminations has recently escalated between the National Kurdish Union (NKU) led by Jalal al-Talabani and the Iraqi Communist Party led by 'Aziz Muhammad. Each charges the other with encouraging and supporting divisions and the formation of blocs in the other side.

At the time when Baha' al-Din Nuri was ousted from the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party in July 1984 and he undertook to create a split among 'Aziz Muhammad's leaders and put out the newspaper AL-QA'IDAH (THE FOUNDATION) and some other publications to sanctify the split in the Iraqi Communist Party, 'Aziz Muhammad's group charged al-Talabani's leaders with inducing Baha' al-Din Nuri to split and embrace and support him ideologically, politically, and physically, provide the requisites for his party publications, and protect him and his group as part of an attempt to encourage divisions within the Iraqi Communist Party. On the other hand, al-Talabani's leaders hold 'Aziz Muhammad's group responsible for the divisions that befell it and for the departure of the organizations ('Alay) Shuresh and Komelah from its ranks. They accused the group of being behind the splits and the formation of blocs within the National Kurdish Union in general.

At the time of the intensification of the campaign of mutual recriminations, al-Talabani made public an interview with Baha' al-Din Nuri that appeared in his newspaper AL-QA'IDAH, No 8, July 1986. In it he praised the relations of his organization with al-Talabani's group and made statements about the political situation as though he were the leader of the Iraqi Communist Party. This greatly infuriated 'Aziz Muhammad's group.

The charges exchanged between the Iraqi Communist Party and al-Talabani's group continued in their newspapers and meetings to drive a wedge into the attempts at normalizing their relations and to deepen the disputes, old and new, to the maximum.

When Baha' al-Din Nuri started to create divisions in the ranks of the Iraqi Communist Party in July 1986, Jala al-Talabani was said to be behind him in

order to serve his own interests and those of the Iraqi regime because al-Talabani was trying to negotiate an alliance with it. Some have gone further, saying that Baha' al-Din Nuri has been in direct contact with the Iraqi regime since his imprisonment in 1969 and release under circumstances that aroused doubts and suspicions about him at that time.

These days when it was announced that the Talabani and Barzani groups were cooperating and allied with the Iranian regime and Baha' al-Din Nuri was under various pressures from these parties in an effort to make him consent to the objectives of this alliance, Baha' al-Din Nuri is exhibiting an inclination to deal openly with the Baghdad authorities in order to escape from the pressures and confront 'Aziz Muhammad's leaders in a situation that enters into the nationalist calculations toward relations with Iran.

Those who dislike Baha' al-Din Nuri say that his open dealings with the regime are quite possible due to his known truces with the various governments since the 14 July 1958 revolution because he was among those who boasted of a strategic alliance with the regime of 'Abd al-Karim Qasim until it fell. He was also a prominent contributor to the August 1964 policy in support of martial law. As for those around him, they agree with the others regarding the possibility of his dealing openly with the authorities, but they justify it in a different way. They say he was the first communist to call for a republic during the period of the monarchy and will not abandon his patriotic beliefs in the face of Iranian aggression against Iraq.

With what will Baha' al-Din Nuri surprise his adversaries and those who are now trying to steal him?

5214/6662

CSO: 4404/287

LABOR UNION LEADER INTERVIEWED ON NEW LABOR LEGISLATION

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 23 Mar 87 p 13

[Interview with Ahmad Muhsin 'Alwan by 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Qaysi on "Elimination of Class Differences Between Workers and Employees in Iraq" in Baghdad; date not specified]

[Text] In assessing the major role played by Iraqi workers on the battlefields in defense of Iraq, President Saddam Husayn announced at his meeting with the permanent secretary of state, members of the Central Workers Bureau of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, and president and members of the executive office of the General Federation of Labor Unions that the workers were being converted into employees.

President Husayn said: "Our main purpose is to create a society balanced in outlook, relationships, and behavior. When a person feels that his rights and obligations are shaped by the rights and obligations of others, he feels there is a balance. From now on the category of "'worker' no longer exists and everyone has become an 'employee' in the state."

On the morning of the day after President Husayn announced that workers had become employees, the streets of Baghdad and the Iraqi governorates overflowed with joyous demonstrations in which tens of thousands of male and female workers took part.

AL-DUSTUR asked Ahmad Muhsin 'Alwan al-Dulaymi, president of the General Federation of Labor Unions, to give us some details about this action, which reflects a great achievement and pioneering step by Iraq, the first country in the region to do so. Mr 'Alwan said:

"About a million persons have benefited from this decision, which is a revolution in itself in the field of work and workers from both the human and the social standpoints. Moreover, it involves a significant number of people as well as future generations. We are well aware of how much workers suffer from social differences between the way in which they and employees are regarded. This decision marks a new path toward the elimination of class differences between Iraqis."

He continued: "We know how much it will cost the government to implement the decision, in spite of the war situation. However, the psychological and human side of the worker is more important than anything else. It is also incumbent upon us not to forget the material side. Therefore, workers will have the same rights as employees according to a series of grades that is to be established. They will also have the same pensions as employees. This was long a desire of the workers until President Husayn made it a reality."

Mr 'Alwan gave an example of the material aspect when he touched on the question of annual raises, that an employee in grade six receives. It amounts to six dinars compared to one dinar received by a worker. He said: "There is no longer any difference between the two individuals. Special committees have been appointed to work out this major part of the labor law." He added that a temporary worker used to earn three dinars a day while an employee earned 10 dinars.

He explained that the decision will not affect our international relations. The goal of the workers' struggle will be to implant the socialist experiment in the region. This applies in particular to the socialist sector. There are many things yet to take place in the field of legislation. Iraq may have been the first country in the world to take this step which will produce a positive reaction among the world's workers to this great achievement. The decision does not include the foreign workers who have employment contracts. But Arab workers will be equal to new Iraqi employees and they will have the same rights and obligations as the Iraqis.

He noted that in making his decision President Husayn intended to put an end to the psychological situation that prevailed among workers as a result of the low esteem in which they are held as, for example in marriage, where an employee is preferred to a worker even if the wages of the latter are double the salary of the former. Such differences are eliminated by the new decision.

5214/6662

CSO: 4404/287

BRIEFS

NEGOTIATIONS FOR FRENCH PLANES--Reliable French sources confirmed that the Dassault Company, which produces Mirage war planes in particular, recently renewed its contacts with Jordanian officials in order to reach an understanding with them concerning supplying the Jordanian Air Force with Mirage 2000 planes, considered one of the most modern French fighter planes. The sources explained that the French company moved once again toward 'Amman after definite information was received that King Husayn does not want to go forward with a request to buy American F-16 fighter planes because of the continuing opposition by Congress and the elements supporting Israel to such a deal as this. The sources also said that the probability of Jordan's venturing to purchase Soviet MIG-23 or MIG-29 fighter planes is very slight. [Excerpt] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 28 Mar 87 p 10] /9274

CSO: 4404/307

AUTHOR EXPLORES SOVIET STRATEGIES, LEGITIMIZING RESISTANCE

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French No 34, Winter 86-87 pp 119-126

[Article by Olivier Roy, research associate at the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and the author, among other publications, of "L'Afghanistan, Islam et modernite politique," Le Seuil, 1985]

[Text] For the past year, both publicly and in private, the Soviets have constantly affirmed their determination to seek a political solution to the Afghan problem. Do they intend to make real concessions (meaning setting up a coalition government and withdrawing their troops in less than a year) or do they simply want to gradually legitimize the communist regime in Kabul by putting an end to foreign aid? Obviously, if the Kremlin can preserve a Sovietized Afghanistan, detente with the West and its positive image in the Third World, then it has no reason to make the slightest concession, even if the armed struggle were to continue in the field for 10 more years.

There remains one interlocutory question: Will the Soviets ever agree to leave Afghanistan? The irreversibility of every Soviet advance has become a myth, erected as a geopolitical theorem. But the myth is dangerous and false: dangerous, because it returns to rubberstamp every advance; false, because history shows that Soviet troops have sometimes left the territories they occupied. Here one might cite the cases of Austria, Azerbaijan, Manchuria or even Romania. Everything depends on the price to be paid to maintain their presence and the Soviets can be realistic. However, one has to be lucid: Moscow is setting up a totally communist regime in Afghanistan, thus making any coalition government impossible. Power belongs to an orthodox Communist Party extended by mass organizations (Fatherland Front, Women's Organization, and so on). The constitution to be promulgated is copied from that of the USSR (the "Supreme Council of the Tribes" plays the role of the Soviet of Nationalities); young people receive a totally Sovietized education. The future of this small country therefore depends neither on a Finnish-type evolution or an "Afghan-type socialism." The Soviets want to turn Afghanistan into a new Outer Mongolia and only the armed, diplomatic struggle can oppose this design. Any strategy that would come down to weakening the Afghan Resistance militarily in order to negotiate better (for example, a qualitative or quantitative limitation on aid granted to the anticommunist underground in response to the symbolic withdrawal of six regiments by Moscow) fortifies the Soviets in their hope of obtaining the butter and the butter money, meaning Afghanistan and detente.

Military Status Quo and Diplomatic Overtures

If there is to be a negotiated solution in Afghanistan, it will only be with a Resistance that is strong militarily and diplomatically. Only two factors could oblige the Soviets to accept such a compromise: on the one hand, military pressure that would force them to increase their armed commitment beyond the limits of a merely regional conflict; and on the other hand, sufficient international pressure to turn their Afghan policy into an obstacle to their diplomatic action, vis-a-vis the West as well as the Third World.

To date, the Soviets have managed to control this war without bringing into question the general troop arrangement in Eurasia or giving up their economic priorities. In order to do that, they have had to rule out any purely military outcome: Their objective is neither to destroy the bastions of the Resistance nor to occupy the 80 percent of the territory still beyond their control in a lasting manner. It should be noted that contrary to the dramatization of events in the international press throughout 1986, no reversal of the situation occurred on the military level. The Soviets are betting on the Resistance and the civilian population wearing down, as well as on a reduction in foreign aid. In the meantime, in the portion of Afghan territory it controls, the Kremlin is strengthening a regime based on the communist model. When time has done its work, the authorities placed in power in Kabul will no longer have to eat away at the areas held by a Resistance now bled white and isolated. Such a process can take over a decade, enough time to train the cadres of a renewed Communist Party. Actually, despite some progress, the Soviets do not yet have truly effective links: The party remains divided into enemy factions and the Afghan Army, although more seasoned, cannot do without the direct support of Soviet troops. One must therefore view this war from a long-term perspective and not attribute excessive importance to the ups and downs comprised of the taking of a base, the death of a leader or a change in allegiance. As long as the Resistance has not adopted a centralized strategy, nothing will truly threaten the Soviets.

There remains the diplomatic question. The Soviets are sensitive to the impact of the war in Afghanistan on world opinion (and, incidentally, on their own public opinion). Until a recent date, if they had had to choose between maintaining their presence in Afghanistan and their determination to avoid a clear deterioration of their international image, their old reflex reaction would undoubtedly have pushed them to scorn their reputation. But times have changed. Today, foreign policy has priority and, unlike Brezhnev, Gorbachev could well opt for negotiation. For the time being, the Soviets have not had to decide because, except in Western opinion, the war in Afghanistan has not blackened them excessively.

Afghan Resistance: Chances To Seize

The Afghan Resistance realized the importance of diplomatic action very late. The weakness of its structures, its lack of cohesiveness, but also, the feeling that the legitimacy of its fight would bring it the automatic support of Westerners and the Muslim countries, caused it to lose precious time. For too long, it said merely: "We are fighting the war; you do the rest." But

if the support of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China was won over from the very beginning, 4 years of intense lobbying was necessary before the United States decided to provide significant aid. Whatever the case, these two obstacles were overcome and the conditions for a diplomatic breakthrough now exist. An Alliance has been set up (1), convinced of the need to wage active, autonomous diplomacy. Obstacles naturally remain: That Alliance is purely formal and the split between the radicals (Hekmatyar and Sayyaf) and all the others weighs heavily on the choice of foreign policy. Moreover, the Resistance does not have enough competent leaders and has not known how -- or been unable -- to integrate the Afghan diaspora which, closely linked to the old regime, is cut off from the soldiers and parties in Peshawar. Nevertheless, a strategy has been adopted, consisting of systematically contesting the representativeness of the Kabul regime in all international bodies, particularly in the Islamic Conference and the UN General Assembly. Its purpose is to obtain the recognition of a government of free Afghanistan by the largest possible number of countries.

However, the countries supporting the Resistance do not want to go that far. Pakistan, satisfied with the annual, massive vote of the General Assembly in favor of the Soviet withdrawal, fears that too rigid of an attitude will alienate many nonaligned states. Westerners, without saying so explicitly, fear that an expulsion of representatives of the Kabul regime will create an annoying precedent for Israel (2). China and Saudi Arabia remain cautiously reserved. The Resistance must therefore pull off decisive propaganda. It will have to step up its semi-official contacts and organize its peacemaking efforts. This is why it has begun opening offices in the large capitals and spreading information and films on the war itself. However, this thrust is doubly hindered by the rivalries that pit parties against one another and by the attitude of "friendly countries" -- like Pakistan or the United States -- which refuse to take any proposal conceived outside the framework of the Alliance into account. And yet, let us repeat that this Alliance is but a facade to date and the real representation of the Resistance still depends on the parties themselves.

Third World, Unswerving Ally

The Afghan Resistance cannot pull off its diplomatic penetration without the support of Third World countries. To obtain that indispensable support, its fight must not appear solely as an avatar of the East-West confrontation (even if that aspect of the problem was decisive in the support given by the United States).

The Soviets have no reason to integrate Afghanistan in an East-West deal. In this affair, the worst is behind them: They endured the wheat embargo and the partial boycott of the Olympic Games. Since these sanctions failed, the West will probably not plunge into such a policy of direct pressure any more. Furthermore, presenting the Afghan question as an East-West stakes is the same as strengthening the USSR in its half-sincere conviction that the Westerners have designs on Afghanistan (which is definitely not the case) (3) and as reinforcing the Soviet complex. Finally, the Soviets know for a fact that no one in the West will sacrifice detente for the Afghan cause. As for the

hypothesis of an overall deal (Nicaragua for Afghanistan), it has little meaning. If the United States were to abandon the Afghan Resistance, the Soviets would not therefore break up the Sandinist regime. By the same token, in case of a direct American attack on Nicaragua, the Soviets would refrain from intervening. The Americans would therefore be very naive to make preventive concessions. How then can pressure be brought to bear on the USSR through the Third World?

The conclusions of the most recent summit conference of Nonaligned Nations meeting in Harare (4) are clear: The USSR is perceived by the governments as well as the intelligentsia of those countries as less threatening than the United States, but the only major criticism aimed at it is precisely Afghanistan. This is a point to be hammered home, especially since the structural anticommunism of the Islamist movements could shift to anti-Sovietism at any time, as proved by the kidnapping of Soviet diplomats in Beirut (5). The alliance between the Kremlin and Islamist dissident movements in the Middle East is purely circumstantial and all the more fragile because the Soviets no longer have any totally reliable links in the region.

On the other hand, the Afghan underground fighters enjoy a number of pluses in the Third World: They form an authentic resistance movement that is both national and of the people. They claim kinship with political Islam (like Iran and a large part of the dissident forces stirring up the Middle East), but remain sufficiently moderate not to worry established regimes. Paradoxically enough, the ones least in a hurry to espouse the Afghan cause are the Muslim and particularly Arab states, whose essential concern is the Palestinian question. Actually, with regard to this problem, the USSR acts as an ally of the Arab world. It must therefore be accommodated on a subject such as Afghanistan, which for this Arab world remains marginal in every sense of the word (political and geographic). Thus it is that Arab centrism prevails over Muslim solidarity. Moreover, secular Arab factions, which claim affiliation with a state socialism long fascinated by the USSR, identify more easily with the Kabul regime than with the Islamic Resistance. The case of Iran also shows that despite the rhetoric, nationalism is stronger than is Islamic solidarity. Tehran, which in the Middle East pursues the policy of regional power established by the Shah, has concluded a tacit agreement with the USSR: In exchange for a near ceasefire between Afghan Shiites and the Red Army and the closing of the Iranian-Afghan border to all arms shipments, the Soviets refrain from attacking the Hazarajat (6). In short-range terms, the Middle Eastern countries have no interest in committing themselves further to the Resistance. However, the Afghan trump card could pay off for many Arab regimes if played intelligently. On the one hand, it would permit a shift further to the center of the Islamist dissident movement vis-a-vis the big powers and would strengthen the Islamic legitimacy of governments determined to support this authentically Muslim movement. On the other hand, in longer-range terms, it would provide a guarantee to be used in case of excessive Soviet expansion in the region. Iran's current attitude can be explained by this reasoning. The country is playing down its hostility in principle toward the USSR as long as the conflict with Iraq lasts, but is worried about possible Soviet penetration of its borders. It is therefore carefully guarding "its" Afghan resistance, to wit, the Hazarajat Shiites, in reserve.

For the time being, only the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wahhabis (7) are working actively on behalf of the Afghan Resistance. To broaden its following, the latter must open up new offices with the consent of existing authorities. Consequently, it must pursue real state diplomacy.

In the non-Arab Muslim countries, the terrain is clearly more favorable to diplomatic overtures by the Resistance. For example, the Malaysian Government is the only one to have granted diplomatic status to the office of the Afghan Resistance in Kuala Lumpur. In Turkey and Bangla Desh, public opinion seems highly sensitive to the Afghan question and the Palestinian obstacle is no longer a factor. India is obviously another key nation. Its strategy is clear: In order to become the real regional power in southern Asia, it must avoid any direct meddling by the superpowers. Since local conflicts encourage such meddling, Delhi tries to control them, as in Sri Lanka. India analyzes the war in Afghanistan as a potential opportunity for American intervention. It justifies the Soviet occupation by using the position of the "limited contingent" coming at the request of the legitimate government and accepts perfectly the idea of a communist regime in Kabul. Its only concern is that this conflict might gradually strengthen American support to Pakistan, which is why it wants a rapid stabilization of the Kabul regime so as to hasten the departure of the Soviets. In its eyes, in fact, a victory by the communists in Kabul would put an end to the assistance granted by General Zia to the Afghan underground and would reduce American aid to Pakistan considerably. However, this calculation, which presumes a rather rapid shift toward a the stabilization of the Afghan regime (which is not the case), neglects the possibility of a strengthening of the Soviet presence, particularly on the Pakistani borders, in the eventuality of a military escalation!

If the future were to shape up in that manner, Soviet intervention would probably cease to appear as a temporary lesser evil for India, whose position is therefore likely to change if the conflict worsens (8).

United States: Ambiguous Ally

If the Resistance wants to be credible in the Third World, it must not seem to be propped up by the United States. For all those who have visited the area, the military as well as political autonomy of the Resistance is obvious. And yet, since the fall of 1984, American aid has been the target of a vast information campaign, so that the Afghans are now on the same footing as the Contras and Jonas Savimbi. This outrageous mediatization climaxed in June 1986 with President Reagan's reception of a delegation from the Alliance headed by Professor Rabbani (9). The fallout of this operation was mitigated, internally as well as externally: If the international prestige of the Alliance was thereby moved up a notch, the visit enabled Afghan radicals to condemn the pro-Western shift of the other leaders and Iran to step up its pressure. While authorities in Riyadh encouraged the rapprochement, Saudi circles in Pakistan, the Resistance's traditional financial backers, cut off supplies to the four parties belonging to the delegation. Furthermore, the United States is not assuming the consequences of its new commitments: The essential portion of the arms it supplies always goes to the most extremist party, the Hezb-i islami of Hekmatyar, which vehemently condemned the trip to Washington. And the other elements of the Alliance receive no political or financial aid.

To explain such an inconsistent attitude, one must realize that since the passage of the Tsongas resolution (10), the United States Afghan policy has been drafted in Congress under pressure from a lobby including ultraconservatives as well as liberals such as Solarz, rather than by the Administration itself. It is common knowledge that both the State Department and the CIA were hostile to any qualitative increase in aid to the Resistance (11). While the Administration prefers to keep a low profile, Congress and the President intend, in contrast, to mediatize and make the most of their support among American public opinion.

Torn between the contradictory exigencies of its allies, the Afghan Resistance therefore has a great deal of trouble asserting its autonomy because it has no funds of its own (the population and the refugees are too poor to finance a liberation movement). And yet, such autonomy is the prime condition for diplomatic progress in the Third World that might bring the USSR to negotiate. Here, the Europeans and the few Third World countries committed to the Resistance have a role to play. They must aid the Afghans fighting the regime in Kabul to open up diplomatic representations abroad, to coordinate their propaganda and contacts with the media and to obtain the funds needed for their fight. Why, in the name of realism, should the annexation of Afghanistan be sanctioned? On the contrary, political barriers must be erected preventing the Soviets from completing their conquest. The Afghans themselves have refused to hand their country over to the Soviets. Their will to survive must wrench us out of our "pessimism of the intellect."

FOOTNOTES

1. On 1 April 1985, the seven Muslim fundamentalist parties and the three moderate guerrilla movements decided to coordinate their fight against the Soviet occupation. This agreement in principle does not, however, provide any merger of the different parties making up the Afghan Resistance. The three main forces of the Resistance remain the Jamiat Islami of Dr Rabbani, supporter of a return to democracy within the framework of an Islamic society; the Hezb-i islami of Hekmatyar, endowed with a highly structured military organization and defending a very radical Islamic ideology; and the Harakat Islami, a moderate clerical party.
2. This would be the first time in history that a government in power would be kicked out of the UN General Assembly and replaced by an opposition movement. Certain Arab countries could use this precedent as an excuse to ask that the members of the PLO take their seats in place of representatives of the Israeli Government.
3. The United States has never taken up the theme of the "Great Game" so dear to the British until 1947 (see, in this connection, Michael Barry, "L'Afghanistan entre Marx et le Coran" [Afghanistan Between Marx and the Koran], *POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE*, No 31, spring 1986, pp 145-166, Ed. Note). Rightly or wrongly, it has never granted Afghanistan strategic value. It was one of the last Western countries to send an ambassador, refused to equip the Afghan Army in 1955 and did not react to the communist coup

d'etat until after the assassination of its ambassador, Adolf Dubbs, on 14 February 1979.

4. The nonaligned countries held their eighth summit conference in Harare, Zimbabwe, from 1 to 7 September 1986.
5. On 30 September 1985, four Soviet diplomats were kidnapped by the Islamic Liberation Organization, which includes Sunnite fundamentalists. On 2 October, one of these hostages, Arkadi Katokov, was murdered and the kidnappers also threatened to execute his three companions "if the attack of the unbelievers and the atheists on the city of Tripoli" did not stop immediately. Finally, following negotiations between the Progressive Socialist Party of Walid Joumblatt and the kidnappers, the three hostages were released on 30 October.
6. Hazarajat: region in the center of Afghanistan.
7. Reformist religious movement founded by Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab (1703-1791). Wahhabism preaches strict application of Islamic law. It served as a foundation for the creation of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932 and still represents the official doctrine of the Saudi Government.
8. When they analyze the Afghan conflict, the Indians engage in "wishful thinking." They do not refer to the fighting and act as if the regime in Kabul were stable, legitimate and independent. The Indian Congress is represented at the congress of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.
9. Burhannudin Rabbani, head of the Jamiat Islami Party and spokesman of the Islamic Alliance of the Mojahidin of Afghanistan, was received by Jacques Chirac on 23 June 1986.
10. Passed on 4 October 1984 by the American Congress, the Tsongas Resolution appeals for aid to the Afghan Resistance, "not only to fight, but to win."
11. This aid is distributed over several budgets. It is made up of official humanitarian aid, military aid allocated to Afghanistan by the Congress, and aid from the CIA's own funds. All together, calculated for the duration of the second term of Ronald Reagan, it represents some \$500 million.

11,464

CSO: 4619/14

AFGHAN REBELS INSIST ON 'PUPPET' REGIME'S REMOVAL

PM101409 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 5 Apr 87 p 5

[Undated interview with Afghan resistance leaders Mohammad Eshaq and Prof Sayd Baha'uddin Majrun by Bo Kage Carlsson: "The Soviet Troop Withdrawal Is Only The First Step"]

[Text] Peshawar--"If we do not get total freedom we will not accept any peace settlement," said Mohammad Eshaq, who is the political spokesman for one of the largest Afghan resistance groups, Jami'at-e Eslami.

"We are not directly involved in the Geneva negotiations between the Pakistani Government and the communist regime in Kabul," he went on.

"The whole scenario could be an attempt to isolate the resistance movement. What is more, it can also be seen as a Soviet attempt to appear more conciliatory and sophisticated than in the past."

Eshaq said that the main question is how genuine Moscow's wish for a peaceful settlement is.

"Do they really intend to abandon their puppet regime? If they do, it will disintegrate very quickly.

"If they see that happening, will they then try to return?"

Eshaq, who has himself lost two brothers in the war, said that the resistance movement is not prepared to allow any communist regime to remain in power in government in Kabul. He stressed that the fight against communism was begun even before the Soviet invasion at Christmas time in 1979. It began when a communist coup took place in the spring of 1978.

"That is why it is not enough for the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops. We also have to get rid of the communists in the puppet government.

"We are afraid that the Russians are playing a dishonest game, that they are trying to isolate the resistance movement, and that they are putting their efforts into keeping the Kabul regime as it is now."

Eshaq considers, however, that it would be difficult to make people accept this. Not even if the Soviet Union invests in an enormous aid program after a peace settlement and before the guerrillas can move freely inside Afghanistan, not even then could Najibullah's regime be credible, tainted as the regime is now, he said. That is why the Soviet Union is demanding to be allowed to keep its troops in the country for 18 months from the day an agreement is reached effectively ending the war.

"In our view an 18-month transition period is too long, but even so it is too short to rehabilitate the Kabul regime," Eshaq said.

"This is because the communists are very heterogenous. They have difficulty in agreeing on anything. A large number of them are people who are simply out to get rich."

According to Eshaq the resistance movement can envisage a transitional government involving the communists, but that is all.

"What we can stretch to is to give them assurances that during such a period we would have normal relations with them on the condition that in the same period they do not interfere in our affairs.

"We are aiming at creating a genuinely independent Afghanistan, which will be a member of, for example, the United Nations and the Islamic Conference.

Eshaq has no doubts about the resistance movement's ability to rule the country, even though he admits that it has been unable to gather itself into a united political movement during more than 7 years of war.

He pointed to a number of factors which hold the groups together:

They are recruited at grassroots level, unlike the past, elitist regimes which have ruled the country.

They are all agreed that Islam is a strong foundation. The left-wing nationalists, who to begin with were a separate segment within the resistance movement, have been absorbed by the various Islamic groups as the war has progressed.

They are all in favor of the country's being ruled by an elected government. He said that a return to monarchy -- a suggestion that has been put forward in recent weeks -- is out of the question.

The war has shown that ethnic divisions are not great enough to prevent joint action for a united Afghanistan.

Professor Sayd Baha'uddin Majruh, who is head of the Afghan Information Centre [name given in English] in Peshawar, thinks that the improvement in the resistance movement's military position has helped to make the Soviet Union more ready to negotiate.

"The Russians can pressure the Pakistani Government by bombing border villages, as they have been doing recently. They can make transport movements more difficult for us in this way for a week or two. But they know that they cannot keep up surveillance on the entire border zone for more than short periods.

"We are worried to a certain extent by the negotiations which are going on without our involvement. It is a problem that the talks are going on with the puppet regime in Kabul, which is thus given some legitimacy.

"As I see it, it is impossible to arrive at a solution which includes the Kabul regime.

"The Soviet military withdrawal is a problem, but the question of the Kabul regime's future is the real obstacle to a peaceful settlement."

Majruh said that he is afraid that the question of guarantees will prove more difficult to solve than the Pakistani leaders have so far indicated regarding the state of the negotiations.

"The Russians for their part take the view that the function of guarantees is to protect the Kabul regime from external threats from the United States and Pakistan.

"We on the other hand take the view that international guarantees mean that in the future the Russians will not invade us and will stop interfering in our internal affairs."

Majruh's interpretation is more pessimistic than the official Pakistani version, which is that the major crux of the negotiations is the timetable for an end to the war, an end to outside support for the guerrillas, and the Soviet troops' withdrawal.

/12624

CSO: 4600/193

PROJECT TO AUGMENT WATER SUPPLY

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 24 Feb 87 p 1

[Text]

The water supply department of the Ministry of Construction has extended to 30 km the water supply network in Kabul city and its surrounding areas in the current Afghan year and partially solve the problem of drinking water in the city.

The department founded 11 years ago supplies drinking water to over one million people in the capital and in provinces at a rate of 80,000 cu.m. in 24 hours distributed through 828 km of pipes, said Abdul Satar Oria, the President.

Taking into view the population growth of Kabul and provinces, drinking water is in sufficient and the country is ranked among the lowest, in potable water supply.

A big project constructed on the banks of Logar river with a capacity of 35,000 cu.m. supplies drinking water to 27,000 persons.

In the international decade of water (1980-1990) announced by the UN over 800,000 dollars have been given by the UNDP and WHO for purchasing equipment and employing foreign experts for the installation of water supply equipment. The project estimated to cost 900 million Afs will augment the water supply considerably.

To meet the needs for drinking water a factory producing concrete pipes and water taps was set up at a cost of 35 million Afs by the department in HS 1362 and will soon be commissioned. Production by the factory will help to prevent the out flow of foreign exchange.

/9317

CSO: 4600/195

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

70 SOVIET SOLDIERS REPORTEDLY KILLED--Islamabad, 8 Apr (AFP)--Seventy Soviet soldiers manning a military post near Khenjan in northern Afghanistan's Salang region were killed by an avalanche last week, western diplomats said Wednesday. Quoting diplomatic sources in Afghanistan, they said the snow blocked the main Salang Highway, and Soviet forces used artillery to clear a passage. [Text] [Hong Kong AFP in English 1010 GMT 8 Apr 87 BK] /12624

CSO: 4600/193

FISHING WAR WITH PAKISTAN REPORTED BUILDING

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 14 Mar 87 p 7

[Text]

Islamabad, March 13 (PTI)

— A fishing war on the high seas appears to be building up with maritime agencies of India and Pakistan seizing fishing vessels for violating their exclusive economic zones.

An exact number of fighting vessels seized and crew members arrested by the two sides is not readily available here.

In the latest incident, 11 Indian fishing vessels were seized last Sunday by the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency and all the 96 crew members were taken into custody. A total fish catch of about 9,510 kg was confiscated.

Simultaneously, the 60 crew members of the two Taiwanese-Singapore trawlers, reportedly chartered by an Indian firm, arrested earlier were convicted, sent to jail and fined Rs four lakh.

The fine was realised by selling 43,000 kilograms of the seized fish for Rs 3.55 lakh.

An editorial in the English daily, *The Muslim*, suggested that the two countries enter into urgent negotiations and undertake joint supervision of the area to prevent this unnecessary fishing war from escalating.

Unlike on land, there is no clear no-man's area between the two seas, the daily wrote.

A controversy is growing among the several Pakistan Government agencies as to how to proceed with prosecution of the foreign fishing vessels seized in the country's economic zone.

Pakistan does not have adequate facilities to berth all such vessels, jail facilities to imprison the arrested crew or refrigerated space to store the fish.

/12379

CSO: 4600/1532

SPACE RESEARCH HEAD DISCUSSES SOVIET OFFER

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 15 Mar 87 p 9

[Text]

NEW DELHI, March 14.

THE Soviet Union, as a space power, is in the international market offering its space-related services at a time when no launchers are available in the western world.

However, the response of potential customers is far from enthusiastic and is tempered with non-technical and non-commercial considerations.

Academician R. Sagdeyev, director of the Institute of Space Research, told this paper here today that several potential customers were fighting shy because of the U.S. embargo on transfer of American components used in a satellite to a Soviet launching station.

He hoped that this political discrimination would end now since the Soviet Union had given an assurance that all satellites received for launching would be treated as special "guests" who could be placed under the protective custody of the client company or country on a round-the-clock basis till they are launched.

The Russian launch service is very competitive, according to Mr. Sagdeyev. The U.S. as well as France, who are in the commercial business of launching satellites, have long waiting lists since the U.S. space shuttle, the Delta rocket as well as the French Ariane, have run into technical problems that have upset all schedules.

The Soviet Union had launched two Indian satellites, Aryabhata and Bhaskara, without any commercial consideration but the launching of the

new Indian remote sensing satellite later this year will be partly commercial.

Russian remote sensing services as well as satellite communication services are also available to other countries, according to Mr. Sagdeyev. The Russian remote sensing satellites have a resolution of 10 metres and the reception infrastructure is being expanded.

The Soviet communications satellite system is more flexible and covers sub-polar regions also. The Soviet Union can offer communication satellites which India is currently buying from the United States.

The Soviet proposal for an international space centre which was mooted by Mr. Gorbachov during his visit here, will come up for discussions with the Indian team led by the space commission chairman, Prof. U. R. Rao.

Mr. Sagdeyev will be visiting Bangalore to follow up the proposal for the international centre. The concept of the Centre is to be fully evolved, he says.

The Soviet proposal envisaged a regional centre for peaceful space activity which could later be part of an international network to be co-ordinated by the U.N. to begin with, it could be bilateral or regional, he says.

The Soviet Union and India will also enhance their co-operation in the field of space sciences. One of the important areas identified by the two sides is that of Gamma ray astronomy.

/12379

CSO: 4600/1533

OFFICIAL TELLS INDIAN SUCCESS AT MOSCOW FAIR

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 8 Mar 87 p 9

[Text]

Moscow, March 7 (PTI)— Indian businessmen signed contracts valued at approximately Rs 40 crore with Soviet trading organisations during the exhibition of Indian trade and industry held here from 23 February to 4 March, Indian embassy official S K Bhatnagar told PTI yesterday.

Further negotiations are expected to lead to additional contracts worth Rs 22 crore, Mr Bhatnagar said.

He said the exhibition was 'extremely successful' in bringing together a large number of Soviet experts, buying agencies of Soviet ministries and Indian businessmen.

Over 5,500 Soviet specialists in consumer goods and capital goods, automobile industry, agriculture machinery.

Electronics, pharmaceuticals and machine tools held detailed discussions with their Indian counterparts in both the public

and private sectors, he said. Some 800 of them attended the six seminars organised by Indian organisations.

The Soviet specialists were particularly interested in computer-controlled machine tools, computers and computer software and other electronic goods, embassy official Sudhir Nath said.

Both Soviet organisations and Indian companies are of the view that these items offer considerable potential for growth in Indo-Soviet trade.

Chief executives of foreign trading organisations and enterprises which now have direct access to foreign markets were the other business visitors.

More than 80,000 Muscovites came during the hours for the general public and evinced keen interest in the display of the wide range of consumer goods, Mr Sudhir Nath said.

/12379

CSO: 4600/1527

DETAILS ON 9 MAR SPEECH BY PRC TRADE DELEGATION LEADER

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 10 Mar 87 p 9

[Text]

NEW DELHI, March 9.—China will continue to follow an open-door economic policy, encourage foreign investment and set up joint ventures, especially in its special economic zones, coastal cities and coastal development zones, Mr Jia Shi, leader of a visiting Chinese delegation and chairman of the Chinese Council for Promotion of International Trade, said here today.

Addressing the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, he conceded that China's earlier policy of total self-reliance has not yielded the desired results. The Chinese economy is undergoing qualitative changes in several directions. The process of economic reforms is on. However, the country is still in a transition between the old and new economic systems.

China's open-door economic policy, Mr Jia said, would allow the setting up of export-oriented joint enterprises, efficient utilization of foreign capital, development of infrastructure in special zones, management autonomy to the foreign investor and preferential treatment in the remittance of profits. There were 4,000 important technological units in the coastal areas.

He invited FICCI to send a business delegation to China in the near future to have a closer view of the Chinese economy and explore the possibility of tie-ups.

Mr Jia said the Chinese economy had taken significant strides in agriculture and industry last year. Agricultural output in terms of value had increased by 3.5% and national income by 7.4% over 1985.

Mr Jia said that foreign business enterprises were welcome to set up offices in China and some countries had already done so.

China had imported too many consumer goods and used up too much of its foreign exchange. "We hold that it should not be one way traffic but on the basis of equality. Sometimes, however, one party may enjoy a surplus. Joint efforts for mutual benefit are desirable", he said. He also

stressed the need for exchange of information.

Mr R. P. Goenka, president of FICCI, said the Indian private sector could be a meaningful partner in China's economic development and modernization programme.

Though two-way trade had risen to \$100 million in 1985-86, it was far below the potential. He hoped that the trade agreement and trade protocol between the two countries would help expand and balance the bilateral trade.

A recent FICCI study showed that Indian businessmen were keen to export to China items like agricultural implements, two-wheeler scooters, steel wires, coffee, chrome ore, tempered glass, light engineering and industrial goods and equipment for paper plants and transformers. Indian companies would also like to import a variety of products from China, including raw silk, wood pulp, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, industrial raw materials, engineering goods and plastic materials.

Mr Goenka said that Indian firms had developed a wide variety of good quality computer software at a low cost which has proved its worth in the U.S., Russian and Gulf markets and also in South-east Asia and Africa. It would be of mutual advantage if China could import its requirements in this area from India, he added.

Indian participants suggested joint ventures with China in the manufacture of bicycles, consumer durables, electric appliances, building materials, tractors and agricultural implements and also in the setting up of hotels and power stations.

The leader of the Chinese delegation promised that specific proposals would be conveyed to the concerned departments and discussed in details while formulating the trade protocol for 1987. A meeting has been arranged in China some time in May this year.

One participant favoured counter-trade to balance Indo-Chinese trade. Mr. Liangling, the Chinese Ambassador, admitted that mutual trade did not match the size and populations of the two countries. He hoped for stable growth.

/12379

CSO: 4600/1529

BUSINESSMEN DISCUSS RECENT INDO-EEC TALKS

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 18 Mar 87 p 12

[Text] Mr B. N. Bhattacharya, president of the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said that it had been agreed at the recent Brussels session of the Indo-EEC joint commission that the EEC would intensify trade promotion programmes for Indian products. It was also agreed that the EEC would assist modernizing India's quality testing laboratories so that Indian products would be recognized in European markets. Entrepreneurs from European countries were, however, wary of collaborating with Indian entrepreneurs in the small and medium sectors, members of the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce and Industry told Mr Brian Hill, adviser, Indo-European Business Development Centre, at a meeting in Calcutta on Tuesday. Only big Indian companies succeed in securing collaboration for technology transfer, they said. Mr Hill highlighted the need for an agency, which could negotiate business deals in the small and medium sectors. The centre, he thought, could be the vital missing link. It could carry out the exhaustive market surveys required for providing technological and financial assistance. Mr Hill also listed some of the problems faced by European entrepreneurs while entering into collaboration with Indian ventures, such as tax deductions on royalty and lump-sum payments. India has a large trade deficit with the EEC, nearly to the tune of Rs 3,215 crores in 1985-86, Mr Bhattacharya said. It could be made up to some extent by stepping up the export of goods produced by small and medium industries. Products of the small-scale sector account for 25% of total Indian exports and the main items included garments, sports goods, marine products, leather and engineering goods.

/12379

CSO: 4600/1536

PAPERS REPORT ON VISIT OF FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER

Differences, Agreement Discussed

Madras THE HINDU in English 6 Mar 87 p 1

[Article by G.K. Reddy]

[Text]

NEW DELHI, March 5.

The French Foreign Minister, Mr. Jean-Bernard Raimond, who arrived in Delhi today on a two-day official visit, began his busy schedule with a call on the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, followed by detailed discussions with the External Affairs Minister, Mr. N. D. Tewari, on both bilateral and international issues.

He will be meeting the Defence Minister, Mr. V. P. Singh, and the Minister for Human Resource Development, Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao, tomorrow before concluding his talks with Mr. Tewari and addressing a press conference.

There has been an exchange of correspondence between the Prime Ministers of India and France, in the light of the various visits that have taken place by senior Ministers and others from the two sides, on how to step up Indo-French economic cooperation.

The relations between the two countries at the political level have been very good over the years with a reassuring degree of continuity despite changes of Government. The Indian Prime Minister has established an equally warm relationship with both the President, Mr. Francois Mitterrand, and the French Prime Minister, Mr. Jacques Chirac, despite the fact that they belong to different political parties and are presently engaged in the novel experiment of what has come to be known as cohabitation.

A major bottleneck: Though India has a well-established economic relationship with France extending from fairly extensive defence purchases to a wide range of industrial co-operation, one of the major bottlenecks to further expansion and diversification has been the payment procedures and interest rates. Almost every major contract gets inordinately delayed by protracted financial negotiations.

An attempt is, therefore, being made to evolve mutually agreeable criteria and work out the broad pattern of payment procedures for avoiding delays in the finalisation of

technology transfer, industrial collaboration and purchase agreements in future. The talks that Mr. Raimond is having in Delhi will help to carry forward this process for expanding Indo-French economic cooperation.

High degree of understanding: At the political level, India and France continue to maintain a high degree of understanding over a wide range of international issues, especially on subjects like North-South cooperation, East-West relations, the role of non-alignment, the need for a new international economic order and opposition to apartheid and other forms of racial discrimination. The French Government has been extending its support to the non-aligned community in its crusade against the Pretoria regime and the objectives of the AFRICA Fund to help build up the economies of the Southern Africa frontline States.

But there are also issues like disarmament and suspension of nuclear tests on which India and France differ, since their thinking is con-

ditioned by the exigencies of their respective environments. The French believe in asserting their independence even to the point of disagreeing with their other western allies over some issues while remaining part of the North Atlantic alliance. The Government of India, on the other hand, has tended to take a wider view of its commitments to many international causes often transcending its national interests.

It is against this general background that the visiting French Foreign Minister began his series of high-level discussions in Delhi today on both national and international issues in an atmosphere of better appreciation of each other's approaches and interests. The French Government continues to attach high importance to the development of close political, economic and cultural relations with India.

And the French Government is planning in a big way to make the Festival of France in India next year an important landmark in the development and consolidation of these relations.

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 6 Mar 87 p 6

[Text]

India and France on Thursday reviewed bilateral economic cooperation and discussed in detail some measures to step up their commercial exchanges and correct the trade imbalance currently weighted against India.

The issues came up during visiting French Foreign Minister Jean Bernard Raimond's 25-minute with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and his two-and-a-half hour official talks with External Affairs Minister N D Tiwari later in the afternoon.

During what was described as courtesy call, Mr Raimond conveyed to Mr Gandhi greetings from French President Francois Mitterrand and Premier Jacques Chirac. The focus at the 150-minute official talks later with Mr Tiwari was on bilateral relations, an official spokesman said.

The two Ministers reviewed Indo-French bilateral economic cooperation in diverse fields and discussed ways to step up trade and commercial exchanges. Attention was also paid to the need to reduce India's deficit in trade with France.

During the talks, Mr Tiwari is learnt to have referred to the terms of credit extended by France and repayments, which India has felt were harsher than prevailing international credit facilities. Mr Tiwari sought the credit terms reviewed.

The scheduled launching of an Indian satellite by a French carrier rocket "Ariane" later this year and the holding of the French Festival in India later next year were also discussed.

During the review of the international situation, Mr Raimond is learnt to have stressed France's opposition to apartheid, and spelt out some of the economic measures taken against South Africa. He, however, also extended reasons for France's reservations to imposition of mandatory economic sanctions against the Pretoria regime.

At a dinner hosted by Mr Tiwari in Mr Raimond's honour lat-

er in the night, the two leaders spoke of "shared approaches" and shared principles" which have helped "substantial, confident and friendly bilateral relations".

Reiterating the importance France attaches to relations with India, Mr Raimond expressed readiness to extend cooperation in all fields, based on India's priorities, where France "could combine our technological, industrial, financial and human resources". France does not intend to neglect or forget her friends who are far from her, he assured.

Observing that in an interdependent world, imbalances of one country affect the economy of others and harm their development, Mr Raimond said France attached importance to a more efficient dialogue between major developing countries and the industrialised countries.

He noted that to foster development reduction in levels of armaments was necessary, and said while there might be some differences in the approach to the problems, India and France shared the same objective.

Stressing that disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, was a prerequisite for peace and was intimately related to development, Mr Tiwari expressed the hope that the voice of reason would ultimately prevail and the world leaders would strive hard to free the world from threats of conflict and confrontation.

As a participant in the Six-Nation Initiative, India has appealed to the world leaders to start a process towards universal nuclear disarmament, Mr Tiwari said and noted that India had supported France's initiative to focus world attention on inter-relationship between disarmament and development.

Mr Tiwari spoke of India's modest but steady rate of growth and efforts to utilise modern technology for the welfare of the common man, and said in this endeavour opportunities exist for friends to cooperate. He expressed confidence that opportu-

nities for thick contacts and collaboration between India and France would be utilised fully.

The Foreign Minister, the first French dignitary to visit India since the right-wing Government of Mr Jacques Chirac came to power a year back, was earlier in the morning accorded warm welcome on arrival at Palam airport.

/12379

CSO: 4600/1531

TRADE PROTOCOL SIGNED WITH BULGARIA

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 7 Mar 87 p 9

[Text]

India and Bulgaria fixed on Friday a trade turnover of about Rs 170 crore this year envisaging a 50 per cent increase over 1986, reports UNI.

An arrangement between the State Bank of India and the Foreign Trade Bank of Bulgaria has also been reached to monitor the trade flows, according to an official release.

The agreed minutes in this regard were initialled by Commerce Ministry Joint Secretary B K Chaturvedi and Bulgaria's First Deputy Minister of Trade Vladimir Lambrev at the end of the two-day official-level trade talks in Delhi.

Both sides emphasised the need for achieving higher levels of trade on a balanced basis.

Among other things India will export soyameal extraction, leather and leather goods, iron ore, tobacco, jute products, mica and mica products, hosiery, knitwear, textiles, computer software and peripherals and consumer electronics to Bulgaria.

Bulgaria will sell India ferrous and non-ferrous metals, rolled steel products, chemicals, soda ash, drugs and pharmaceuticals, newsprint and electronic components.

Bilateral trade in 1986 was of the order of about Rs 110 crore with India's exports accounting for Rs 54 crore and imports being marginally higher at Rs 57 crore. Indian exports including engineering goods registered an increase of 42 per cent compared to 1985.

/12379

CSO: 4600/1524

PAPER REPORTS ON VISIT OF ROMANIAN PRESIDENT

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 11 Mar 87 p 1

[Text]

India and Romania on Tuesday called for urgent, resolute measures towards nuclear disarmament, and resolution of global economic debt and repayments crisis to facilitate development and growth of the not-rich and poor countries of the world.

At a banquet hosted by President Zail Singh in honour of visiting Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu Tuesday night, both leaders expressed concern at the deteriorating international situation, and affirmed opposition to the extension of nuclear arms race to outer space.

The danger of nuclear catastrophe is already hanging over humanity. The frightening spectre of the nuclear arms race being extended to outer space augments the danger, President Zail Singh said.

Stressing that disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, is the "crying need of the hour", Mr Zail Singh called upon all states, irrespective of their sizes and regardless of their socio-economic systems, to join together in finding solutions that would halt and reverse nuclear arms race and reduce tensions in the world.

Referring to the situation in the sub-continent, the President regretted that India's sincere efforts to build bridges of understanding with neighbours, for solving problems through bilateral political dialogue and to promote regional cooperation through regional dialogue and conciliation "are being thwarted".

Though the President did not name any country, he did refer to efforts by some to "prepare for war". The need for peaceful coexistence is not a remote ideal, but a dire necessity today, he added.

Referring to the present global economic debt and repayments crisis, Mr Zail Singh warned that the existence of a few rich amongst many poor is a factor of instability and a potential threat to peace and security in the world. India, he said, stood unequivocally committed to the new international economic order.

President Ceausescu welcomed Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's latest proposal on medium-range missiles withdrawal from Europe, and expressed the hope that the US too would reply in a positive manner to what could be the first step, conducive to elimination of all nuclear weapons from the continent.

Elimination of nuclear weapons ought to be paralleled by measures to cut conventional weapons as well as troops and military expenditure, Mr Ceausescu said, and welcomed India's and the six-nation initiative towards nuclear disarmament.

Mr Ceausescu also made a pointed reference to Romania's old demand for turning the Balkans into nuclear-free and chemical weapons free zone, and dismantling of all foreign military bases in the region.

The Romanian President said the international situation had become very serious and complex as a result of arms race, interference in other states' affairs, and world economic crisis. All that increases the danger of a world war and a nuclear catastrophe, he said.

Romania, Mr Ceausescu said, stood for elimination of force and threat of force from international relations, and for settlement of all conflicts in various parts of the world, including West Asia, Central America and Asia, through negotiated political means.

He also called for an international conference under the UN aegis with equal participation of the developing and the developed countries for global settlement of the debts and repayments issues.

Trade accord: Meanwhile, India and Romania also decided to increase their Rs 600 crore a year bilateral trade at least twofold by 1990, and concluded agreements on long-term economic, scientific and technical cooperation and avoidance of double taxation.

The tone and the tenor for the decisions were set by over 120-minute separate talks without aides between Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and visiting Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu at Rashtrapati Bhavan Tuesday afternoon.

During their meeting, the two leaders are understood to have discussed a wide range of international issues, including the situation in the subcontinent and India's relations with neighbouring Pakistan and China, and bilateral Indo-Romanian relations.

Later the two leaders joined the ministerial level talks at full delegation level, led by Commerce Minister P Shiv Shankar and Romanian Deputy Premier Dimitrie Ancuta.

At Mr Gandhi and Mr Ceausescu's suggestion, the ministerial meeting also decided to pay greater attention to scientific, technical and cultural relations. Details would be worked out during a visit by a high-level Indian delegation to Romania in the near future.

/12379

CSO: 4600/1534

DEFENSE BUDGET FOR 1987-88 CRITICIZED IN DETAIL

BK221220 Delhi INDIAN EXPRESS in English 9 Mar 87 p 8

[Article by B.G. Verghese, "Defence Budget: Case for a Cut"]

[Text] The outstanding feature of the 1987-88 budget is the whopping Rs 3,784 crore or 43 percent increase in the outlay of "Defence Services" so-called over the current year's budget estimate (Rs. 8,728 crore), exceeding the incremental growth in central Plan expenditure for next year. The projected figure of Rs 12,512 crore, as against the revised estimate of Rs 10,194 crore for 1986-87, has obviously contributed in good measure to the large uncovered deficits which the Prime Minister has said he does not like.

To Rs 12,512 crore for "Defence Services" must be added a sum of Rs 926.77 crore under "Defence Civil Estimates." This consists of Rs 703.86 crore on Defence pensions and Rs 222.91 crore towards revenue and capital outlays on miscellaneous general and secretariat services, housing, public works, and non-plan investments in and loans to various Defence enterprises other than Ordnance factories. Additionally, the Government has "sums guaranteed or outstanding" on "Defence production and supplies" amounting to Rs 115.16 crore as of 31 December 1986. Ignoring this last figure, the overall Defence outlay for 1987-88 comes to Rs 13,438.77 crore.

Most people appear to condone this level of Defence outlay as inevitable. Presenting the budget, the Prime Minister, doubling as Finance Minister, said: "The budget estimate for Defence... has naturally cast a heavy burden on our budgetary resources, but the house will agree with me that no compromise is possible where the country's defence is concerned." The question is wrongly put. Uncritical acceptance of what is fast becoming a runaway burden is unwise. There is a considerable opportunity cost involved and there are ways of ensuring national security, which admittedly none would wish genuinely to prejudice, without merely piling up defence expenditure.

Indeed the true cost of security is higher if one includes the estimated Rs 376.49 crore for the Border Security Force; Rs 44.27 crore for the Indo-Tibet Border Police; Rs 123.23 crore for the Assam Rifles; and Rs 8.16 crore for "strategic and border roads" which are listed outside the Defence Budget. These four items add up to another Rs 653.38 crore. Taken with the outlay on Defence Services, the aggregate external security budget comes to Rs 14,092.15 crore. Other paramilitary formations such as the CRPF (Rs 51.17 crore) may be

classified as coming under the internal security budget along with the Police, Special Armed Police, Homeguards and the like.

Implementation of the Fourth Pay Commission's recommendations has necessarily added to the Defence burden, including pension liabilities. But this must have been anticipated when in December 1985 the then Finance Minister, Mr V.P. Singh presented the Government's Long-Term Fiscal Policy (LTFP). He then told Parliament that against a Seventh Plan public sector outlay of Rs 180,000 crore, Defence expenditure was estimated to be on the order of Rs 45,000 crore during the same period. Defence expenditure, he said, was expected "to grow modestly" as a percentage of GNP from 3.3 percent to 3.8 percent in 1984-85 prices in the quinquennium 1985-90. The latest estimate of GNP is Rs 213,553 crore in 1985-86. Even assuming a 5 percent rate of growth over the next two years, defence expenditure would work out at 5.3 percent of GNP in 1987-88.

Again, the actual, revised budget estimate for Defence Services for the three years, 1985-88, totals Rs 31,095 crore or approximately Rs 28,100 crore in 1984-85 prices. Given an outlay on Defence Services in the next two years no higher than the 1987-88 figure of Rs 12,512 crore (reduced to 1984-85 prices) the overall Defence Services expenditure in the quinquennium 1985-90 will be around Rs 50,500 crore or Rs 5,500 crore in excess of the LTFP forecast. If expenditure in the remaining two years goes up by even 10 percent and no more, the total overrun in 1984-85 rupees might be on the order of Rs 8,000 crore. This is something to ponder. Are there any options? There are.

Of next year's Defence outlay of Rs 12,512 crore, Rs 3,094 or just under 25 percent will go in pay and allowances. But if one takes the Army estimates alone, excluding the Navy and Air Force, pay and allowances at Rs 2,183.38 crore accounts for over 34 percent of the expenditure of Rs 6,359.47 crore. The Army will also account for at least Rs 600 crore if not more of the total Defence pension liability of Rs 703.86 crore in 1987-88. Pension costs are going to rise sharply as the post-1962 intake (that doubled the Army's strength) retires. This liability will plateau to rise again, as the strength of the Army was further increased from 825,000 men to over 1.1 million into the 1980s. Manpower therefore is a significant cost.

Inventories constitute another very large item, the value of stores held by the three services being estimated in 1987-88 at Rs 4,113.67 crore. This comes to some 32 percent of the total Defence Services estimate. Better storekeeping and inventory control is necessary. Clearly this effort is under way as the 1987-88 estimate for stores is Rs 738.75 crore less than the figure for the current year at Rs 4,852.42 crore. This reduction of 15 percent, if much or all of it can be attributed to tighter inventory control, is creditable. But more can be done. Both the system of holdings from base depots to field formations and the ratio of war reserves to production/maintenance capability need constant and rigorous attention. The "civilianisation" of defence production in certain areas could possibly obviate the need to hold large reserves given a quicker production-peaking capability. Standardisation would obviously help. The new Defence Minister must devote special attention to systems analysis and more effective management techniques in which mobility will obviously play a crucial part.

Another, more complex area of defence management that Mr V.P. Singh must tackle is manpower planning. Gone are the days when soldiers were mere cannon-fodder. The concept of a "front-line" has also begun to blur with mobile warfare and combined operations. Does, then, India need a 1.1 million-man Army? Fire-power, force-multipliers, mobility, communications and other systems are going to be more relevant in the fairly limited-duration wars of the future rather than in long drawn out wars of attrition like the Iran-Iraq conflict.

Two questions then arise. Would India's security be better off with a smaller Army that is better-equipped and more mobile, say of half a million men, with compact strike divisions trading punch and speed for numbers? That way manpower requirements would fall while equipment costs would correspondingly rise. Alternatively, could India work to a 10-year plan to reduce core Army strength to, say, a quarter of a million professionals, supported by maybe 750,000 or fewer national service conscripts serving for two to three years, perhaps longer in some semi-technical branches. Military conscription should in this context, appropriately form part of a wider national service corps programme for high-school leavers or other youth.

The present manpower structure of the Army is no longer suited to the time, with most jawans retiring after 17 or more years while still in the prime of life. Officers go up the ladder to the rank of Lt. Col (or equivalent) and retire thereafter at 50 years of age and every two years unless promoted to the next higher rank. This has led to bunching, stagnation and loss of morale. Rehabilitating a jawan or officer in the 35-50 year age group is difficult and would not be necessary after a three year national service stint at the age of 21 or 22 with credit given for military experience in a variety of ways. Bulk retirement at this age would also significantly reduce both pay and allowances and pensions (as national service conscripts would earn no pension) and reduce the requirement for married accommodation as well. A younger Army will also be fitter and more adaptive to technological change.

National service conscripts qualifying for permanent service and desirous of making a military career could stay on. The others could be given the option to join the police and paramilitary forces or enter civilian life as students or trainees and job-seekers.

The proposed changes in manning and equipment would need to go with a new military doctrine. Threat perceptions and military-crisis management however, can and must be modified to a considerable degree by diplomacy. To that extent, the latest Rs 12,512 crore Defence Budget represents in some way a failure of foreign policy. Those who speak of not compromising on security and teaching others a lesson must know that jaw-jaw is better than war-war and that jingoism is not the same as patriotism or civilised prudence. Operation Brasstacks and the "red alert" it triggered will between them have cost the country, who knows, a nice Rs 500 crore or thereabouts. Military exercises are, of course, necessary and equipment cannot be forever mothballed. But the course of Operation Brasstacks in its political-cum-military unfolding reinforces the feeling that the lines between foreign policy and defence can get blurred and have got blurred all too often in the recent past with some people striking military postures--for that is what they are shorn of the

verbiage--when they should be searching for more productive and far-sighted diplomatic postures.

India has no need to enter into an arms race with Pakistan, as it has done. Pakistan is primarily re-arming against India and India against Pakistan. Both face other threats as well, but their primary concern is the other. The prospect of Pakistan going nuclear, to be able to look India in the eye, has unleashed more panic and a fierce new argument. Rather than plead with others to stop Pakistan going nuclear or unwisely seek to match its nuclear progress, India could equally attempt to blunt Pakistan's motivation by pressing ahead with a dialogue for peace and friendship which has always faltered on ancient prejudice and suspicion, both ways. India's lofty ideals of disarmament and peace somehow all too often take a hard knock nearer home. This has undermined the moral basis of its foreign policy and enabled all others, friends and foes alike, to play off this country against Pakistan and vice versa, to their mutual insecurity. The arms merchants, East and West, continue to have a field day.

There is a border problem with China that still awaits resolution. One framework for settlement could be to accept Nepal's plea for recognition as a Zone of Peace and to extend this principal along the Himalayan fold including Arunachal and Ladakh, Bhutan (if it so desires) and the other mountain regions, as well as Tibet and a swathe of Xinjiang on the other side of the hill. This would fit with revival of the spirit and content of the Sino-Indian Treaty of 1954, the Panch Sheel Treaty, governing the relations between India and the Tibet region of China. Cultural autonomy and customary intercourse for this cis-and-trans Himalayan belt, as accepted by the Chinese in their 1951 Agreement with Tibet and renewed in 1956, could if revived, also create the conditions in which the Dalai Lama and his followers might be persuaded to return to Tibet with dignity and honour. The Zone of Peace could be demilitarised.

Likewise, J&K [Jammu and Kashmir] along an adjusted line of control converted into a soft international boundary could also be made another zone of peace in stages. What has been a bone of contention between India and Pakistan could well become a cementing bond in the future. This path will not be easy as many myths will have to be shed on both sides. But statesmanship could lead both countries along it.

There are then real options to ever more Defence. And instead of continuing to applaud the barren alternative pursued thus far, the opposition too must think afresh. "Peace hath its victories, no less renowned than war."

/12913

CSO: 4600/1540

GANDHI, MAHANTA DISCUSS ASSAM, DIFFERENCES PERSIST

Madras THE HINDU in English 5 Mar 87 p 9

[Text]

NEW DELHI, March 4.

In spite of a three-hour long meeting between the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, and the Assam Chief Minister, Mr. Prafulla Kumar Mahanta, here last evening, the differences between the Centre and the State Government over the implementation of the Assam accord of August 15, remain as wide as ever. This is the impression the Chief Minister gave at a news conference here this afternoon.

Even though a number of issues cropped up at the parley -- perhaps the longest the Prime Minister has had in a single sitting with a Chief Minister -- the main issue was the detection of post-March 24, 1971, illegal infiltrators into Assam. All that was achieved yesterday was the decision that there would be further discussions on the subject between officials of the Central and State Governments. If necessary, ministerial level talks too would be held.

Modifications to Act: The State Government has been pressing the Centre to modify the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act of 1983, which is the main instrument for the purpose, so that constraints holding up the identification of aliens illegally staying in the State are removed. Clause 5.9 of the accord enjoins on the Centre to give due consideration to certain difficulties expressed by the All-Assam Students' Union and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (now the Asom Gana Parishad) regarding the implementation of the Act.

Addressing newsmen on January 20, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, had indirectly blamed the Assam Government for the delay in amending the Act. Mr. Mahanta yesterday pointed out to him that whatever clarifications the Centre had sought on the Assam Government's proposals had been given. There have been several rounds of talks both at the level of officials and Ministers on the Illegal Migrants' Act but the issue has not been clinched yet.

The Chief Minister told newsmen today that the suggestions made by the Assam Government were examined at length but the Prime Minister was of the view that further discussions were necessary. So the issue was being referred back to officials for a fresh look.

'No harassment of minorities': The Chief Minister assured the Prime Minister that there would be no harassment of minorities. The State Government had taken up socio-economic development schemes for all sections of the people including tribals and minorities. It was unfortunate that a politically motivated propaganda was going on insidiously that the accord was directed against the minorities.

Positive indications: Mr. Mahanta, however, identified three specific achievements of his talks with the Prime Minister. One was the Centre's acceptance of the Assam proposal for strengthening the detection machinery. The Home Ministry would shortly notify the appointment of ten Assam cadre IPS officers as foreigners' registration officers covering 18 districts provisionally. (There was a hitch earlier as to whether the IPS officers should be from the Assam cadre or from other cadres.)

The second outcome was the setting up of a task force headed by Mr. J. S. Bajjal, Secretary of the Planning Commission, to examine proposals formulated by the Assam Government for the State's speedy all-round development as envisaged in the accord. The task force would visit Guwahati on March 25 for discussions.

The third tangible outcome was the Centre's acceptance of the suggestion that vigil on the international frontier should be intensified. More Border Security Force personnel would be deployed on the border.

Mr. Mahanta, however, drew a blank on the State Government's suggestion that the new petroleum refinery, envisaged in the accord, should be in the public sector. Mr. Gandhi maintained at his January 20 meeting with the press that the accord provided that the refinery would be in the private sector. There was a resource crunch and the Centre could not provide funds for a public sector refinery in Assam, he had said.

There was no change in the position following Mr. Mahanta's meeting with the Prime Minister. The State Government has asked Engineers India Ltd. to draw up a pre-feasibility report on the proposed refinery. The report is expected in a couple of months.

CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSIONER MAKES ANNUAL REPORT

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 5 Mar 87 p 5

[Text]

The Central Vigilance Commission has observed that absence of systematic scheme of inspections covering all aspects of organisation activities and operations is a major factor contributing to corruption in government department, reports PTI.

In his annual report for 1984-85, presented to Parliament on Wednesday, he said "it is observed that in most of the cases revealing misconduct, misdemeanours and malpractices, they arose on account of non-existence or ineffectiveness of internal checks and inspection".

The CVC's remarks were contained in "an analytical study of misconducts in selected areas" like railways, banks, posts and telecommunication department and the Ministry of Works and Housing. In the study a time-frame of two to three years had been adopted to provide long enough a period to enable assessment of definite trends.

The commission said that blatant and flagrant violation of procedures with improper motives was rendered possible in a large number of cases because of laxity in the operation of the control mechanisms and the systems of cross checking.

"It is observed that although most of the organisations lay down very detailed procedures and control mechanisms but in actual practice, these degenerate into a spirit of complacency and routine handling."

In majority of the cases, the CVC said, that malpractices were rendered possible because of the common interest amongst a number of officials. The incidence of cases of individual corruption was comparatively less.

The CVC said "under these circumstances, a properly devised system of

checks and controls if duly implemented without any laxity, can definitely help to minimise the areas of corruption and malpractices".

Another conclusion which could be drawn by the CVC from the analysis was that there was a lack of proper appreciation of procedures, delegation of authority and modes of working at different stages and levels of organisations.

"Systems and procedures are not kept under constant review in the light of experience with a view to minimising the scope for corruption. Research and development for system improvements is of vital importance for prevention of corruption".

There was inadequate emphasis on identifying notorious and habitual corrupt officials and measures to deal with them, he observed.

Out of the 350 cases received by the commission from the railways during 1984 and 1985, it was that 34.6 per cent of the cases involved favouring of contractors like in awarding of tenders, 14.3 per cent related to malpractices connected with recruitment appointment, promotion and transfers. Most of the irregularities concerning recruitment pertained to casual labourers.

In 13 per cent of the cases direct demand and acceptance of bribes was involved of which four per cent related to railway doctors taking bribes for issuance of sick and fit medical certificates, medical decategorisation and fees.

Other misuses included diversion of wagons for some consideration and fees.

Other misuses included diversion of wagons for some consideration, misuse of railway passes and cases of acquisition of disproportionate assets.

Out of 565 cases involving mostly of bank officers between 1983 and 1985, the study revealed that in 29 per cent of the cases, delegated powers entrusted at various levels in hierarchy were exceeded.

/12379

CSO: 4600/1520

CONGRESS-I REVOKES SUSPENSION OF FORMER MINISTER

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 6 Mar 87 p 1

[Text] NEW DELHI March 5 (UNI). The Congress president, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, today revoked the suspension order against the former Union home minister, Mr. P. C. Sethi, and two others. Announcing this, the Congress general secretary, Mr. G. K. Moopanar, said on the recommendations of the Central disciplinary action committee the suspension order against Mr. Sethi had been withdrawn. Similar orders against the former West Bengal governor, Mr. A. P. Sharma, and the former chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, Mr. Sripati Misra, have also been withdrawn, he added. Mr. Sethi was suspended from the party on October 16 last a few days after he gave an interview to the "Illustrated Weekly of India" in which he was critical of Mr. Gandhi and the Congress leadership. The order was issued by the Congress high command after consulting the party president who was away on a foreign tour at that time. Mr. Sharma and Mr. Misra were suspended earlier in April. Though party sources declined to give the reasons for the withdrawal of the suspension orders, informed sources said all the three leaders against whom disciplinary action was taken had given written explanations. These are understood to contain apologies from the suspended leaders. The party disciplinary action committee comprising Mr. Darbara Singh, Mr. G. L. Dogra and Mr. Moopanar is understood to have favoured withdrawal of the suspension orders on the basis of explanations received. Political observers said the timing of the withdrawal was significant though they failed to provide an immediate explanation.

/12379

CSO: 4600/1521

MAJORITY FAVOR POPULAR ELECTION OF PRIME MINISTER

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 8 Mar 87 p 1

[Article by Dr. N. Bhaskara Rao and S. Venkat Narayan]

[Text]

PROTAGONISTS of the "elect the Prime Minister directly" concept have some good news. Three out of every five voters interviewed in a nationwide opinion poll last fortnight favour choosing India's chief executive in a direct election.

This is one of the findings of an opinion poll commissioned by "The Times of India". It was conducted by the Operations Research Group (ORG), the wellknown market research organisation. ORG's field researchers interviewed 2,109 carefully selected male and female voters in 36 urban centres, including Calcutta, Bombay, New Delhi and Madras.

Throughout the country, 61.5 per cent of those interviewed said that all the voters should be involved in directly electing the Prime Minister. They said this will ensure "better control and performance" at the Centre.

At the moment, the party that procures a majority in the Lok Sabha elects its leader who, in turn, is appointed by the President as the Prime Minister.

The manner of choosing the Prime Minister has been the subject of a lively debate during the past four years. It was first mooted by Mr. Vasant Sathe, a member of the Union cabinet at that time as well as now.

Mr. Sathe put forth the idea at a time when Mrs. Indira Gandhi's popularity was thought to be on the decline. Even though she was popular with the masses at a personal level, many thought the Congress might not get a majority in the Lok Sabha in the eighth general election. Therefore, Mr. Sathe's proposition only aroused suspicion when he mooted it.

However, last November, it suddenly became a live issue when Mr. Ramakrishna Hegde, a leader of the Janata Party and the chief minister of Karnataka, came out openly in favour of the idea. At its Vijayawada session in December, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) also endorsed the proposition. Since then, it has been discussed vigorously in newspaper columns and seminars.

Q: For better control and performance at the Centre, should we opt for a system in which all the voters in the country elect the Prime Minister directly?

Zone	Yes (%)	No (%)
North	64.1	35.9
East	48.3	51.7
West	67.7	32.3
South	65.0	35.0
All-India	61.5	38.5

The TOI-ORG poll sought to find out if the electorate also wishes to elect the chief ministers in the same fashion. The answer is a positive yes.

The voters in the South are more enthusiastic in their support to the idea than their counterparts in the North and the West. Considering that two of the four southern states are being run by film stars who enjoy popular support, this is understandable. On the other hand, the East which has not produced many charismatic leaders, is against it: 50.4 per cent have opposed the idea. The voters in the Eastern zone are equally averse to the idea of directly electing the Prime Minister.

Q: To ensure better control and performance at the state-level, should we elect the chief ministers also directly?

Zone	Yes (%)	No (%)
North	65.3	34.7
East	49.6	50.4
West	67.5	32.5
South	71.9	28.1
All-India	63.8	36.2

The general belief that small states are easier to administer than big ones is not shared by many. A majority of those interviewed in the North and the East feel that big states are better. However, a majority of the adults in the West and the South think smaller states would be better managed.

Q: Do you think big states should be divided into small ones to facilitate better implementation of development programmes?

Zone	Big state better	Small state better
North	56.9	43.1
East	59.5	40.5
West	49.8	50.2
South	43.5	56.5
All-India	52.0	48.0

Obviously the size of a state is not something that bothers the Indian electorate at this point of time.

/12379

CSO: 4600/1525

EMIGRATION RULES SIMPLIFIED TO PROTECT WORKERS ABROAD

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 8 Mar 87 p 6

[Text]

New Delhi, March 7: The government has simplified emigration rules for the greater protection of workers seeking jobs abroad.

Power of attorney and registration certificates will now be valid for three years unless withdrawn. Earlier, power of attorney was for one year and registration certificates were given for three years.

Another change stipulates that the permit for recruitment by Indian construction companies executing projects abroad would be extended to one year from the existing six months.

Changes are also being brought in procedures for "renewal of registration" for recruiting agencies. The certificate will contain the photograph of the proprietor, director or partner of the recruiting agency and such a certificate will be prominently displayed at the business office. The photograph has to be attested by the protectorate of emigrants.

Over 70 per cent of workers who get jobs abroad are skilled.

There is a decline in the number of overseas jobs. It is stated that the cause is the completion of developmental infrastructure and construction activities and changing of such emphasis towards utilities and maintenance requiring higher skills.

/12379

CSO: 4600/1526

TATA EXPERTS IMPROVE SUPERCONDUCTIVITY TEMPERATURE

Madras THE HINDU in English 9 Mar 87 p 9

[Text]

From Our Science Correspondent

NEW DELHI, March 8.

A record high-temperature superconductivity at 82°Kelvin (minus 191°C) had been claimed recently by the University of Houston, Texas group in the March 2 issue of the journal *Physical Review Letters*. It is reliably learnt that this has been successfully reproduced and improved upon (to 86°K) by Indian scientists working at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR), Bombay. The same TIFR-BARC team had earlier last month (reported on February 7) verified the claims of superconductivity at around 40°K by Mr. R. J. Cava and others at the AT&T Bell Labs., US.

Essential difference: There is, however, an essential difference between the present findings of the highest temperature ever—the previous highest claim, as yet unpublished, was 70°K by the Beijing group led by Mr. Zhongxian Zhao—and the previous observations. All the earlier measurements were on material complexes which were basically lanthanum-strontium/barium/calcium/lead-copper-oxygen compounds. The Bell Labs. used strontium, the Japanese, the Dutch and the Houston groups used barium and the Chinese, somewhat intriguingly, used lead but lanthanum was com-

mon to all. Now what we have is that if, instead of lanthanum, the element yttrium (a rare greyish metal of atomic number 39 and atomic weight 89) is used such high-temperature superconducting transitions are observed.

The Houston group, headed by Mr. Ching-Wu Chu, had only recently reported an improvement in their measurements on lanthanum-based compound from 40.2°K to 52.5°K. The search for high-temperature superconductors has, with these claims, entered a new phase. Such high temperatures will, in fact, not even require liquid nitrogen as the BARC-TIFR experiment has shown. The currently at-

tained temperatures are above the temperature at which nitrogen liquifies. Theoretical understanding of such high-temperature superconductors is very poor. Conventional theories of superconductivity limit the temperatures at which the superconducting transitions can set in to around 25°K.

As soon as the report of the 82°K result appeared the Indian group set out to fabricate the sample and found that, given their experience with such compounds, they could do it easily in a matter of two days and the measurements took them another two days. Working on two semicircular green coloured samples of about 8mm diameter of yttrium-strontium-barium-copper-oxygen crystalline complex—annealed in an atmosphere of oxygen, powdered, cast into a disc and cut—the scientists observed that its electrical resistivity dropped from 90% of its room temperature value to 10% of the value within 2°K around 86°K.

In the Houston experiment, in fact, the drop to 10% resistivity, after the onset of the superconducting transition, had occurred over a width of 10°K around 82°K. In this sense, therefore, the performance here has been better. In a superconductor resistivity drops to zero to allow flow of electricity without hindrance and a drop to a total null resistivity will be a tailing off from the 10% value. However, this superconducting substance has been found to be in a 'multi-phase' crystalline state—that is, different crystalline structures co-existing—and the determination of the single phase structure that would exhibit superconductivity is an ongoing investigation.

The Houston group apparently has already patented the yttrium compound and several laboratories in the US have begun to work on this material and efforts to produce wires which are superconducting at these high temperatures are already afoot.

/12379

CSO: 4600/1528

WRITER SEES HIDDEN DEVALUATION OF RUPEE

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 11 Mar 87 p 12

[Article by K.K. Sharma]

[Text]

New Delhi, March 10: With the pound sterling selling last week at the official exchange rate of Rs 20.70 and the US dollar at Rs 13, the value of the rupee fell to a record low and provided further evidence that a deliberate "hidden devaluation" of the Indian currency has been accelerated.

The pound sterling was worth Rs 19 less than a month ago while the dollar remained constant at Rs 13. This means that the rupee has been devalued by more than six per cent in just four weeks.

In the middle of 1985, the pound sterling could be bought for just Rs 16 and the dollar for Rs 12.50, which means a devaluation of the rupee by more than 20 per cent in less than two years. Similar comparisons show a drop in the rupee's exchange rate by as much as 40 per cent in the last four years. Recent trends suggest the devaluation process has been hastened because the German mark and the Japanese yen have also become markedly costlier.

With the pound and the dollar, the mark and the yen form the main convertible currencies, called the "basket of currencies," in relation to which the Reserve Bank fixes the daily value of the rupee which has been on what is called "controlled float" for many years.

Observers keeping a close eye on the mechanism used for fixing the daily exchange rate of the rupee by the Reserve Bank have noted that this is done in a

manner that leads to a gradual fall in its value in relation to the major currencies.

The conclusion is inescapable that since a hefty devaluation of

the kind that Mrs Indira Gandhi took recourse to in the late 1960s was politically unwise, a "hidden devaluation" is being carried out instead.

The Reserve Bank expresses the rate of the rupee daily in sterling which is called the "currency on intervention." Its value in terms of other major currencies is then worked out in accordance with weights attached to them. But these weights have never been revealed. This has led to the suspicion that there is, in fact, no real formula and that the government is using the turmoil in the foreign exchange markets to deliberately devalue the rupee.

Since the dollar has been falling steadily and the sterling has been strengthening in the world, any devaluation against the pound should be accompanied by an upward revision of the value of the rupee against the dollar. In fact, this does not happen.

Instead, the value of the rupee weakens steadily against both the sterling and the dollar so that its external value is effectively devalued over a period. Rather than take recourse to a major and swift devaluation at one stroke, the authorities have preferred a slow, steady but real devaluation.

This has had two important effects. First, the cost of imports

has risen steadily and export earnings have increased with only a marginal rise in the volume of exports. Second, the value of foreign exchange reserves has risen in rupee terms but has fallen when expressed in dollars or other hard currencies and the special drawing rights of the International Monetary Fund.

(Economic News Service).

/12379

CSO: 4600/1530

POSSIBILITY OF U.S. INTERVENTION 'VIRTUALLY NIL'

NC090928 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0345 GMT 9 Apr 87

[Commentary from the "Developments on the Front" feature]

[Text] At a time when the reactionary Arab faction has focused all of its recent political activities on the so-called international peace conference -- meaning, in fact, a compromise by the Middle East -- the region's reactionary leaders, by fabricating problems and by intensifying their propaganda activities, are trying to emphasize the need for a united front in a bid to achieve harmony, albeit unstable, among their scattered ranks.

The propaganda commotion about the deployment of Iran's surface-to-sea missiles near the Hormuz Strait and the babblings of reactionary regional leaders on the subject seek to serve this objective.

Meanwhile, one of the primary reasons for the U.S. decision to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf is obviously to show off the United States' flimsy strength in the region, since even in its strongest and most active phase such action will never go beyond mere show. Both the United States and the rest of the world have become very well aware of the extremely sensitive importance of the Hormuz Strait and of Iran's indisputable strength in the region. Given such conditions, the possibility of a direct U.S. intervention against Iran is virtually nil, because Washington knows only too well that the tragedy of Lebanon would be repeated, though on a vaster and regrettable scale, should it try to intervene.

Amid all of this, the reactionary leaders of the region do not yet understand -- though it has been more than 8 years since the Islamic revolution took place, and though they are Iran's neighbors -- that they cannot depend upon the chimerical U.S. guarantees, which clearly lack any guarantee of implementation and amount to mere babbling. An example in this context is a remark made by the Kuwait foreign minister suggesting that the security of the Hormuz Strait can be insured by U.S. intervention. The fact is that one must be extremely optimistic to believe that the United States can regain its former position in the region.

The indisputable fact is that, under current circumstances, the Islamic Republic of Iran is the sole true power in the region -- a power that, with its final victory in the war of good against evil, will completely alter the region's political, military and economic system and will effect a great change, which will be as strong as a tempest and as vast as the sky.

TEHRAN REJECTS 'GREAT SATAN'S' OVERTURES

LD092350 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1110 GMT 9 Apr 87

[Unattributed political commentary]

[Text] Following the conquest [as heard] of the American den of espionage [former American embassy in Tehran] on 13th aban 1358 [4 November 1979] and the failure of Washington's desperate attempts to extricate itself from that crisis, Carter's government, in addition to imposing a series of economic embargoes, on such a day, severed America's relations with Iran. This decision was taken at a time when the continued detention of American spies in Tehran and the futility of American's extensive threats and attempts had delivered unprecedented and irreparable blows at the prestige of America as a world superpower. However, American rulers themselves knew full well, that not only would that decision not have any important effect upon the fate of the American spies but that, on the contrary, the increase of pressure upon the steadfast and self-sacrificing Iranian people could further expand and deepen the dimensions of the anti-arrogant struggles of this uprisen nation.

However, the important point was that in order to preserve the prestige of Washington, Carter's government had to resort to certain actions such as that -- even though some of the American officials were convinced of the futility of such policies vis-a-vis the revolutionary Iranian ummah. As expected, immediately after that decision by Washington, Imam Khomeyni, in a message to the Muslim Iranian people announced: We welcome this severance of relations, because this severance of relations proves that the American Government has lost any hope regarding Iran. The combative Iranian nation is justified in celebrating this omen of final relations -- namely to put an end to its plunders.

Also, as befitting a Muslim nation, the people, while expressing their pleasure at the severance of relations, once again expressed their readiness to confront American conspiracies and their [the people's] resolve to achieve self-sufficiency and independence. During this period too they demonstrated in practice that, in order to establish the sovereignty of Islam and the Koran and in order to defend the legitimate rights of the oppressed people, they are prepared to endure difficulties and hardships and even to willingly sacrifice their dearest possessions on this exalted path.

Therefore, as a result of the belief and self-sacrifice of this nation, and in view of the justice-seeking aspirations of this revolution which is deeply rooted in sacred Islamic ideals, the Great Satan, in keeping with its arrogant and expansionist nature, has tried at every stage to make use of various plots -- such as a complete economic embargo; military aggression in Tabas [the aborted attempt to rescue American hostages], organizing a military coup d'etat, fanning the flames of the imposed war; arming the Iraqi regime, resorting to military threats and showing its teeth and claws in the Persian Gulf, as well as hatching the plot regarding the reduction in the price of oil -- in order to impose a compromise upon this uprisen nation, the signs of whose resistance can today be clearly seen in Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, Tunis and other Islamic countries.

However, thanks to God, so far all these conspiracies have met with defeat as a result of the faith and indestructible unity of the people and the decisiveness of the leadership, and after the unsuccessful experience of more than 8 years of conspiracy and aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the American leaders, confessing now to the strategic importance and the might of the Iranian revolution, are persistently trying to find a suitable way for the resumption of relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The remarks of Reagan a short while ago, trying to explain the reasons for McFarlane's failed trip to Tehran, clearly prove this point.

However, this change of tactics by the Great Satan would not mean the end of the aggressive and expansionist policies of Washington, and the Great Satan, in view of its vile nature, will certainly try to make use of every opportunity in order to achieve its inhuman goals. Vigilance, steadfastness and continuous and constant struggle will be the only method which will render Washington's cruel policies ineffective. Therefore, at this critical juncture, the revolutionary Iranian nation, learning from its considerable past successes and by maintaining its unity and solidarity, should guarantee its future successes against World Arrogance and should pave the way for the final triumph of the oppressed over the oppressors.

/12624

CSO: 4600/194

SUPERPOWERS CONFINING ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

LD101435 Tehran IRNA in English 1350 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] Tehran, 10 Apr (IRNA)--In a meeting with a group of visitors here Thursday prime minister Musavi said that the big powers are bent on geographically confining the Islamic revolution in Iran and checking its spread to other lands, but noted that the revolution has long since crossed Iran's borders to other lands.

He said for the same reason that the enemies of Imam Hoseyn (AS) and of his comrades-at-arms could not manage to portray the news of his struggles and his martyrdom as a merely local development devoid of any other implications, so too, the powers cannot confine the Islamic revolution to its birthplace.

Musavi who was addressing a group of soldiers of Karbala'-25 army along with a group of educators of Education Ministry and another group of Jihada-Sazandegi (engineering support personnel for war operations) also lauded the Hizbollah (pro-Islamic revolution militant Muslims) in and outside of Iran and also praised the Jihad personnel, describing them as "unarmed people building bulwarks for Islam."

The prime minister noted that despite allegations by certain foreign media the Islamic Republic has never sent arms or explosives to any foreign country and explained that the bullets which ripped through Al-Sadat's chest had not been sent to Cairo by Iran.

Towards the end of the meeting a check for four million rials (about 55,555 dollars) in contribution to flood-stricken people in Birjand of Khorassan Province was presented to the prime minister.

/12624

CSO: 4600/194

COMMENTARY SCORES FRENCH SUPPORT FOR IRAQ

NC081012 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0345 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Commentary form the "Developments on the Front" feature]

[Excerpts] From 11 February 1979 to date the Islamic Republic has been the target of attacks by its enemies. The world of arrogance, which felt greatly threatened by the victory of the Islamic revolution in the region, gradually became more aware of the great dimensions of this movement. So it considered ways to compound its plots and ultimately imposed a full-fledged war on Iran as the only solution.

Obviously Saddam is merely a pawn in all of this, and the organizers of this game are elsewhere, the same people who suffered the most losses in the region and the world after the victory of the Islamic revolution. What we have witnessed form the start of the war to date is proof of this.

Despite their apparently contradictory stand in supporting Iraq's war machinery, the East and West have displayed a concurrence of views one could call rare, if not unprecedented. The Soviet Union's direct delivery to Iraq of long-range, surface-to-surface missiles, very modern tanks, and ultramodern aircraft came at a time when the Western bloc was doing its best to place advanced weaponry such as aircraft, bombs, and tanks and raw material required for the manufacture of chemical weapons at the disposal of the Ba'thist regime.

Meanwhile, if we look carefully we can eas'ly see that among the Western bloc countries France has palyed the biggest role in arming the Iraqi regime. Presently the Iraqi Air Force, with its Russian complexion, is using Mirage planes, and Iraqi pilots are being taught to guide these planes. We have not yet forgotten the delivery of the Super-Etandard planes to Iraq and the commotion this evoked among world propaganda. We have not yet forgotten how the French Government, ignoring political-military relations prevailing at the time, delivered the advanced Super-Etandards to Iraq. When the French leaders could not sell a weapon to Iraq they were prepared to rent them that equipment, swallowing their pride in their efforts to confront Islam. But very quickly -- thanks to the initiative of Islam's combatants, the downing of two Super-Etandards, and the inefficiency of Exocet missiles -- France was compelled to terminate this arrangement.

In view of all this, Mr Mitterrand has said in a TV interview: France will continue to assist the Iraqi regime in order to prevent the growth of the Islamic movement in the world. Alas! It seems these remarks are being uttered by someone who has not yet extended any real assistance. Mr Mitterrand: You and the other leaders of the so-called superpowers should know that the world today is not what it was 100 years ago. Today the people of the world are aware; and Islamic countries are no exception. The Islamic revolution movement today does not rely on Iran or the Iranians. Today the world is fed up with oppression, and the oppressed are seeking ways to free themselves. It is the bright sun of Islam that has started to shine on the dark horizon of the world today, and neither you, Mr Mitterrand, nor anyone else can stop this ray from shining.

Yes, Mr Mitterrand, this is how a person who has lost an arm defending the ideals of the revolution feels, still standing firm today. You and others should know that more terrifying than your complicated weapons is the will of a nation that has risen to defend its revolution!

It is in view of the high morale of the Iranian nation that the officials of our country today strongly defend the just stand of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was this spirit that overcame 2,500 years of monarchy supported by the superpowers. And it is these same people who will determine the destiny of this war, not you, Mr Mitterrand, nor anybody else!

/12624
CSO: 4600/194

KEYHAN VIEWS ECONOMIC RESOURCES OF SOUTHERN IRAQ

PM091501 Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 29 Mar 87 p 3

[Report by unnamed Keyhan correspondent: "The Importance of Iraq's Southern Regions"]

[Text] The attacks of the brave warriors of Islam during the "Karbala'-5-" operations, launched against the Zionist regime of Iraq, were aimed at achieving political-economic goals. These attacks have left the economic situation in southern Iraq in turmoil.

According to reports received, the main Iraqi natural gas resources are in the southern part of that country. There are two natural gas installations in Al-Zubayr and Al-Rumaylah near Basra. The Iraqi regime has announced that it has achieved some success in expanding the oil fields in the Thigar [as transliterated] region north west of Basra.

Officially Iraq's oil resources have been estimated to be some 59 billion barrels, but that country's petroleum minister in 1983 boasted that this figure was 63 billion barrels. It is estimated that the total production of Iraqi crude oil in the southern regions of that country is some 2 million barrels per day, including the new oil fields.

According to this same report, before the war Iraq was producing some 3.5 million barrels of crude petroleum a day. The oil and gas publication printed in the United States said in 1981 that Iraq's oil reserves stood at 44.11 billion barrels. Iraq's oil reserves in the Al-Zubayr area is some 4.5 billion barrels. Iraq's oil reserves in the Majnun Islands are estimated to be some 7 billion barrels. The total Iraqi crude production in 1985 was some 1.4 million barrels per day.

The report indicates that Iraq's present capacity for oil exports, taking account of the present circumstances but disregarding the cut in the oil pipelines to the Mediterranean sea and the Persian Gulf, is about 1.5 million barrels per day.

Iraq's oil exports to the Saudi port of Yanbu' are provided mostly from the Al-Zubayr and Al-Rumaylah fields south west of Basra. It has about 16 huge crude oil reservoirs holding about 6 million barrels in the Al-Zubayr areas.

The most important buyers of Iraqi oil from the port of Yanbu' are: Petrobras of Brazil which buys 70,000 barrels a day in exchange for arms and ammunition and Brazilian goods; Shell, 50,000 barrels a day; Transinor [as transliterated] 25,000 barrels a day; Japanese companies, 150,000 to 200,000 barrels a day; and India, 80,000 barrels per day. During the first 3 months of 1986 the capacity of the Iraqi pipeline to Yanbu' was some 350,000 barrels.

Iraq's natural gas reserves are said to be about 815.5 billion cubic meters, with Al-Rumaylah and Al-Zubayr being the most important gas regions in southern Iraq. A second natural gas installation is being built in Al-Zubayr.

This latest installation was completed in 1983 but because of the war, has never started to function. The installations were constructed by the French and are worth some \$165 million. Because of air raids Iraq has built the gas reservoirs underground. Perhaps it is thinking about exporting natural gas to Kuwait through pipelines, stretching some 170 km for which Kuwait will pay.

The report also indicates that a chemical fertilizer plant comprising three separate units exists in Abu al-Khasib, Al-Zubayr, and Basra. There is also a petrochemical plant producing mostly artificial plastics in Al-Zubayr and Basra. It is important to note that the plant in Basra has so far cost \$2 billion and the one in Al-Zubayr has cost \$1 billion.

/12624

CSO: 4600/194

SAIRI CHAIRMAN ON NEED TO 'LIBERATE' IRAQI NATION

NC100848 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0430 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] The Central News Unit reports from Qom that as the combatants of Islam are achieving new victories on the fronts with the Zionist enemy, a memorial ceremony was held last night by the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution Iraq [SAIRI] to mark the seventh anniversary of the martyrdom of the founder of the Islamic revolution in Iraq, the Martyr Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, and his dear sister Bint al-Huda by the bloodsuckers ruling Iraq. Iraqi exiles, emigrants, and mujahedin residing in Iran attended the ceremony at the Hoseyniyeh Mosque of the Najafis in Qom.

Also attending were representatives of the Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, several scholars and students from the Theological Seminary, a number of SAIRI members, combatant Iraqi, Bahraini, Lebanese, Hijazi, Afghan, and Indian scholars, and combatant scholars from other Islamic countries residing in Qom. A combatant Iraqi clergyman and SAIRI members spoke about the grandeur of the Islamic revolution in Iran, the awakening of the world's deprived and oppressed nations, and the emulation of the imam of the Ummah and discussed in detail the services rendered by the Martyr Ayatollah al-Sadr to Islam and the Muslims of Iraq, who are in bondage.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Hakim, SAIRI chairman, then spoke about the recent victories scored by the combatants of Islam in the Karbala'-8 and -9 operations, congratulating the imam of the Ummah and the Islamic Ummah on these great conquests. He said: At this sensitive point in the war, it is the duty of each Iraqi brother residing in Iran or abroad, each of whom has suffered losses through the martyrdom or capture of a brother, to join the great army of the combatants of Islam and fulfill the long-standing wish of Muslims who are anxiously waiting to make a pilgrimage to the holy shrine of the leader of the freedom lovers, the Imam Husayn, and to liberate the captive Iraqi nation from the yoke of the Iraqi Zionist regime.

/12624

CSO: 4600/194

IRAQI MOJAHEDIN, REFUGEES MARCH IN TEHRAN

LD102302 Tehran IRNA in English 1310 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] Tehran, 10 Apr (IRNA)--Thousands of Iraqi refugees and Mojahedin in Iran staged a rally here Friday morning commemorating the seventh anniversary of the martyrdom of Ayatollah Mohammad Baqer Sadr and his sister, who were savagely tortured to death by Iraq's Ba'thist regime.

A group of Supreme Assembly of Islamic Revolution of Iraq's (SIARI) clerics and several battalions of reserve forces of Majohedin 9th Qadr Division participated in the march.

The marchers, condemning the Iraqi crimes, expressed their support for the Islamic Republic of Iran and emphasized the necessity of continuing the fight to overthrow the Iraqi regime.

A SAIRI communique issued at the end of the march said that at a time when the holy land of Iraq is on the verge of being liberated, as a result of the heavy blows of Muslim combatants and of the activities of Iraqi mojahedin inside and outside of Iraq, the children of Iraq promise to continue the revolution to lay the foundation of Islamic Iraq under the leadership of a supreme religious jurisprudent.

One of the participants in the rally quoted martyr Sadr as saying "melt in (Imam) Khomeyni because he has melted in Islam." He further said that they will fight till their last drop of their blood for the establishment of an Islamic government in Iraq with the help of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

/12624

CSO: 4600/194

VELAYATI RETURNS FROM DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

NC110641 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0430 GMT 11 Apr 87

[Text] Our country's foreign minister, "Ali Akbar Velayati, who led a political delegation to Geneva to participate in a disarmament conference, returned to Tehran last night. On his arrival in Tehran he noted the results of his visit in an interview with our correspondent.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Mr Velayati, could you please tell us about the most important issues discussed at the disarmament conference and the results of your visit?

[Velayati] In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. As you know, the disarmament conference is the only official venue for investigations into and discussion of disarmament on behalf of the United Nations, accepted by all UN member countries. Though many years have passed since its inception, no notable or significant progress has been made in preventing the proliferation of lethal weapons. But the conference remains the sole tribune [preceding word in English] providing a forum for the members, including Iran, to air their views.

I wish to note in particular that the topics discussed included the production and proliferation of nuclear arms and nuclear testing; possible use of nuclear weapons; the production, transfer, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons; and the use of space for military purposes. It is significant that the member countries formulated a draft calling for a ban on chemical weapons' usage which is actually a revised and more specific, succinct amendment to the draft resolution adopted in 1925. This draft will probably be debated at the next UN General Assembly session. In view of the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been a victim of these dangerous weapons during Iraq's military aggression of the past few years, our country has played an effective role in heightening world awareness of chemical weapons. Obviously this lent greater weight to the Islamic Republic of Iran's opinion in the international community, especially at the disarmament conference. All of our experiences and reports have been documented there, and we hope in the future to witness greater and more extensive efforts by nations striving to uphold humanitarian values in the world.

[Correspondent] Thank you very much. [end recording]

/12624

CSO: 4600/194

TUDEH ORGAN CALLS ON ARMED FORCES TO RISE AGAINST REGIME

Stockholm NAMEH-YE MARDOM in Persian 3 Mar 87 pp 1-2

[Stockholm NAMEH-YE MARDOM weekly in Persian; Central Organ of the Tudeh Party of Iran]

[Text] The economic and social crisis in our country grows ever larger, and, along with it, the vast discontent and protest among the people widens, while differences of opinion and clashes among the various factions of the Islamic republic become more acute. Since the armed forces are one of the important pillars of the political life of our country, the regime uses every weapon and trick to keep all of these forces, from the army and the revolutionary guards to the other military and police forces, out of the great ring of crisis, dissent, and political and economic policy-making.

On this basis the regime's leaders and operators enter the picture with a grab bag of advice, naked swords and terror, attacking progressive or more or less sound movements taking shape at various levels within the armed forces, whether at the fronts or behind the lines, in order to fight injustice and the suppression of freedom and the democratic rights of the people and for the sake of peace. The leaders of the Islamic republic basically describe it as "very dangerous" for dissent to find its way into the army and the revolutionary guards. They say that the army and the revolutionary guards must stay out of politics, otherwise the foundations of the military will be destroyed. This is why Khomeyni has always cautioned the "armed force" against "intervention in political affairs," and continues to do so.

The undeniable reality is that nothing can stop the conflicts and disagreements in society from finding their way into the armed forces, because all the political changes and crises arising from the social relations and class conflicts in society will find their way into the armed forces, as if obeying the laws of nature and independent of the government's wishes and will.

The question that arises now is what are the policies and positions that the leaders of the Islamic republic are so deathly afraid of their penetration into the ranks of the armed forces? Policy is nothing more than the aggregate of methods and dictatorial executive means used by the ruling class, and its implementation is nothing but the existing social relations between the various classes of society. Clearly, there are conflicts of interest in a class society, and they cannot be glossed over with fine words. The conflicts and disagreements in society are actively reflected in the armed forces. This phenomenon is also connected to the class composition and to the existing essence and character of the armed forces. The class origin of most of the armed forces, revolutionary guards and other military and police forces is among the workers, the rural people, their children and other urban and rural laborers. The destiny, interests, and positions of

members of the armed forces are basically no different from the classes and levels of society from which they came. In the long run they cannot remain indifferent to the unjust relationships of authority that exist for the procurement of the huge interests of capitalists and big landowners.

The regime wants to shield the army, the revolutionary guards and the mobilization from a system which places their fathers, mothers, brothers and fellow-suffering citizens and class members under the severest oppression, exploitation, and social and economic pressures. Not only the reactionary leaders of the Islamic republic, but all backward and oppressive regimes always strive with all their being to keep the armed forces as a tool of oppression, as an agent of the ruling minority dictatorship, and as a force separate from the masses of people and the issues relevant to their lives. Throughout the ranks of the various armed forces there reigns a spirit of avoiding politics, serving without question to preserve the system and an atmosphere of blind obedience and servile submission. The prevailing system in the army is one of absolute orders and obedience, without rationality. This is why, for example, when Khamenei visits the armed forces, he stresses the "necessity of strengthening military regulations and observing the chain of command."

It goes without saying that a regime that appears to oppose any infusion of politics or ideology into the armed forces has its own educational and propaganda units such as the "political-ideological circles" in order to feed its reactionary politics and ideology to the armed forces. When the regime says that members of the army, the revolutionary guards and the mobilization have no right to approach politics, the point is clear. It means that they must become obedient and tame pawns who will take to the field at any moment to face and crush the people whenever the reactionary leaders of the Islamic republic so desire.

The regime now wants its armed forces to be its mindless, unreasonable and mute bayonet fighters who will spare no effort preserving its existence and implementing its independence-destroying policies and plans. This is why, for example, when Khomeyni was warning the "armed force" against "intervention in political affairs," he said: (politics) do not pertain to them. They must occupy themselves with the war (ETTELA'AT, 7/25/1364 [17 October 1985]).

Yes, Khomeyni and the other leaders of the Islamic republic say that the members of the army and the revolutionary guards must be cannon fodder at the fronts and must crush the people behind the lines. They must pay no attention to the fact that the regime is rebuilding the foundation of the system of capitalism and dependence, that it is making ties with imperialism and opening the country's doors to imperialist monopolies. They must pay no attention to the fact that plundering by big capitalists and large landowners is expanding and that the gaps between classes are widening every day. They must pay no attention to the fact that "This group (the Hojjatiyeh), being organized, seizes the sensitive organizations and positions, and in the end we see that there is no room left for the children of the revolution." (KEYHAN 6/3/1364 [25 August 1985]).

In the view of the regime's leaders, the armed forces must remain silent in the face of injustice and the violation of rights, and they must go into action at the wave of a hand from the executioners in order to crush heartlessly the protests and unrest of workers who are fed up with the capitalists. The regime wants the armed forces to take to the field with bayonets and rifle butts to implement the brutal orders of the judicial authorities, and to take away from the rural people the little plots of land they risked their lives to get during the revolution, presenting them ceremoniously to the big landowners and "Islam-embracing" feudalists, or throw them into the street with their belongings from the houses confiscated after the revolution in order to return the houses to their owners who fled the country, in order that "religious law" should prevail in the Islamic nation.

The regime wants to mobilize its armed forces to arrest laborers seeking their rights, who are not willing to bow their heads before the sword of injustice. Likewise, in order to crush the Kurdish people, every day it rains bullets and artillery fire on Kurdish villages, leveling the villages to the ground.

Currently the primary responsibility of the armed forces is to keep the fires burning in the Iran-Iraq war, a war whose continuation benefits only the imperialists, the Zionists, and the reactionaries in the region, a war which brings only bitter fruits to the people of Iran, in the form of homelessness, refugees, unemployment, poverty, death, and other things, a war which does nothing but strengthen the positions of the social plunderers in political power and does nothing economically, a war which today is not for defending the country's territory and independence, but for achieving the expansionist and adventuresome aims of the leaders of the regime of the Islamic republic.

In addition to these things, it must be added that the revolutionary guards, as the most important and most reliable support which the regime depends on most among all the armed forces, is not only the agent of domestic oppression, but has become an agent of oppression abroad as well. Groups of revolutionary guards are sent to democratic Afghanistan to work alongside Afghan counterrevolutionaries to carry out plots and sabotage in our neighbor nation's internal affairs, or to create "hot associations" to "export the Islamic revolution" and carry out sabotage and assassination operations in other countries.

It must not be forgotten that in the course of the struggles and social changes after the triumph of the revolution there were striking changes in various circles within the armed forces, including the newly-formed organizations such as the revolutionary guards, the komitehs and the mobilization. Now the revolutionary guards, the komitehs and the mobilization have the role of running the war machine and carrying out oppression, assassination, and mind control for the regime. In the years after the revolution, many sincere and infatuated youth who had turned to the revolutionary guards as an organization in service of the revolution and of anti-imperialist and popular goals have either been executed, deliberately killed at the war fronts, or become the target of individual and group "purgings."

Despite this, in recent years in various arenas there have been acute social clashes such as the oppression and killing of revolutionary and patriotic forces, the continuation of the devastating Iran-Iraq war, the slaughter of the Kurdish people, the suppression of worker demonstrations and unrest in the factories, rural resistance and movements in the villages, and the suppression of the anti-war movement. Likewise, in the wake of the disclosure of the McFarland trip and the regime's ties with American imperialism and the Israeli Zionists, there have been striking instances of increased threats, lack of confidence, protest, and resignation in the armed forces, especially in the revolutionary guards. The increasing wave of firings and resignations in the revolutionary guards, despite the non-acceptance of resignations unless "for justified and convincing reasons," and after repeated investigations, affirms this truth. In this connection, the representative of Bu'in Zahra says:

One after another, the children of the revolution are either quitting or being fired, and we see dear children in the revolutionary guards who are working on ugly projects.

The course of events in society shows that the regime, despite its efforts, has been unable and will not be able to crush and uproot the progressive or more or less sound political movements in the armed forces, nor to keep them from taking political positions on various issues. The publication

of RANJNAMEH-YE SEPAH in 1364 [21 March 1985 - 20 March 1986] and the arrest of a large number of revolutionary guard members following the disclosure of the McFarland trip bear witness to this claim.

In RANJNAMEH-YE SEPAH, which was circulated among members of the revolutionary guards, we read:

We revolutionary guards joined the revolutionary guards for revolutionary reasons, but today they are asking us to stand against the people and fire upon them. Unlike some of our brothers who resigned when they saw irregularities or quit the revolutionary guards without notice, we have decided to stay, to keep the connection, to fight, to collect documents, and to do things worthy of the revolution in relation with other national and popular forces.

The officers, revolutionary guards, and honorable and people's military people who have not been cut off from the masses and who consider themselves part of the people must not remain silent in the face of the selfishness and the government's making of policy against the people and the nation. The only way is for them to return to the ranks of the masses and to widen the awareness of the people as much as possible with their disclosures in order to overthrow the regime.

Honest officers, patriotic and populist revolutionary guards, come to your senses! Let the honor of the military uniform be bestowed upon those who arose from the workers and who defend the interests of the masses rather than crush the people for a government whose political foundation is based on the defense of the interests of the big landowners and capitalists.

Officers, non-commissioned officers, freedom-loving revolutionary guards! Aware members of the mobilization and soldiers!

Let your cry for liberation be heard. No more bullets should be fired at your orders or from your rifles to continue the imperialism-instigated Iran-Iraq war. Your rifle barrels must not be aimed at the breasts of patriotic Kurdish brothers and liberation fighters, but rather at the heart of the regime of the Islamic republic.

Officers, revolutionary guards, members of the mobilization, anti-imperialist and people-loving military men! Return to the embrace of the people and to the trenches of defense of the oppressed and workers. The only reliable and honorable fortification is this one.

9310

CSO: 4640/0101

TUDEH DELEGATES ATTEND SECOND NATIONAL FRONT CONGRESS

Stockholm NAMEH-YE MARDOM in Persian 3 Mar 87 pp 8,6

[Stockholm NAMEH-YE MARDOM weekly in Persian; Central Organ of the Tudeh Party of Iran]

[Text] Recently the Second Congress of the National Front of the Father of the Nation of Afghanistan was held. This congress was attended by almost forty representative delegations from the national fronts, political parties, and progressive and revolutionary political organizations from other countries, including the Tudeh Party of Iran and the Feda'iyān-e Khalq of Iran (the majority faction).

In the Tudeh Party of Iran's message to the Second Congress of the National Front of the Father of the Nation of Afghanistan, it said: The National Front of the Father of the Nation is the crystallization of the national and democratic traditions of Afghanistan in the area of extensive and united cooperation by the people in the struggle for liberation and the construction of a new society. The rural people have always played a vital role in the achievement of the national and democratic objectives of the Sowr revolution and in the attainment of independence, growth, and comprehensive progress in the ancient and proud land of Afghanistan.

In our party's message to the congress reference is made to the basic and clear policy of expanding the social base, for which the Democratic Party of the People of Afghanistan is now persistently struggling. It says: The revolutionary initiative of a six-month unilateral cease fire by the armed forces of the revolution was another great step in illustrating the legitimacy, humanity, and peacefulness of the toiler's revolution, and of its leadership in the attainment of national mutual understanding and unity. Likewise, these initiatives once again provide an opportunity for the achievement of all the those who truly wish for peace and security in the area, so that they can play a worthy role in ending open and surreptitious aggression and intervention by reactionaries and by world imperialism, led by American imperialism.

In its message to the Second Congress of the National Front of the Father of the Nation of Afghanistan, the party adds: The people and the revolutionary and progressive forces of Iran recognize the national and democratic revolution of Afghanistan as a new phase in the liberation struggles of the people of the area, and as a phenomenon rich in experiences and lessons to be learned. They decisively support it, as well as the progressive and peaceful policies of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on national and international affairs.

Our delegation of representatives at the congress then discussed the deep political, economic and social crisis in our country, the devastating war and the severe repression and brutality against freedom-seeking revolutionaries, and it directed the attention of participants to the matter of maximizing solidarity with political prisoners. It concluded:

For this reason we call upon this democratic and humane gathering to heed the necessity of using the tool of solidarity in order to save the lives of the most worthy sons of the people who are in prison. In the public call, which was issued by a great many prominent persons participating in the Second Congress of the National Front of the Father of the Nation of Afghanistan, it said: We declare our deep concern at the threat of death which faces tens of thousands of political prisoners, including members of the Tudeh Party, members of the Feda'iyen-e Khalq and other democratic and combative forces. We call upon world public opinion to give a sign of solidarity with political prisoners, and we call upon the international authorities to inspect the black pits in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Among the signatories to this public call were the representatives of the International Syndicated Federation, the Peace and Solidarity Society of the Soviet Union, the Palestine Peace and Solidarity Committee, the Cuban National Homeland Front, the Sandanista National Worker Solidarity Front, the Democratic Republic of Yemen Non-Military Defense Committees Organization, the National Homeland Front of Vietnam, and the National Front of Czechoslovakia.

During the congress the newspaper HAQIQAT-E ENQELAB-E SOWR, the central organ of the Democratic Party of the People of Afghanistan, interviewed the Tudeh Party delegation. During this interview the representatives of the Tudeh Party severely condemned the assistance given to Afghan counterrevolutionaries by the Islamic republic, and likened this regime's intervention in the affairs of a neighbor country to the treacherous "Irangate" plots.

9310

CSO: 4640/0100

IRAN

GULF WAR CRITICIZED AS 'USELESS, ENDLESS, AIMLESS' BLOODSHED

Stockholm NAMEH-YE MARDOM in Persian 10 Mar 87 pp 1,2

[Stockholm NAMEH-YE MARDOM weekly in Persian; Central Organ of the Tudeh Party of Iran]

[Text] The bloody battles at the fronts continue, especially in the Basra area, and there is never a day when the VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC does not announce with fanfare the attacks by the "combatants of Islam" against "Saddam's wretched army," expressing its joy at killing, wounding and capturing thousands of Iraqi youth. Of course it says nothing about the hordes of Iranian youth who fall to the ground like the autumn leaves, so that those who are still alive will militantly attack the Iraqi fortifications in waves.

The war is presented as the country's most important issue, but if someone tries to use the speeches and writings of those who run the Islamic republic to understand why Iranian youth are being sent to die, who they are fighting and how long this war will continue, they will get nowhere. What is being said or written, especially for domestic consumption, is completely confused and muddled.

Outside the country their propaganda says they are defending themselves and that they want to punish the aggressor who invaded our soil and caused us great material and human losses. Sometimes they even say that the aggressor must be punished so that someone else will not take a notion to attack others. At the same time they claim that all the misfortune in the area is the result of the current government of Iraq. One would think that it is not international imperialism and imperialists but the president of Iraq who is the cause of all the problems that exist in the Persian Gulf, the Near East, and the Arab nations. However, when we look at the propaganda being used domestically to justify the continuation of the war, we see that this worm has a long tail and that they are not just talking about the president of Iraq and the Ba'th Party.

On 12 Esfand [2 March] Tehran Radio broadcast a talk by one of the leaders of the Islamic republic. He said: Our war with Iraq is an Islamic crusade; an Islamic crusade is considered defense and is legal. The speaker explained: There are three kinds of defense. One is personal defense, in the event that one's property, life or honor are being attacked. The second is national defense, in the event that a nation's rights are attacked. The third is the defense of human rights, in the event that people are attacking human rights in society, in which case both the members of society themselves as well as others outside society may rise up and defend the society's human rights. Islam considers these types of defense legal. The speaker said that the Iraqi regime has violated the human rights of the people of Iraq, and he considered it the lawful duty of the people of Iran to help the people of Iraq overthrow this government.

The point worth noting is the speaker's interpretation of human rights. He said: If unity and the choice of the straight path of God, which is the only way to the perfection and elevation of a human being and to the fruition of all his talents and capabilities, is violated, that is if people in neighbor countries block the way to unity with God, a defense must be made against them. An army must be sent to those countries and divine unity established there. This kind of holy war has been called defense by Islam, which considers it necessary. The rule of religion in society is the right of human beings and is at the top of the list of the rights of the people and... and...

The conclusion the speaker draws in these so-called introductory remarks is: We are not only defending ourselves in this war, we are defending the rights of other nations. We cannot watch our brother nation Iraq having its right to freedom, humanity and unity threatened by Zionism and still have peace of mind. Our combatants must continue the fight until Saddam's final downfall and the esteemed nation of Iraq is liberated.

It is evident that the discussion no longer concerns defense against invasion. Instead intervention in the affairs of other nations under the rubric "divine responsibility" has become the motivation for war and bloodshed. Tomorrow they can use the same pretext to attack Afghanistan, or they can call threats to the use of the woman's veil in Turkey a violation of "unity", and they can continue the "defensive crusade" to "eliminate the nuisance from the world."

He says: In Islam jihad means defense, and is completely legal. Wherever a right is violated we must stand against the aggressors to the limit of our ability and resources. The only hope for the world's deprived and oppressed people is this tempestuous movement by you, the nation. The only hope for the deprived of the world is Iran. Only you, the nation, are an example and model. God has shown favor to you and given you a mission; he has placed the burden of liberating the nations on your shoulders. This nation must understand this honor, and must strive with all its power to liberate the nations. In other words: War, war until all signs of Iran and everything Iranian are destroyed!

Another question is, with what enemy are our people at war? If the enemy is only the present regime of Iraq, there is hope of the war ending in any case. However, as long as they shout that this war is a war with imperialism, atheism, world polytheism, the superpowers, and the so-called "enemies of Islam," what it means is that the war must continue until resurrection day, because even if Saddam is overthrown, "world imperialism" will still exist, as will what they are calling "atheism and polytheism." The leaders of the Islamic republic do not try very hard to conceal their diseased objectives, and they say openly that the war must continue until the banner "There is No God but God" flies all over the world. The slogan "perpetual war until Mehdi's revolution" is a part of the ideology of the leaders of the Islamic republic, and their goal is to make Muslims of all the people of the world by "putting fear into the hearts of enemies" and exporting the revolution.

The bloody and devastating Iran-Iraq war is useless, futile and aimless. It benefits only international imperialism and reaction, and it damages the people of Iran and Iraq, all the people of the area, and world peace.

9310

CSO: 4640/0102

SHAH'S SON, FORMER PREMIERS SEND NOWRUZ MESSAGES

Reza's Message

London KEYHAN in Persian 19 Mar 87 pp 1,3

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] Reza Shah II, sovereign of Iran, stressed in his Nowruz message that the first and basic steps have been taken for the fulfillment of the responsibility that is the desire and the expectation of the people of Iran. He said that in another message he will soon give details to the people of Iran on his efforts to more decisively fulfill the responsibility to continue the fight.

Iran's Monarch's Nowruz message for the year 1366 [21 March 1987 - 20 March 1988] appears below.

My dear compatriots:

Another bitter and inauspicious year has passed for Iran, another year in which there has been no sign of the springtime of life and freedom, and not a trace of a life of peace and tranquility. It was a year of winter and fall from beginning to end, and the coldness of death and affliction went unrestrained throughout the pure soil of Iran.

A year has passed for Iran in which, for the eighth time, the pseudo-clerical usurpers have offered the noble nation of Iran nothing but war, fratricide, floggings, torture, terror, suppression, lies and hypocrisy.

Once again the birds of terror have dropped the fire of death from the skies of Iran, leaving sadness and grief. Once again the brave children of Iran, the youth and infants of Iran, have given up their dear lives by the thousands in the swamps and deserts of a foreign land. However the blood of these dear ones was not sacrificed defending the integrity of the motherland, nor in the defense of the independence and freedom of the people of Iran. Their blood was the price of the desires of the usurper regime, which will stop at nothing to conceal its own historic corruption, and which disregards all of Iran's interests.

During the last year the name of Iran and its government was again discussed by the people of the world, but only when the subject was assassination and extortion, the extensive and merciless violation of human rights, the most savage war in the contemporary history of the world, or corrupt dealings with greedy arms profiteers.

Last year the wheels of the country's industrial and agricultural production turned more slowly than ever, and in their place corruption, bribery and black marketeering were stronger than ever. The mosque and the altar were not places of mystery, need and prayer in the presence of the Almighty, but remained a place for materialistic profiteering, with continued illegal intrusions everywhere in clerical costume, even in the most private areas of the lives of the people of Iran.

Finally, in the last year nature was not kind to our afflicted nation, and the disasters of floods and earthquakes made vagrancy and homelessness even more extensive than it was.

My dear compatriots:

Although I am still not among you, know that I consider myself your partner in all the hardships and difficulties you have endured in this dark year. I know that today as the new year begins you are in the most difficult conditions of life, but I also know that you have not given up your will to remain steadfast or your hope for Iran's future. Just as the proud soldiers of Iran distinguished themselves thousands of times yesterday by defending the motherland and the nation by driving out the foreign aggressor, I know that today also thousands of patriots are continuing the struggle and are sacrificing themselves to defeat the traitor domestic enemy to regain their freedom, honor and dignity.

My steadfast compatriots:

Your kind and affectionate messages and your affirmation and support which reach me through various channels have delighted me and filled my heart with emotion and gratitude. I have not forgotten your demands and expectations for a moment. The day I followed my conscience and took on the responsibility of the monarchy by the decree of history and under Constitutional law, I was aware of and heartened by your support. Today also your support is my most important weapon. It is the most valuable capital that heartens me to continue the fight with the enemies of Iran and to fulfill as decisively as possible this responsibility I carry upon my shoulders on this sacred path. You must know that I have taken the first and most basic steps to fulfill the responsibility which is your demand and expectation. With the help of my brave and combative compatriots in Iran, and utilizing the capabilities and resources of fervent combative and patriotic Iranians everywhere in the world, I will take steps to expand units and to acquire resources which will prepare and equip me better than ever to reach the final stage of the battle alongside the nation. In another message I will soon give you, my dear compatriots, the details.

My dear compatriots:

This year the new year dawned concurrently with the first day of the week. Our forefathers have long considered it a sign of good fortune when a new year, a new month, a new week and a new day begin together on New Year's Day. I also consider such an event a sign of good fortune, and on this auspicious beginning my message to my honorable, proud, oppressed and steadfast compatriots is that you must never lose your will and your hope in the fight against the satanic enemies of Iran, and you must know that the God of Iran is with us. You must know that if we are united in a common cause and free of separations, and if we think only of Iran and do not lose any opportunity to close our ranks and weaken the enemy, victory will come to that nation and the lifetime of dark days and the inauspicious years will come to an end.

May God be Iran's protector.

Amini's Message

London KEYHAN in Persian 19 Mar 87 pp 1, 3

[London KEYHAN weekly in persian; founder and publisher Dr. Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] Dr Ali Amini, coordinator of the Iran Liberation Front, gave the good news in his Nowruz message that the Iranian nation will put the storm of events behind it and that it will establish a government of law.

He expressed the hope that the year 1366 [21 March 1987 - 20 March 1988] will be a year of victory for the Iranian nation.

The text of Dr Amini's message follows below.

My dear compatriots:

I congratulate you on the arrival of the new year at a time when I know that the majority of my dear compatriots are unfortunately either mourning lost loved ones, uninformed and anxious about the welfare of children and brothers who have gone to the fronts or are in prisons, or have lost their homes and families to merciless enemy bombings. However for centuries, even in the worst of times, our Iranian forefathers have celebrated Nowruz, this holiday of renewal of the life of nature and the beginning of the life of the earth and the plants and the trees, and congratulated each other. They have acted in concert with nature as it awoke from its winter sleep and torpor, going to visit one another, strengthening the ties of peace and friendship in order to help one another begin a new life free off the sadness and afflictions of the previous year. One of the most important historical and cultural elements which have preserved the solidarity of the Iranian nation for centuries is this very series of common national rites. We have not forgotten the first Nowruz when a handful of prejudiced and ignorant people took over our country and they spoke of banning Nowruz, which they were unable to do. Although they were able to kill thousands and thousands of youth or to send them to their deaths in an endless war, and they have desecrated prosperous cities and spread famine, high prices, unemployment, homelessness and corruption, they have not been and able and will not be able to sever the national, cultural and historic ties of the Iranian nation. The Iranian nation is alive, and once again it will put the storm of events behind it and remain alive. It will obtain security, freedom, independence, and the rule of law. Security and political and social independence are only possible when economic independence and financial security are obtained and the pointless war, factionalism and fratricide created by this government are ended. You can see how they have trampled security and economic, political and social independence. I am confident, I have always said and I say again that the Iranian nation will conquer the demon of despotism by relying on its own power, and it will realize its hopes for freedom, independence, security, peace and the rule of law. I hope that this year will be a year of triumph for the Iranian nation. Long live Iran and the Iranian nation.

Bakhtiar's Message

London KEYHAN in Persian 19 Mar 87 pp 1, 3

[London KEYHAN weekly in persian; founder and publisher Dr. Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] Dr Shapur Bakhtiar, leader of the National Resistance Front, announced in his Nowruz message that he will not rest for a moment until a humane government based on national government and social justice is established.

Bakhtiar added: Today the Khomeini government continues its tremulous life in a more isolated and contemptuous way than ever, and its claims to stability and strength are simply boastful nonsense.

The text of Dr Bakhtiar's message is presented below.

My dear brothers and sisters:

Last year was a year of heavy burdens in terms of its unexpected events and the resultant political developments. Despite the heartfelt hopes of the Iranian nation for national freedom and an end to the Khomeini disaster, it did not happen, but the anti-Iranian regime of mullas undoubtedly came closer to its grave.

As you know, apart from the constant efforts we have made since the beginning of the Khomeyni government in Iran to reveal his character and the nature of his government, from the first days when terrorism and hostage-taking were imposed and became a common tool of international relations, we have given the world irrefutable documentation that the training and equipment of terrorists takes place in the shadow of Khomeyni's government of God and within the borders of the Islamic republic, and we have given special warnings, to countries against giving in to the demands of terrorists and extortionists, with mention of the evil consequences. Unfortunately men of government who should properly recognize their responsibilities with regard to this new and dangerous phenomenon, because of the failure to see reality or because of election considerations and other factors, have heedlessly embarked on this endless path. However, it was not long after they paid the enormous price for their weakness and naivete that their eyes opened to bitter reality, and they knew clearly that there is no way to come to terms with a government whose domestic power is based on strangulation and oppression and which uses terrorism and hostage-taking as a normal means of advancing its seditious aims beyond its borders.

Today the government of the mullas, apart from its great domestic difficulties caused by the war and its powerlessness to deal with a war-stricken society's economic and social problems, is more isolated and detested than ever internationally, so that even the leaders of the two or three ill-reputed countries who had spoken of unity and friendship with the Islamic republic because of the exigencies of the time and special interests have distanced themselves from it one after another to protect their positions.

Do not pay much attention to the messages from Mr Khomeyni and the leaders of the regime who impose radio and television on your eyes and ears by force. What these messages contain more of than anything else, repeated to excess, is the boast of the regime's stability and strength. Does a stable and strong regime need all this repeated affirmation? I do not think it necessary to tell you, the intelligent nation of Iran, that the purpose of all this insistence and importunity is on the one hand to bolster the morale of the government's people who see the foundation of their power shaking in the face of a mountain of difficulties and the steadfast resistance of most of the people. On the other hand, the aim is to weaken your morale, so that you will lose hope of victory and stop your fighting and resistance.

My dear compatriots:

In these moments as you begin another year in the midst of the roar of cannons and with the constant terror and anxiety of bombings, I feel closer to you than ever. There is never a moment when I am not thinking of you and your pain and suffering, and searching for a way to alleviate them. I want to recommend to you that you begin the year with a firm resolve to fight the war,

³ and remember that the war is the life of the regime. To fight the war is to fight the hellish regime of the mullas. Throughout these years when hundreds of thousands of Iranian youth have been slaughtered in a foreign land and our thriving cities have been wasted, Mr Khomeyni and his henchmen have repeated many times that the war is a blessing. I will pass over the blessings from the abuses by the regime's corrupt insiders in their arms smuggling deals, for their secrets will be revealed in time. The main blessing is the survival of the regime, which is one of the blessings of the war. It is a blessing for those whose government has continued because of the blessing of the war. It is the blessing of power for them and fire, blood, the mourning of loved ones, famine and unemployment for you. Let us take the blessings of the war away from them with strength of will and decision and put out the lamp of their sinister existence.

I especially call upon you not to allow the ruling mullas to take from you the weapon of hope and faith in a bright future, weakening your resolve to fight. They are nothing in the face of your will. The best indication of the regime's weakness in the face of the nation's demands is the endurance of the ancient tradition of Nowruz. Look to your own memory and recall how in the beginning, when the war did not exist as an excuse, the ruling mullas spent all their efforts trying to weaken and denigrate Nowruz and prevent you from honoring this ancient national tradition. They called it a holiday for infidels, foreigners and fire worshippers. In the face of your will and firm resolve to preserve national customs, however, they retreated in disgrace, and today Khomeyni and the leaders of his government themselves send you messages on Nowruz, although they do so without mentioning the name Nowruz and in the name of the beginning of another spring of revolution.

I assure you that the abominable life of the Islamic republic is ending. Take heart and remind your children that throughout history the Iranian nation has weathered many storms, and every time it has lifted its head from the depths of the dark night and the cold winter like a bright Nowruz.

Help us in this struggle which is nearing its final stages, and remember that while we know that the readiness of today's international environment will have an effect on our success, we are not pinning our hopes of saving our country on the generosity of foreigners, and remember that we have never allowed ourselves to hesitate in the fight against this anti-Iranian regime, not when Khomeyni allowed traffic in arms smuggling at the expense of the regime's power and credibility and at great expense to himself, and not today when the world has opened its eyes to reality and an international mobilization to combat terrorist-sponsoring governments is about to begin. We will not rest for a moment until results are achieved, meaning the liberation of Iran, the healing of wounds, the restoration of the losses brought by the government of mullas, and the establishment of a humane regime based on national rule and social justice.

May our Nowruz be victorious. Iran will never die. New Year's day, 1366 [21 March 1987].

9310

CSO: 4640/0096

GENDARMERIE CHIEF DISCUSSES PROJECTS AGAINST SMUGGLERS

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 16 Feb 87 p 2

[Interview with Col Mohammad Sohrabi, gendarmerie chief; date and place not given]

[Text] Economic Service—Colonel Mohammad Sohrabi, commander of our nation's gendarmerie, gave an exclusive interview in which he answered our correspondent's questions concerning the gendarmerie's presence and active role in the imposed war, the anti-narcotics smuggling campaign, the control of the nation's borders, and this force's future plans for the expansion and construction of posts. The text of this interview follows below.

ETTELA'AT: How do you assess the role of the gendarmerie in the imposed war?

Colonel Sohrabi: In the classic war against infidel Saddam and the imperialist mercenaries, the gendarmerie has been present and participated actively, in coordination with other groups and beside the brothers of the army, the revolutionary guards, the mobilization and other popular forces. The gendarmerie is proud to have given the first martyrs to the Islamic revolution while carrying out its border patrol responsibilities. Even now our units are continuing their sacred and lawful defense against Saddam's nondescript forces alongside the units of the army and the revolutionary guards. The gendarmerie is also proud to have carried most of the load in the provinces of Kordestan and West Azarbaijan in the clashes and combat against the hostile and atheist mini-groups. In all parts of the country where there is a struggle against narcotics smugglers, our dear ones have exerted themselves to destroy the international bands of narcotics smugglers, shoulder-to-shoulder with the brothers of the Islamic revolutionary komitehs, and the course of events will lead to the destruction of the bands of narcotics smugglers throughout the country.

On the other hand, while the gendarmerie is fulfilling its assigned responsibilities behind the lines, it is proud that half of its forces are being deployed at the fronts and in the operational areas, and every program and plan being made for this force's future is based on the importance of the war and with consideration for the Imam of the nation's statement, "The war has priority over all issues."

Likewise, a seminar is planned in the martyr-nurturing and holy city of Mashhad to promote further achievements as well as to assess and evaluate the efforts of the past year. The seminar will be attended by the commanders of districts, independent regiments and gendarmerie training centers as well as by the chiefs of the ideological and political circles and councils of these units throughout the country. The seminar will be held at the court of His Holiness Samen ol-A'imeh (Peace Be Upon Him). We hope that through comprehensive analysis of its programs the Gendarmerie of the Islamic Republic of Iran will be able to fulfill its responsibilities in the best way possible.

ETTELA'AT: Gendarmerie agents recently won in clashes with narcotics sinugglers in the eastern part of the country. What items were confiscated during these clashes?

Colonel Sohrabi: During the current year gendarmerie anti-narcotics agents have confiscated a total of almost 14 tons of opiates, including opium, burnt opium residue and hashish and a total of 710 kilograms of heroin from 5,045 suspects and turned them over to the appropriate authorities. During these clashes a number of our best dear ones were martyred. Other miscellaneous gendarmerie confiscations in the area of customs and tobacco products include more than 4,500,000 packages of foreign cigarettes, large quantities of clothing, tea, various electrical appliances, watches, and a large quantity of gold coins.

Our most important find was 2.427 valuable hand-woven Iranian carpets which currency brokers were planning to export, but they were arrested by agents before doing so. In the same connection close to 59 kilograms of gold were also found. A total of 9,034 suspects have been arrested this year. New plans are being implemented in the struggle against insurgents and smugglers. It is worth mentioning that no matter how complex the methods of the smugglers become, we stop their operations with the necessary plans.

ETTELA'AT: Could you discuss the measures the gendarmerie has taken to control the borders?

Colonel Sohrabi: Concerning border control, the appropriate steps have been taken in view of what the Majlis has said about this important matter. They include road building, outpost construction, the establishment of battalion complexes, and other things. From a physical point of view, our units, in cooperation with other organizations, are more alert and aware than ever in order to give the most decisive response possible to any aggression from any direction by any aggressor. Concerning the military service obligation, it is also worth mentioning that this year, compared to 1356 [21 March 1977 - 20 March 1978], we have tripled the number of personnel we have sent to the revolutionary organizations and the army. It is also worth mentioning that we sent twice as many people this year as we did last year.

ETTELA'AT: What measures have been taken to expand and build gendarmerie highway patrol stations?

Colonel Sohrabi: Nine highway patrol stations have been planned for the current year, seven of which have been opened and activated. Two others will be opened in the deprived south, in Khorasan and Kordestan, concurrent with the anniversary of the triumph of the Islamic revolution on the ninth day of the springtime of freedom [29 March 1987]. No small number of other necessary outposts are being rebuilt throughout the country to carry out their assigned responsibilities. We hope that with the maximum expansion of our units throughout the country and with the utilization of believing and skilled forces we will be able to pay our debt to Islam and the Islamic nation.

ETTELA'AT: What measures have been taken to achieve security in the urban precincts and to fight theft?

Colonel Sohrabi: The gendarmerie is now fulfilling its responsibilities on the outskirts of most of the major cities, including Tehran, which was outside this organization's sphere of responsibility and was considered the responsibility of the sheriff's department. However, so long as our brothers in the sheriff's department are not ready to accept these responsibilities, the gendarmerie will continue to fulfill them with existing resources and with the necessary reinforcements. For example, in the current year our agents have discovered and thwarted 3,520 petty thefts and 119 armed robberies. Our total confiscations in domestic and customs goods is valued at 60 billion rials, with 350 million rials of it in foreign currencies.

CLANDESTINE RADIO REVEALS SECRET BANK ACCOUNTS

TA081832 (Clandestine) Voice of the Kavyani Banner in Persian 1630 GMT
8 Apr 87

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, please pay attention to this revealing report: Hashemi-Rafsanjani's account number in the Union Bank of Switzerland is: 322/3870390H. Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni's account number in Germany's Dresdner Bank, Dusseldorf branch, is: 8-452-797-00. Moreover, Ahmad Khomeyni has another secret account in Federal Germany's (Spartak) Bank, the number of which is: 22-7002592.

The account number of Mohammad Gharazi in Union Bank of Switzerland is: DS452/84200H. Hojjat ol-Eslam Nateq-Nuri has a secret account in Britain's Midland Bank, London branch, the number of which is: 809577/PLC/833222187. Mohammad Hoseyn Ha'eri has an account in Germany's (Spartak) Bank, Hamburg branch, the number of which is: 1227-839210.

Dear listeners, on the basis of information we have received from reliable sources, Hashemi-Rafsanjani opened his account in the Union Bank of Switzerland in 1981 and has so far deposited hundreds of millions of dollars in his account. It is worth noting that the latest amount deposited in Rafsanjani's account in the Union Bank of Switzerland was \$6 million, which U.S. agents deposited as commission for the purchase of arms.

So far the identity of Mohammad Hoseyn Ha'eri has not been determined, and no one knows who this person is or what post he occupies in the Islamic Republic's ruling circle. According to information we have received to date, it is possible that this name is a front, enabling one or a number of the mullahs in the ruling circle to open secret bank accounts.

/12624
CSO: 4600/194

BRIEFS

GUNNING DOWN OF PROTESTORS--In recent days the armed guards of the mullah's regime, through firing at demonstrators opposed to the Islamic Republic in five Iranian cities, killed and wounded a number of these freedom-seeking strugglers. According to informed sources, during the past few days the cities of Tehran, Tabriz, Mashhad, Kermanshah, and Hamdan witnessed anti-islamic Republic demonstrations. Elements of the guards corps who came to the location of the demonstrations to disperse the crowds, cruelly gunned down the opponents of Khomeyni's regime and killed a number of people. On the basis of these same reports, a large number of our compatriots were wounded in these five cities as a result of the savage acts of the Islamic Regime's agents. [Text] [(Clandestine) Voice of the Kavyani Banner in Persian 1630 GMT 9 Apr 87 TA] /12624

IRANIANS SET UP SUICIDE SQUADRON--The Iranian Air Force has set up a suicide squadron modelled on Japanese kamikazi units of World War II, writes Farzad Bazoft. Pilots have been recruited from the revolutionary guards and trained to fly small Chinese planes converted into flying bombs. They are based at the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas and may attack shipping in the Gulf. Existence of the kamikaze squadron was revealed by five Iranian air force colonels who defected in London in February. They were in Britain to hold secret talks with the Ministry of Defence's arms sales company, International Military Services. Three have been granted asylum in the United States and two have fled to Spain. The defectors were led by a former deputy commander of Iran's air force, Colonel 'Abbas Abedini. IMS last week denied any knowledge of the secret arms-buying trip. [Text] [London THE OBSERVER in English 5 Apr 87 p 15 LD] /12624

IRAN, CHINA DISCUSS AGRICULTURE TIES--Beijing, 8 Apr (IRNA)--Ways to expand Tehran-Beijing economic relations especially in bilateral agricultural ties were discussed in a meeting between Iranian ambassador Ala'eddin Broujerdi and Chinese agriculture minister here Wednesday. Broujerdi outlined Iran's views on ways to expand mutual relations and cooperation in the fields of farming, live-stock breeding and fisheries. The Chinese minister expressed satisfaction over the pace of the expansion of Tehran-Beijing relations and said his country is keen on cooperating with Iran in the agricultural area, especially in the cultivation of corns. He expressed hope that China would establish wide-ranging cooperation with Iran. Among other topics discussed during the meeting, was the impending trip of Iran's construction jihad minister Bijan Namdar-Zangeneh to that country. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1153 GMT 8 Apr 87 LD] /12624

IRANIAN KURDISH LEADER KILLED--Ceylanpinar (UBA)--The leader of the military wing of the Iranian Kurds, Mohammad Amin Ghafur, has been killed. According to the clandestine Voice of Iranian Kurdistan he was killed by special teams affiliated with Khomeyni. Ghafur, who was 47 years old, was received by Khomeyni in Tehran some time ago. He is reported to have rejected a request from Khomeyni for approximately 2,500 of his peshmergas to fight at the fronts with Iraq. Khomeyni promised land to the Kurds in Iran and Iraq in return for the 2,500 peshmergas. Well-informed sources state that after the meeting between Khomeyni and Ghafur the latter informed the Iranian leader the Kurds did not want any land in Iraq; they wanted only to set up an independent state in their own regions. [Text] [Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 2 Apr 87 p 3 NC] /12624

CSO: 4600/194

PEOPLE'S PARTY, JAMAAT-E ISLAMI COOPERATION SAID INEVITABLE

Karachi JANG (Supplement) in Urdu 4 Mar 87 p 4

[Analysis by Faruq Puacha]

[Text] Ever since a People's Party official addressed Jami'at-e Tulaba an Islamic student gathering a guessing game has started in different political circles. Leftist thinking parties in the MRD have severely criticised this "unbecoming action" on the part of the People's Party.

The People's Party itself seemed to be apologetic over its action. Its leader stated in clarification that although there were differences of opinion between the People's Party and the Jamaat-e Islami, the topic regarding which opinion was expressed in this Jami'at meeting was the common problem facing students throughout the country. Moreover, the deputy chief of Jamaat-e Islami, Professor Ghafoor, has said that if necessary the Jamaat will co-operate with the People's Party. Far Eastern Economic Review, a Hong Kong periodical has expressed the hopeful view in a recent article that there existed a possibility of full co-operation between the Jamaat and the People's Party in the future. This report goes on to state that the PPP's popularity and the Jamaat's organisational discipline could force the present regime to have elections before 1990, and therefore it was possible that the government would put obstructions in the path of the Jamaat and the People's Party getting together because their unity could cause its disintegration.

During the past few months both the PPP's and the Jamaat-e Islami's guns trained on each other are silent; instead there is talk of co-operation from both sides. Certain circles in the People's Party are totally against this co-operation. Their argument is that the Jamaat-e Islami was not only in the forefront to bring the downfall of the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto but was also responsible, to a great extent, for his journey to the gallows. They also say that this party joined the martial law government only to reap the reward for overthrowing Bhutto.

But the contention of those among PPP circles who are in favor of co-operation is that the Jamaat-e Islami was not alone in helping to overthrow Bhutto. There were some other "hidden" hands who today stand shoulder to shoulder with the People's Party in the MRD. If these people can stand up along with the PPP against the present regime, why should we discriminate against the

Jamat and not take advantage of its efficient organisation. These circles further argue that today the leftist parties in the MRD tend to ignore Jamaat-e Islami as a conservative religious party, but during the PNA [Pakistan National Alliance] movement the same leftist parties joined hands with the Jamaat to spearhead the effort to dislodge Bhutto. If these parties had no objection then to aligning themselves with the Jamaat, why do they now look at JI-PPP co-operation with disfavor?

The head of Tehrik-e Istiqlal, Mr. Asghar Khan, during the PNA agitation, used to threaten openly to 'hang Bhutto and his cronies upside down trees, but even he was in the MRD for a while. If no one objected to his being in the MRD, why is there so much fuss over the Jamaat's co-operation with the PPP? After the downfall of Mr. Bhutto and his arrest, the journalists and newspaper men in a nationwide movement offered themselves for arrest. A few of them were even flogged by the military courts. During this period a delegation of reporters met the leader of a leftist party and requested him to make a statement in support of the journalists. He refused to do that on the grounds that this movement by the media men was not to free the press but to free Bhutto. Doesn't his express desire to keep Bhutto in jail point out the fact that at that time it was the main objective of every political party to remove this great and intelligent leader of the country from the political horizon? There was no difference then in the thinking of the left or the right because they knew that during the life of Mr. Bhutto neither of them could ever rise. But even after the death of Mr. Bhutto they have failed to make any inroads into the hearts of the masses and have worn themselves out trying to chase the goddess of power.

The subject of cooperation between the PPP and the Jamaat-e Islami came into the limelight when women belonging to both parties demonstrated the same day in front of the Sind Assembly building. Some political circles are of the opinion that this demonstration, on the same day and at the same time, was not just a coincidence but was planned and was agreed upon earlier. Why did the PPP and the Jamaat-e Islami feel the need for this cooperation? Political observers are of the opinion that the Jamaat's prestige and reputation suffered in the eyes of the masses because of its association with the government. In addition, in the refugee areas where the Jamaat was quite popular, its position has been weakened after the formation of M.Q.M. [Muhajir Qaumi Movement]. On the other hand the PPP, after trying a couple of times to start an agitation against the government, has realized that in spite of its popularity it could not mobilize the masses. Therefore, whereas the Jamaat needs the masses, the PPP needs its discipline. The Jamaat wants to get rid of the stigma of aiding the government--its leaders have realized that by siding with the government they have lost much and have gained nothing. The People's Party on the other hand is highly aware of the fact that without organization discipline they cannot do the slightest damage to the regime. Hence the situation is such that the People's Party and the Jamaat-e Islami have become interdependent.

According to a young official of the PPP, a rapport had existed between the Jamaat and the People's Party at a lower level for some time now, and there are plenty of possibilities of a rapport very soon at a higher level too.

According to some informed sources, if a formal declaration of co-operation comes about it will break up the MRD because the leftist parties in it will separate and in that event emergence of a new political unity will become unavoidable. But the question arises whether the People's Party, by joining with the rightist and conservative parties, will be able to maintain the label of a progressive party also. In answering this question a leader of the PPP said: "Our objective is to ask for immediate elections and for that even if we have to sit with our enemies we shall do so. During the agitation against Mr. Bhutto, both the leftist and the rightist parties had joined hands and it did not effect their conservatism or their progressive thinking. How can this alliance now effect ours?". According to this leader it was a hypothetical assumption that after a PPP alliance with the Jamaat-e Islami, MRD will break up. He maintained that one or two parties might break away but it was impossible that the alliance will come unstuck completely because the People's Party will not take any step without mutual consultations with all parties in the MRD.

13333/7687

CSO: 4656/63

PAKISTAN

BRIEFS

NETHERLANDS GRANT--Netherlands is to provide a grant of over \$23 million and a soft loan of more than \$4 million to Pakistan for development projects this year. The projects include Digh area development plan, Malakand-Balochistan minor irrigation, Agha Khan rural support program, and watershed management projects in Digh and Swat. [Text] [Karachi Overseas Service in English 0800 GMT 1 Apr 87 BK] /12624

CSO: 4600/192

GOVERNMENT FACES WORST ECONOMIC CRISIS SINCE 1977

Colombo SUN in English 25 Feb 87 p 8

[Text]

The Sri Lankan Government of President J. R. Jayewardene is presently facing its most crucial crisis on the economic front since assuming office, a group of international economists have reported to government.

According to this group, developments in 1986 showed that Sri Lanka was in bad shape in comparison to the marked achievements that were achieved in the post-1977 years.

RISING

Un-employment is reported to be rising, and in 1986 it stood at 16 per cent. This indicated a rise from 10 per cent the previous year. The growth rate anticipated is likely to be less than 3 per cent when in the recent years it has been in the region of 5 per cent.

According to the findings, Sri Lanka's debt service ratio is as high as 30 per cent of export earnings and one of the reasons they have attributed for this high figure has been the free mis-use of commercial borrowing facilities by government agencies in the recent past.

CULPRITS

Sources told **IN THE CITY** that one of the main culprits in the extensive use of com-

mercial borrowing has been the national carrier Airlanka which freely engaged in treasury backed loans at high interest rates from several international banks.

The study of the economy has shown that defence expenditure has risen but the windfall revenue from the drop in prices in the world market of essential commodities such as oil, sugar, wheat, rice etc., have more than adequately compensated for this defence expenditure.

Government sources say that these economists have referred to the Government's fiscal policies as a 'high risk balancing act', and that politically the Government seems reluctant to tackle the economic problems if they are to have adverse effects politically particularly if elections are due.

SLIPPED

Sources added that it has been observed that the economy has slipped in 1986, and that certain remedial measures may have to be taken early unless the Government is forced to bring in more controls at a subsequent stage closer to elections.

In a bid to alleviate colossal losses made by state corporations, the Government of Sri Lanka is presently drawing up measures to privatise several loss making public ventures.

Falling prices from Sri Lanka's primary export commodities have also contributed to the dismal performance of the economy for 1986. Tea prices which plummeted in 1986 cost the state some Rs. 2,000 million in lost revenue.

It is estimated that Defence Expenditure is going to rise in 1987 to an alltime record of 5 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product when prior to the outbreak of violence it had been at only one per cent.

BLAME

Government sources told 'IN THE CITY' that the Ministry of Finance and Planning has already addressed their minds to several of these aspects, but blames the Ministry for its inability to push effective reforms. Part of this blame also lies with other Government agencies which oppose Finance and Planning Ministry proposals, these sources added.

Several lending agencies are studying Sri Lanka's economic performance and remedial measures that are necessary to put it back on its feet. New areas for development are being studied, these sources added.

DISCUSSIONS

World Bank Vice-President Dr. David Hopper who was in Sri Lanka recently had wide-ranging discussions with President Jayewardene and Finance Minister de Mel on new areas of development as well as remedial measures that might be adopted by Government.

A team of economists from the International Monetary Fund as well as other donor countries that are due to meet at the Sri Lanka Aid Consortium meeting in June this year are also presently reviewing the Sri Lankan economy at present prior to making their final observations.

/9317

CSO: 4600/198

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

18 July 1987